- The Strategist - https://www.aspistrategist.org.au -
China’s emerging undersea capability and the implications for Australia’s future submarine
Posted By Benjamin Schreer on April 24, 2014 @ 06:00
At ASPI’s recent Submarine Conference the strategic rationale for Australia’s Future Submarine (FSM) was only lightly discussed. Presenters stated that the FSM worked best as an ‘offensive platform’ and ‘up threat’. But that issue deserves a more detailed debate: it’s central to answering the question about what we want the submarines to do. A hidden assumption of the 2009 Defence White Paper, which provided the vision for 12 new and large diesel-electric submarines, was that the boats would be able to operate for extended periods as far away as Northeast Asia, including off the Chinese mainland. Some analysts, including here on The Strategist, support such a view.
China’s Submarine Fleet, 1990–2020
Type | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 |
Diesel Attack | 88 | 43 | 60 | 51 | 54 | 57-62 | 59-64 |
Nuclear Attack (SSN) | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6-8 | 6-9 |
Nuclear Ballistic(SSBN) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3-5 | 4-5 |
Total | 93 | 49 | 66 | 59 | 63 | 66-75 | 69-78 |
China’s Submarine Fleet, 1990–2020, approximate percent ‘modern’
Type | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 |
Diesel Attack | 0% | 0% | 7% | 40% | 50% | 70% | 75% |
Nuclear Attack | 0% | 0% | 0% | 33% | 33% | 70% | 100% |
Article printed from The Strategist: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au
URL to article: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-emerging-undersea-capability-and-the-implications-for-australias-future-submarine/
[1] Image: http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/7704331080_ffc4923b68_z.jpg
[2] ASPI’s recent Submarine Conference: https://www.aspi.org.au/events/the-submarine-choice-aspis-international-conference,-canberra
[3] here: http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/of-australian-strategy-and-submarine-design/
[4] undersea balance between the US and China is still very much in favour of our major ally.: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/working_papers/Undersea%20Balance%20WP11-1.pdf
[5] recent report: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf
[6] staff report for the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission: http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20Combat%20Reach%20to%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf
[7] Congressional testimony from the US Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence: http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Karotkin_Testimony1.30.14.pdf
[8] article: http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-04/wired-sound-near-seas
[9] points out: http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/submarines-does-moore-mean-less/
[10] elsewhere: http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-future-of-sino-us-strategic-stability/
[11] China’s ‘Near Seas’: http://nationalinterest.org/article/chinas-near-seas-challenges-9645
[12] Peter Jennings : http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-submarine-choice/