Articles by " Anthony Bergin"

Data retention: who should pay for our national security?

Who should pay for national security?

The data-retention debate has been dominated by discussions over the extent to which metadata information retention is an essential tool for investigating terrorism and crime, what agencies should be able to access it, and the safeguards that should exist for privacy.

A neglected issue is who bears the costs of implementing the means to safeguard national security: do we ask telcos and internet service providers to find the money to retain metadata, or should government bear the full responsibility and foot what could be a significant bill? ISPs have been vocal about the costs that storing metadata will have on their businesses in what might be an open-ended commitment.

Generally speaking, the principle that has been adopted is that the users, providers and owners of the property or service pay for the costs of security: in other words, security is a cost of doing business in a risky world.

In that sense, ISPs and telcos are no different from other essential services and critical national infrastructure, like electricity and water companies, that have had to shoulder the responsibilities for the costs of securing their own assets.

One alternative is for the public to pay, through taxation.

The argument is one that involves issues of equity, efficiency and effectiveness. If the government subsidises data retention as part of its counter-terrorist measures, it may waste money and create a bidding contest amongst companies seeking counter-terrorism funding support. Self- reliance can provide incentives for companies to innovate in their counter-terrorism protection.

But we can’t leave all our counter–terrorism efforts to be managed solely by market forces. That approach won’t always offer adequate protection across the community. Certain threats such as chemical and biological attacks, for example, require a response with specialist equipment, which would be difficult to achieve without direct government intervention.

Lack of adequate information to price the risks associated with terrorism resulted in a market failure in insurance in this country, and prompted the government some years ago to establish the Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation to provide reinsurance cover for losses arising from a declared terrorist incident.

When it comes to who pays for data storage, the benefits of any government intervention must be weighed against the downside of excessive cost.

Government intervention may do more harm than good in an innovative and rapidly-evolving market like data storage. If the government picked up the whole tab it could encourage gold-plating. In some cases, ISPs and telcos may well have undertaken the digital data storage required by government even in the absence of government covering the costs.

Government payment for data storage may provide a strong incentive for the telcos to classify changes to their data-storage practices as counter-terrorism measures to line up for the government payment. And as the Abbott government wrestles with budget deficit pressures, how fair would it be to ask all Australians to provide the telcos and ISPs with a large subsidy?

This argument was neatly and recently (paywalled) put by Henry Ergas in The Australian:

Retaining that data will, no doubt, force providers to incur some costs, but with data storage becoming ever cheaper, their extent is controversial. Unpopular as it may be, placing those costs on network operators gives operators strong incentives to use smart technologies to manage them efficiently. Yes, like any other regulation, the costs can be likened to a tax; but as virtually all Australians use communications networks, this tax would be levied on a broad and relatively efficient base, and one that largely matches the beneficiaries of better law enforcement.

For those reasons, I think the market has a critical role to play in data retention, but government intervention in some form shouldn’t be ruled out completely: the entire community will benefit from strengthened counter-terrorism and crime-investigative powers that a data-retention regime provides.

Maybe we need a hybrid model, where the government could pay let’s say a third of the costs, (at least for some of the smaller- and medium-sized providers). Such an allocation would need to be reviewed in a couple of years as the market for digital storage is changing quickly.

Since telocs and ISPs would pay the greater share of costs under such a model, it’s far less likely that we’ll get a gold-plated system: after all is said and done, it’s industry that’s best placed to minimise the costs for data retention.

Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user penguincakes.

Reader response: a parliamentary vote on military action?

House of Representatives Front BenchHeath Pickering argues that ‘in the interests of democratic scrutiny and ensuring that any intervention occurs with broad political support, RAAF air strikes in Iraq (and potentially Syria) must be supported by a parliamentary vote in both houses’.

He cites the precedent of the UK where David Cameron lost a non-binding parliamentary vote last year (285–272) to support a British intervention in Syria. Prime Minister Cameron wasn’t legally required to hold the vote, but chose to do so (to avoid a repeat of the country’s swift backing for the invasion of Iraq). No British government has previously lost a vote over matters of military involvement since at least the mid-19th century.

I’d support Heath’s call for greater information to be provided to parliament on decisions about defence deployments. That might include governments providing a statement to parliament outlining the basis of the decision and reporting on the progress of military operations. Read more

But I’d reject the idea of parliament voting on decisions to go to war. Governments need the capacity to react quickly to events. Sometimes they won’t be able to disclose all secret intelligence that supports a decision. Most critically, where the government of the day doesn’t have control of the Senate—now the norm in Australian politics—the executive would be hamstrung in acting, regardless of the political, diplomatic and military circumstances of a crisis. The current Ludlam bill would, if accepted, simply hamstring the government of the day to the whim of minor parties.

There’s also the practical issue of the time delay this will create in engaging personnel. That’s a big enough problem now for the ADF, without the added complication of having to get both houses involved, possibly out of session.

The bottom line is that in a two-chamber system any government that’s required to get the approval of both houses for overseas conflicts will simply be a hostage to fortune.

A one-chamber system might be workable if a vote on troop deployments was thought necessary. But we have that already in the House of Representatives, where members can change a government or the majority party can change a leader if they oppose a war strongly enough.

There’s also a fundamental question of ‘what’s a war?’ for the purposes of a vote. The US system is relevant here: the US Congress has ‘war powers’ but the president has authority to exercise right of self-defence which has seen several wars/armed conflicts launched by the president without any reliance on Congress.

In any event, it’s not clear who in Australia would decide when parliament is to have a say on troop commitments, nor define the precise circumstances that would count as a ‘war’.

By the way, even if we introduced a vote to go to war I don’t think it would make any practical difference to the actual outcome. I can’t think of a single example where it would have changed a decision on Australia’s commitment to send our troops to war.

Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user Alison Young.

Reader response: security vs civil liberties

PendulumMy colleague Tobias Feakin suggests that the discussion about any balance between security and civil liberties is inadequate for analysing counter-terrorism measures: it leads to ‘the establishment of rigid political positions which tend to overlook external perspectives—especially those of the public’.

Toby says that concepts of ‘balance’ have contributed to the widespread assumption that the relationship between the two can be considered as a ‘zero-sum’, and ‘that the balance model misunderstands the complexity of the relationship between security and civil liberties’.

I beg to disagree. The world is full of constraints: in a practical public policy sense, democratic governments will always need to balance national security objectives with civil liberties.

We can’t avoid the question of where the best point of balance lies because the two claims, both in law and policy, will always have some degree of tension between them. Read more

One claim won’t always defeat the other, so we do have to try and work out some balance (and this isn’t just a ‘splitting the difference’ exercise.)

It’s true that security and civil-liberties values and goals can sometimes both be maximised, but in practice it’s hard to think of cases where we won’t need to come to a judgment on where the balance lies.

Perhaps the most controversial recent example was the publication of the materials by Edward Snowden that raised basic questions about whether some security materials should be published.

I suggested in a recent op-ed on data retention that in making judgments on the balance here between security and privacy, there will be a need to adjust to the security situation we face at a particular time: we should permit a greater degree of tolerance for national security measures if the threat level goes up.

In striking the appropriate balance in our legal and policy measures for countering terrorism we should avoid excessive swings of the pendulum. (But there’s no doubt the pendulum’s swing will change over time.)

We must always compare the gains we make in national security benefits against any real harm done to our civil liberties.

Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user Shannon Kokoska.

A new wave for Foreign Affairs?

A new wave in Foreign Affairs?

In the Indo-Pacific, there are enormous challenges in oceans management. Last November, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, chaired by Australia, recognised that fact by issuing a formal declaration on the principles for peaceful, productive and sustainable use of the Indian Ocean and its resources. The Pacific Islands Forum that recently concluded also issued the the Palau Declaration, The Ocean: Life & Future ‘Charting a Course to Sustainability.

Australia’s a three-ocean country: the Pacific, the Southern Ocean, and the Indian Ocean. We have the largest area of maritime jurisdiction in the Indo-Pacific region. Our security largely depends on maintaining good relations with our archipelagic and island neighbours. Maritime and oceanic issues should be a key element in these relations. Read more

Some of our archipelagic neighbours have large EEZs, including several Pacific island countries with EEZs of over 1 million square kilometres. The economic potential of their maritime zones is mostly unrealised. However, a notable exception is the importance of coastal and oceanic fisheries (see also here), especially for tuna. East African and Indian Ocean island countries also have significant marine resources that aren’t providing full economic benefits to them at present. (chapter 7)

With Australia’s recognised good-standing in managing the marine environment and resources, oceans affairs should be a central plank in our broader political relations, particularly where our neighbours have populations with a high dependence on extensive maritime domains.

We need a greater focus in Australian foreign policy and aid on oceans management and development. That would reflect many of our economic, scientific, environmental, and strategic interests in the surrounding oceans and seas. In coordinating Australia’s maritime aid, there’s a need for a formal process through which those programs and our national interests can be addressed in a strategic manner. With the integration of AusAID into DFAT, the transformed Department can better align foreign, development, and trade policies and programs.

A more coordinated approach to oceans affairs is needed in our foreign and aid policies. The Department of the Environment has some responsibility for regional and international marine initiatives, as well as broader external sustainable development advice. It’s heavily involved in Antarctic and Southern Ocean issues. The Department of Agriculture has responsibility for regional fisheries engagement work. Foreign Affairs leads on international law of the sea issues.

Australia should have a capacity to align regional ocean management with our foreign policy objectives. Coming to grips with the new mandate to align aid with foreign policy objectives means Australia should now create a mechanism in DFAT like the US Government’s Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, located in the US State Department.

Creating an Office of Ocean Affairs would be instrumental in coordinating DFAT’s oceans expertise, as well as providing a focus for interdepartmental coordination. It’d be a positive step towards advancing our regional foreign and security policy objectives, as well as Australia’s aid program. Our assistance to regional countries in managing their marine zones and exploiting their marine resources contributes to their food security and economic development.

Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr Sunova Surfboards.

Necessary, but not sufficient: Australia’s new Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre

Money is All Powerful

While most of the attention on national security has focused on this Tuesday’s announcement of limited new counter-terrorism measures, last week’s news that a Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre is to be established within the Australian Federal Police has been overlooked. The Centre will evaluate serious fraud, foreign bribery and corruption complaints and refer them on to state-based investigation teams. They will also assist in training Commonwealth agencies in fraud prevention.

The Centre will have federal police working with officials from the Australian Taxation Office, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Department of Human Services, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Department of Defence, and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Importantly, the Centre will also leverage the intelligence capabilities of the Australian Crime Commission. The Centre will have out-posted officers in many state capital cities. Read more

Issues relating to national government integrity and anti-corruption go directly to the public interest: to see money used to the public’s best interests, to ensure transparency and accountability, and to retain a high level of trust in public decision-making. A national anti-corruption plan prepared by the previous Labor government last year stated: ‘Corrupt practices have the potential to undermine Australia’s reputation for high standards of governance, robust law and justice institutions, equitable delivery of services, democratic and electoral accountability, and transparent and fair markets.’ But the national ability to prosecute such complex cases like corruption and fraud has attracted criticism in the past.

While Australia’s ranked by Transparency International as one of the world’s least corrupt countries, it’s naive to assume that federal politicians, ministerial advisers, former politicians, lobbyists, and members of Commonwealth departments or agencies are immune to the temptations of corruption. (Indeed, more than 100 allegations are being made each month of crime, corruption or serious incompetence by Commonwealth government officials under new whistle blower protections laws.) The same point applies to large corporates, where the stakes are high and their behaviours are cloistered far from the scrutiny of state anti-corruption bodies.

No government can afford complacency when it comes to fighting corruption. There’ll always be those who seek to influence public-sector decision-making for personal gain. At the national level in recent years we’ve seen scandals such as the AWB and the UN’s oil-for-food program and the bribery scandal that rocked the Reserve Bank. While there are various state mechanisms in place, like the NSW Independent Commission on Corruption, we’ve had a blind spot when it comes to establishing an anti-corruption body at the national level.

Instead, the responsibility for reporting corrupt or inappropriate activity has rested with various parliamentary inquiries, investigative journalists and whistle blowers. The Commonwealth Ombudsman’s office is one of administrative review and oversight, rather than corruption investigation. The Australian Commission on Law Enforcement Integrity provides scrutiny of six federal law-enforcement agencies, but it excludes companies and has few investigators. The corporate watchdog, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, doesn’t have jurisdiction in relation to foreign bribery, although it’s prepared to run civil proceedings alongside the AFP’s criminal ones.

This new Centre is a welcome step. It follows an increasing trend for government departments to work closely together in the law-enforcement space, which has included focused task forces, the Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability, and the National Anti-Gangs Squad initiatives. It will pool resources and expertise, always important in highly technical areas such as these. And placing it within the AFP likely increases the chances of effective collaboration with the Criminal Assets Confiscation Task Force. This task force itself should receive a boost once the Commonwealth government’s legislation on unexplained wealth is put into operation.

So while the creation of the new federal Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre is a positive development, it will need to be properly resourced and linked to other efforts. On the first point, there’s cause for concern: while other areas of national security expenditure are set to expand, the Commonwealth contribution to the AFP’s budget in four years time will likely be about 16 per cent smaller than it is now.

Effective cooperation with existing, state-based anti-corruption bodies will also be essential. Establishing jurisdiction in those cases may be an issue for prosecutors, so close cooperation with the state governments and their police will be vital.

That last point’s especially important because the new Centre falls short of previous public calls for an independent federal anti-corruption agency that would have the potency of a Royal Commission and a full armoury of special powers: intercept, undercover operations, and surveillance.

Corruption by its nature is hidden and persistent. We need a Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre sufficiently resourced to go looking for it.

Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI. David Connery is a senior analyst at ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user Alan Light.

A stark warning on regional marine resources

Yellowfin tuna

This week, leaders at the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Palau received a clear warning on the state of the region’s fisheries.

Fisheries are one of the key issues on the minds of Pacific Island leaders: they’re keenly aware of the importance of this industry to their countries and the wider region. Indeed, Palau’s President Tommy Remengesau Jr. has declared the theme of this year’s forum to be ‘The Ocean: Life & Future’.

In an earlier post, I argued that effective management of the fish stocks in the Pacific is important for food security, healthy ocean ecosystems and livelihood security. I even suggested that, in many ways, sustainable fisheries help to underpin regional political stability. Read more

The head of Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, Glenn Hurry, pointed out yesterday at the Forum meeting that the total catch of the key tuna species is valued at around $US6 billion. From that, the income to Pacific island countries is estimated to be in the order of $350–400 million.

But Hurry noted that we don’t know the impacts of the last two years of fishing. So there remains a ‘level of uncertainty about what our world really looks like but indications are that catches have not reduced’. He warned that Pacific bigeye tuna is overfished and requires urgent management action and that yellowfin tuna is at 38% of the original stock biomass and requires stabilisation.

Regional leaders were told that there’s an urgent need to agree and implement a target reference point (i.e. where you’d like the fish-stock level to be to ensure the maximum and most profitable catch levels) for skipjack to retain the stock at optimal levels.

Island leaders were told there are simply too many boats in this fishery and more are coming in: ‘We must agree on arrangements to restrict fishing effort and boats to a more sustainable level and do it now and not tomorrow.’

There’s now 300 large-scale, purse seine vessels fishing in the tuna fishery, up from 225 vessels in 2004 and with 37 new purse seiners under construction in Asian ship yards. Seventeen will enter the regional fishery over the next 12–24 months.

One of the challenges here is that, as the Pacific tuna fishery becomes more valuable, it’ll become harder to manage as both the companies and the countries are profiting from both income and employment (working in processing plants, canneries, on vessels and in regional agencies). But the stark message to the Forum leaders this week was that if the region doesn’t adjust early then the pain will be greater later on.

Australia will need to play its part in assisting the island countries to manage their tuna stocks to provide the long-term sustainability of the fishery for future generations of Pacific Island people. That will require our long-term investment in the islands to enhance fisheries management and work with regional fisheries bodies in areas such as negotiating fisheries’ access arrangements.

We often fail to grasp here that retaining strong healthy Pacific fish stocks is critical for island income, investment, food security and generating some degree of economic hope for island peoples.

Regional leaders at the Forum were left in no doubt this week that the Pacific can’t continue to fish at current levels and expect the resource to last. The day the Pacific loses its fish, we’ll not only have food security issues on our doorstep, but significant adverse income and employment impacts on our neighbours. And if that happens it’ll most likely be Australia that picks up the tab.

Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user r36ariadne.

Pacific maritime security—from quad to hexagon

Solomon Islands Police Vessel Lata departs from Honiara as part of Operation Kuru Kuru, a regional maritime surveillance operation in September 2008, as part of the Pacific Patrol Boat Program.

In the joint statement following Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Abe’s meeting, titled Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century’, one of the action items listed was tasking officials to develop a ‘coordinated strategy to strengthen cooperation in the Pacific region, commencing with consultations to identify priorities’. The two leaders stated that the strategy would ‘support economic prosperity, peace and stability in the Pacific region’.

To get the ball rolling, both countries should now be talking about cooperation on maritime security in the South Pacific. The timing couldn’t be better. It’d not only build on the goodwill from the Abe visit but also on changes to Japan’s aid policy that could strengthen defence and security cooperation.

Late last month, recommendations for changes to Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy were sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by an expert committee. The committee suggested relaxing the ODA ban on military-related projects, arguing that, as military capacity can assist in non-military areas, such as disaster relief, Japan shouldn’t exclude all military activities from its ODA. Read more

Australia should now be working with Japan on the Australian Pacific Patrol Boat replacement program. It’s now, and will remain in the future, the central component of our defence cooperation program in the Pacific islands region. Twenty-two boats have been given to 12 island countries. But the fleet is now approaching its end of service.

The Australian government has recently decided to continue the Pacific Patrol Boat program within a different framework and has just approved almost $600 million in purchase costs and $1.38 billion in sustainment and personnel costs over the next thirty years. Timor-Leste is to be added to the new program, with Defence being lead agency on the project.

The Pacific patrol boats are the only real capability that can protect the EEZs of the island countries. Even under the previous Japanese ODA policy, Japan could have cooperated with the ADF in respect of the patrol boats (although the sponsorship of the project by Australia’s Defence department might have been a complication.)

As I’ve argued before (with Sam Bateman), the Pacific Patrol Boat project isn’t really about supporting warfighting missions: its aim is to provide capabilities for good order at sea in the region.

But if the recommended changes to Japan’s ODA policy flow through, that would mean the JMSDF might be able to cooperate with the three countries that run their Pacific patrol boats as part of a military force (Fiji, Tonga and PNG). In all those countries (and the other island countries where the boats are under police control), they’re focused on fisheries surveillance, disaster relief and search and rescue.

Japan is already working on maritime capacity-building in Micronesia, with the initiative of two NGOs, the Nippon Foundation and Sasakawa Peace Foundation. They’ve provided small boats to several Micronesian islands, with Japan’s Coast Guard also assisting in capacity building. And Japan has been willing to cooperate there with RAN maritime advisers in Micronesia.

Apart from the Micronesian project, Japan has also been supplying patrol boats to both the Philippines and Vietnam. It was even instrumental in getting the Vietnamese to separate their Coast Guard from the military to facilitate that assistance.

There are opportunities to work closely on Pacific maritime security not only with MSDF, but also with Japan’s Coast Guard and its Fisheries Agency. Indeed, we could encourage Japan to become part of Quad arrangements, where we coordinate surveillance patrols and flights in the Pacific with New Zealand, France and the US.

Following Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Australia, China didn’t criticise the intensification of Australia’s defence ties with Japan. China’s foreign affairs ministry said only that ‘we hope that cooperation among relevant countries can contribute positively to regional peace and stability, instead of the opposite, let alone harming the third country.’

There’s no reason why we couldn’t consider inviting China into cooperative Pacific maritime security arrangements as well as Japan. Protecting the marine living resources of the region and strong Pacific oceans governance should be a common goal of all the major players of the region. Let’s talk to our quad partners about rebadging the arrangement as a hexagon, engaging both Japan and China.

Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI. Image courtesy of Department of Defence.

Colombia: back from the brink

Colombian National Police seized large quantities of FARC materiel.

In an op-ed published yesterday, I highlighted how, with the right resources and strategies, a country could turn its security problems around.

I was referring to Colombia. I made a recent visit there with a small group of African political leaders and military commanders, arriving shortly after President Juan Manuel Santos’ re-election for another four years. And I found the security situation much improved.

Rewind to the late 1990s and Colombia was on the verge of being a failed state. In 2002, the government controlled just half of Colombia’s countryside. Ten years later, the figure’s over 90%. According to the World Bank’s ‘ease of doing business’ index, Colombia ranks third in Latin America. This year, according to government projections, the economy could grow at 5%. Read more

Part of that success is this: the Colombians have built an incredibly impressive military force, (we visited military bases and spent a day with Colombian Special Forces), and allocated resources to their armed forces and police (around 480,000 strong). The country’s defence budget has doubled over the last ten years.

The military is seen as the most respected institution in the country, even above the church, and the quality of the officer corps was evident. They’ve developed an efficient intelligence capability which has allowed the Colombians to conduct aerial attacks against the FARC in their jungle strongholds, resulting in high casualty rates for senior FARC leaders. The number of FARC combatants has dropped from around 20,000 in 2002 to between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters.

Our group was given extensive briefings on the country’s two flagship security strategies: ‘Sword of Honour’ and ‘Plan Green Heart’. The first is an integrated military and police effort which has launched simultaneous offensives across Colombia focusing on a dozen ‘hot zones’ where the guerrillas are active and have significant economic interests which overlap with those of the state, such as oil pipelines.

‘Plan Green Heart’ is the national police strategy aimed at combatting organised crime and crimes affecting citizen security. It’s focused on land reform, rural security, cybercrime, road security and urban security. It’s targeting drug trafficking, terrorism, criminal mining, kidnapping and extortion, smuggling, and mobile phone robbery.

I saw first-hand in La Macarena, a town about 280km south of Bogota and formerly a FARC stronghold, how the military has worked to improve service and infrastructure delivery at the community level across an extraordinarily rugged countryside. As one Colombian military officer explained to us: ‘the problem is rural, so the solution is rural’.

Colombia has benefited from strong and consistent political leadership over the last decade that’s focused on confronting drugs and guerrillas, and not just political spin. The CEO of the Colombian subsidiary of a major multinational company (that’s operated in Colombia for years) summed it up in a statement to our group: ‘The political leaders here work 24/7 for the country’. Defence Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon told us that ten years ago, ‘we’d lost our country, and now we’ve got it back’.

Colombia’s lessons are of relevance to other states facing armed challenges: my African travelling companions told me at the end of our visit they’d learnt a lot from Colombia in addressing some of their own internal security problems such as insecurity in eastern Congo, Boko Haram in Nigeria, insurgents in Mali, and Al-Shabab across east Africa.

Building military-military ties to facilitate information sharing and lessons learnt could be fruitful for both the ADF and Colombian military. That could begin with a visit by the new Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, to scope practical defence engagement, including for strategic dialogue, training and staff college exchanges and defence trade.

In particular, it would be useful to visit Buenaventura, a town of 400,000 and a major drug-trafficking node on Colombia’s Pacific coast, to see how Colombian’s navy is dealing with the problems of drugs and crime. Of interest too would be looking at the Colombia’s practical approach to force structure. Colombians are buying useful equipment such as turbo-prop aircraft for counter insurgency, transports and Blackhawks. Colombia has a long history of riverine warfare and they’ve got a large fleet of effective riverine combatants.

Australian Customs and the AFP would benefit from strengthening information exchange on the drug trade and trends in serious and organised crime.

A great highlight of my visit was cheering a Colombian victory in the World Cup, watching the match with the bravest of the brave—soldiers who’d lost limbs to FARC mines. With the remaining time left on the UNSC, we might consider offering Colombia help in dealing with the IED and de-mining problems the country faces. I’ll never forget those soldiers, or the staunchly patriotic Colombians I met.

Things are really changing for the better in the country. The tourism promotion says it all: ‘Colombia, the only risk is wanting to stay’.

Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI. He travelled to Colombia courtesy of the Brenthurst Foundation. Image courtesy of Flickr user Colombian National Police.

Search and rescue: a growing responsibility

Regional search and rescue (SAR) issues have stolen a lot of international headlines lately. The disappearance of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 in March, and the subsequent multinational search effort, revealed substantial cracks in the region’s surveillance and SAR arrangements. But the issue of regional SAR was large and growing even before MH370. The rescue of passengers on board the ship Akademik Shokalskiy in the Southern Ocean earlier this year was watched by an estimated 32 million people world-wide. As Australia and other Antarctic nations enhance their polar programs, with more personnel and greater coverage of land and marine activities, the risk of SAR incidences will increase. This month, ASPI held a workshop to discuss issues surrounding the coordination of search and rescue operations in Australia’s area of responsibility. These are some of the key points from the discussions.

Australia has the largest search and rescue zone in the world, stretching through parts of the Indian, Pacific and Southern Oceans, and amounting to roughly 12% of the Earth’s surface. Looking south, Australia’s SAR region is vast. It extends east and west of Australia’s land mass and penetrates through the Australian Antarctic Territory to the South Pole. In the Antarctic region, our SAR area adjoins those of New Zealand and South Africa. Figure 1 below shows Australia’s Antarctic SAR region (source: Australian Maritime Safety Authority).

Australia’s Antarctic SAR region

Read more

As Asia’s air- and water-ways become more congested with commercial and other traffic, and as wealthier citizens seek ever more exotic tourist destinations, pressures on the regional search and rescue arrangements are growing. Active in our SAR region are both legal and illegal fishers, and a growing number of independent visitors and sailors. In recent years, we’ve seen an escalation in confrontations between the Japanese whaling fleet and anti-whaling protestors. Figure 2 shows SAR activities in our southern backyard both in recent years and earlier.

SAR activities south of Australia

Close coordination between the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, the Australian Antarctic Division, and the Department of Defence, the effective transfer of information about the availability of shipping and aircraft assets, and the availability of suitably-trained personnel to undertake SAR response, will all be critical for future SAR operations. Of equal importance will be coordinating with other national Antarctic programs active in our SAR region and the Southern Ocean.

The trend toward more non-government operators travelling through the Southern Ocean and to Antarctica will continue. Privately-funded voyages—like that of the Akademik Shokalskiy—fishing operations, tourist operations and independent travellers are expected to increase over time.

The entry into force of the IMO’s Polar Code will provide some additional safeguards, although universal coverage of vessels isn’t assured: many fishing vessels undertaking illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing activities in the Southern Ocean, for example, are unstable and poorly crewed.

It’s likely that there’ll be increased fly-in/fly-out tourism over the next two decades. That will have significant environmental and safety considerations and require the revision of arrangements for air traffic management, emergency accommodation, medical facilities and medivac capability.

As the relevant SAR coordinator for much of east Antarctica, we could project an expected increase in SAR incidences into our strategic planning. SAR planning offers an opportunity for us to work with China, India, Korea, Japan, France, South Africa and New Zealand to foster good relations and sound SAR practices.

As new technologies develop in unmanned aerial vehicles, those will offer additional resource capability in SAR operations. At present, much of that technological development sits within the Department of Defence. There’s potential for enhanced cooperation between the Australian Antarctic Division and Department of Defence in the use of unmanned assets, not only for SAR purposes, but also for general operational support in the region.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue, Defence Minister Johnston proposed that Australia facilitate a regular multilateral search and rescue exercise in the future, that’s ‘practically focused, designed to strengthen interoperability, and to build fraternal connections’. The proposal highlights the fact that while search and rescue operations are important in themselves, they also serve an important political purpose; they build patterns of peaceful interaction between countries with limited experience of each other, and so help generate strategic trust.

That’s a good idea: there are clearly gaps in regional SAR arrangements in Asia. (See here and here.) At the same time, we should be conducting Southern Ocean and Antarctic search and rescue exercises to strengthen cooperation amongst Australian and other Antarctic states.

 Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI. Daniel Grant is an intern at ASPI. Maps courtesy of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority.

New online CVE studies—lessons for Australia

In discussing the foreign fighter issue in Australia last month, I noted that the Syrian civil war is being broadcast live over social media. Some call it the first YouTube war.

That live feed of information is useful to Australians who have family in Syria and surrounding countries, but social media platforms are also recruitment and propaganda tools for extremist groups involved in the conflict, and their supporters overseas.  So any campaign undertaken by authorities here to discourage Australians from fighting in Syria should include a strong online effort to counter extremist recruiters.

 Last month the UK’s Quilliam Foundation published a report on online extremism. The study found that the vast majority of radicalised individuals come into contact with extremist ideology through offline socialisation prior to being indoctrinated online. The report found that relying on censorship and filtering methods to counter online extremism was ineffective. It advocated developing counter-extremist efforts through online content and popularising online initiatives that fight against extremism. The report found that there weren’t enough materials that counter extremist content online, allowing extremists to dominate the conversation on many topics. Read more

The report makes several useful recommendations that warrant study in Australia by those responsible for implementing countering violent extremism programs:

  • establish a forum that deals with online extremism and brings stakeholders from key sectors together in order to do so
  • improve digital literacy and critical consumption skills in schools and communities
  • encourage the establishment of a social media outlet that clarifies government policies and debunks propaganda
  • undertake a mapping exercise that explores current efforts to tackle extremism online and identifies partners that could be given support to develop an effective online presence
  • establish a central body that offers seed funding and training for grassroots online counter‐extremism initiatives.

The last suggestion is particularly relevant to Australia. Quilliam suggests grants ranging between A$900 and A$3600 that would go ‘towards helping existing initiatives improve their online presence and further develop their social media outreach … [S]pecific online initiatives could include fully fledged websites, social media campaigns, a series of videos hosted on videosharing platforms such as YouTube, and forums that discuss pertinent topics related to extremism’.

Quilliam suggests the initiatives could be run by individuals, small community groups, student societies and other small- to medium-sized networks. Initiatives in Australia to counter online extremism should, as the Quilliam Foundation suggests, help grassroots initiatives that are already trying to tackle extremism to make better use of online tools.

But a word of warning: a recent report by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue in the UK makes clear that in developing a counter-messaging campaign on the foreign fighter issue, many of the most credible messengers have poor online skills, so they aren’t able to use social media platforms. It found that many counter-messengers don’t have even the basic skills that would allow them to take and upload photos or create and share basic videos using smart phones.

The Australian government through its countering violent extremism program will have an important role to play here in building technical capacity with those individuals and groups best placed to deliver counter-narrative campaigns.

Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI.

Supporting Australia’s Antarctic interests

Aurora Australis anchored off Macquarie Island.Earlier this year, I cited the case of the tourist expedition ship Akademik Shokalskiy, which became entrapped near Commonwealth Bay in the waters of Australia’s Antarctic Territory, as showing up serious limitations of Australia’s weakening search-and-rescue capabilities down south: our one polar vessel couldn’t reach the Shokalskiy. Nor was it carrying helicopters that could.

In the recent federal budget, the government announced that it will request tenders for a new icebreaker to replace the ageing Aurora Australis. It’s a welcome move: Aurora Australis is approaching the end of its serviceable life. A decision was needed to commit to a replacement to ensure our ability to conduct marine research anywhere in the Southern Ocean at any time of year, and to provide a heavy-lift capability for efficient delivery of station cargo and refuelling.

Environment Minister Greg Hunt said two Europe-based firms had been shortlisted to build the vessel, to be delivered by 2019. Hunt told reporters that it will cost ‘hundreds and hundreds of millions’, but he wouldn’t comment further due to an ongoing tender process. The new ship will be a significant capability enhancement over the Aurora Australis, in terms of its icebreaking and cargo capacities. Read more

In announcing the decision, Minister Hunt linked it directly to our polar sovereignty claim:

It is absolutely critical under international law for Australia to maintain an active presence in Antarctica so as to maintain our claims. We have about 42 percent of the Antarctic land mass which is covered by Australian claims and if we were to abandon that … then that would be a deeply irresponsible action for future generations.

But while the Minister’s decision to replace Aurora Australis is welcome, it’s only one part of the story when it comes to the maritime capabilities required for our southern backyard.

The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee is currently inquiring into Australia’s future activities and responsibilities in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters. In a joint submission to the Committee, Sam Bateman and I argue that Australia requires ships capable of operating in the Southern Ocean and off the coast of Antarctica for surveillance, patrol and response (for sovereignty protection, law enforcement and search and rescue); marine scientific research; and the logistic support of Australia’s Antarctic program. In the longer term, a requirement may arise for warships with the necessary capabilities.

Response requires a surface vessel and that’s where we’re most seriously lacking at present. The requirement for the task will increase in the future: apart from our own national interests, the Southern Ocean contains valuable living resources including the largest underexploited fishery in the world, the Antarctic krill fishery.

Our current capability to respond to a safety-of-life-at-sea issue in southern waters is limited to three principal vessels: Ocean Protector, Ocean Shield, and Aurora Australis, and only the latter is ice-capable. RAN ships may be available, but none are ice-strengthened and only the fleet replenishment ships, HMAS Choules and the LHDs about to enter service, could undertake an extended search without the support of a tanker.

As noted above, in terms of marine research and logistics, with only one ageing Antarctic research vessel, we’re being left behind by other nations: China, Japan, the Russian Federation, South Korea and South Africa have each launched or announced new icebreakers.

And it’s over two years since we’ve had a patrol vessel in the Southern Ocean. We’ve relied on assistance from France, but that’s only available off the Territory of Heard and McDonald islands.

The concept of a ‘national fleet’ offers a possible approach to building the required capacity: rather than each agency doing its ‘own thing’ with blue water capabilities, there’s scope for a ‘whole of nation’ approach to address national requirements for those capabilities other than naval war-fighting. Along with the Senate Committee’s report, it might be useful to have an independent study into Australia’s requirements for blue-water capabilities for maritime policing, patrol and scientific research, including in the Southern Ocean and off Antarctica.

The national fleet concept might be considered in both the project to replace the Aurora Australis and Defence Project SEA 1180 to provide a class of around 20 Offshore Combatant Vessels (OCVs). Regarding the OCVs, the 2013 Defence White paper noted (at paragraph 8.56): ‘in the shorter-term, Government will seek to replace the current Armidale Class patrol boats with a proven vessel to ensure that Defence can continue to provide a patrol capability’ while a longer-term solution is considered.

It’s probable that the Armidale Class replacement will be an updated version of the Cape Class vessels being acquired by the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service. Such vessels would be unsuitable for operations in the Southern Ocean and off Antarctica. The requirement for operations in those waters should be considered in selecting the longer-term solution for the OCV.

Anthony Bergin is deputy director at ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user Natalie Tapson.

Foreign Affairs and the strategy business

I found Brendan Taylor’s view that Foreign Affairs shouldn’t do strategy because they don’t have a ‘few battalions hidden away in the bowels of ‘Gareth’s Gazebo’ somewhat bizarre. Along with the Defence Minister, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop sits on the National Security Committee of Cabinet, which considers the major national security issues facing this country. So too does the Treasurer, the Attorney General and the Immigration Minister. The Deputy Prime Minister, who’s the Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development is also a member and the Finance Minister is co-opted as required.

Apart from Defence, none of those ministers have a ‘few battalions hidden away in the bowels’ of their departmental offices. But all are expected to be across the delicate business of strategy for key decision-making purposes—and it’s not unreasonable for them to expect their departmental staff to be able to advise them in that regard. So perhaps we should be thinking about strategy in a broader rather than a narrower sense. Read more

Rather than just focusing on the use of military force, it’d be useful to see how business thinks about strategy. After all, if a company doesn’t have a sound strategy it won’t stay in business for long. I concur here with Lance Beath  that one of the more useful strategy texts is Richard Rumelt’s book, Good Strategy, Bad Strategy.

Rumelt holds a chair in business and society at UCLA Anderson School of Management. His book argues that the core of good strategy is discovering ‘the critical factors in a situation and designing a way of coordinating and focusing actions to deal with those factors’; that bad strategy covers up its failure to guide by embracing the language of broad goals, ambition, vision, and values; and that a strategy that fails to define a variety of plausible and feasible immediate actions misses a critical component.

Rumelt argues that for corporate strategic planning purposes leaders must identify the ‘critical obstacles to forward progress and then develop a coherent approach to overcoming them’. Indeed he notes that most strategic plans have little to do with strategy: they’re ‘three-year or five-year rolling resource budgets, and they coordinate deployment of resources—but that’s not strategy’.

Rumelt points out that strategy starts with identifying changes and that strategic thinking ‘helps us take positions in a world that is confusing and uncertain’.’ A lot of strategy work, he says, isn’t just deciding what to do, but a more basic problem of ‘comprehending the situation’. He emphasises that a good strategy is, in the end, a ‘hypothesis about what will work. Not a wild theory, but an educated judgment’.

I think many of us who’ve read ‘strategy’ documents would agree with Rumelt’s observation that: ‘Bad strategy is vacuous and superficial, has internal contradictions, and doesn’t define or address the problem. Bad strategy generates a feeling of dull annoyance when you have to listen to it or read it’.

Lance Beath is correct that business schools can teach both military organisations and diplomats how to do strategy. The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre might even consider adding some business strategy readings to their course guides.

Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI.