

What Defence White Papers have said about New Zealand: 1976 to 2009

1976 Defence White Paper

Chapter 1, 15. ð Remote from Europe, we now have one significant alliance- the ANZUS Treaty, with New Zealand and the US. Both countries are important to us; but it is prudent to remind ourselves that the US has many diverse interests and obligations. Australia has local and regional associates with whom we enjoy close and cooperative relations. We must continue to work constructively with them to support stability and security in the general strategic situation; and by our own policy and effort we can insure against the uncertainties that continuing change will sustain and that could produce situations with which we may well have to deal on our own.

Chapter 2, 35. ð We shall continue to co-operate under the Five Power arrangement, which embraces Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore.

New Zealand

Chapter 2, 48. Our long historical association with New Zealand and the many common interests that sustain our co-operation as neighbours, partners and allies, need no elaboration here. Defence co-operation with New Zealand is fundamental to our interests and policy, and covers a very wide range. It includes bilateral consultation, maritime surveillance, combined exercises and training programs, exchanges of technical and operational information, and co-operation in intelligence, defence science and supply. We will devote continuing effort to sustain and further develop these programs.

Chapter 5, 46. ð Officers and senior NCOs are sent on exchange postings to other countries including the United States, Britain, Canada and New Zealand.

Chapter 6, 18-20. The Kangaroo series of exercises in and off Queensland include participation by Australian, United States and New Zealand forces. The RIMPAC series, off Hawaii, sees Australian naval and air elements exercising with those from the United States, Canada and New Zealand. Examples of smaller, but significant, exercises are TASMANEX with naval and air elements of Australia, the United States, Britain and New Zealand, and the Integrated Air Defence System exercises in Malaysia and Singapore involving the Royal Malaysian Air Force, the Republic of Singapore Air Force, the RAAF, the RAN and the RNZAF.

There are a number of international Army exchanges up to Company Group size (150 personnel) which serve to broaden knowledge and experience and to bring personnel into contact with the latest developments in equipment and tactical doctrine. These include exchanges between Australia and Britain, the United States, Canada, New Zealand and the Gurkha element of the British Army from Hong Kong.

Exercises in the more immediate neighbourhood are conducted with New Zealand and Indonesia, e.g. AUCKEX/LONGEX with RAN and RAAF participation, and TNI-AL/RAN exercises with the Indonesian Navy.

1987 Defence White Paper

Executive Summary. [Self-Reliance] strengthens our ability to meet the mutual obligations we share with our chief allies, the United States and New Zealand.

1.2 This policy of defence self-reliance is pursued within a framework of alliances and agreements. The most significant of these is with the United States. We share a defence relationship with New Zealand which is of basic importance. We have other important arrangements with Papua New Guinea and with the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore in the Five Power Defence Arrangements.

1.11 This area stretches over 7000 kilometres from the Cocos Islands to New Zealand and the islands of the South-West Pacific, and over 5 000 kilometres from the archipelago and island chain in the north to the Southern Ocean.

Australia and New Zealand

1.27 Australia and New Zealand share a defence relationship which is of basic importance to the security of both countries, because of our common history and traditions, our proximity, and our shared strategic concerns.

1.28 New Zealand has an important role in the South-West Pacific, where it has strong political, economic and military ties· in some cases more substantial than our own. Defence co-operation with New Zealand covers a very wide range, including assistance to the island states, maritime surveillance, combined exercises and training programs, exchanges of technical and operational information, and co-operation in intelligence, defence science and logistics.

1.29 It is important that Australian and New Zealand forces maintain and develop their ability to operate together. We will continue to promote defence co-operation and operational compatibility with New Zealand, reflecting the considerable potential for strengthening our defence relationship.

1.30 The extent to which this potential can be realised will depend, among other things, on the compatibility of the equipment and capabilities of the two forces. Priority must therefore be given to co-ordinating our policies on these matters.

1.31 The dispute between New Zealand and the United States over visits by ships and aircraft has seriously damaged the defence relationship between our two allies. Australia is not a party to the dispute. It accepts, however, that access within reasonable environmental constraints for ships and aircraft is a normal part of an alliance relationship. Australia regrets that New Zealand policy detracts from that relationship.

1.32 This Government's policy has been directed to preserving our important bilateral defence relationships with both the United States and New Zealand, and ensuring as much as possible that the underlying framework of the trilateral relationship under ANZUS is maintained so that full co-operation can be resumed should current New Zealand policies on warship visits change.

1.33 These goals have been achieved. The ANZUS Treaty remains in place, and the mutual obligations under it between Australia and the United States and between Australia and New Zealand are preserved. This includes the security commitments embodied in the treaty.

1.38 Under the FPDA, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom cooperate to support the security of Singapore and Malaysia.

2.39 Australia's longstanding defence interests in South-East Asia are also reflected in our participation in the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) and other co-operative activities under the FPDA with Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

2.52 In order to build upon and reinforce the defence co-operative activities already in progress in the South-West Pacific and to meet the challenge posed by recent strategic developments, the Government has decided on a number of important initiatives, including:

- increasing the number of RAAF LRMP deployments to the region (arrangements will be made for co-ordination with deployments undertaken by New Zealand).

2.69 Arising out of the foregoing discussion, Australia's principal national defence interests can be summarised as: ÷ · the maintenance of a strong defence relationship with New Zealand.

5.45 Technology transfer is achieved through bilateral agreements and programs such as The Technical Co-operation Program between Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.

6.84 ÷ New Zealand has agreed to purchase the [Steyr] rifle from the Small Arms Factory under these arrangements.

9.3 ÷ Our national effort in the defence field, the alliance relationships we have with the United States and New Zealand, and the enhancement of our defence relationships with friendly countries in the region all help to sustain our favourable strategic situation.

1994 Defence White Paper

3.15 We will work hard to keep the alliance vigorous and relevant in changing circumstances. Our US alliance, and also our relationship with New Zealand, will remain important to our defence policy over the next fifteen years.

8.35 The emerging cooperative security approaches build on the existing networks of relationships, including our alliance relationships with the United States and New Zealand, and the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

The New Zealand Alliance

9.20 Both Australia and New Zealand expect that if either country were threatened, the other would come to its aid. That expectation reflects both the strong personal, economic, cultural and historical ties between us, and the shared strategic interests which result from each country's security being bound closely to the other's.

9.21 These interests are expressed in our continuing defence alliance. The ANZUS Treaty embodies formal commitments and reciprocal obligations between Australia and New Zealand which endure despite the United States' suspension of security obligations to New Zealand. Despite changes in the global and regional environment over recent years, our defence alliance with New Zealand remains important to Australia's defence policy. Indeed, in the more demanding strategic environment of the next century, it may become even more important. Australia values the support which New Zealand could offer us in a conflict, and we will continue to accept our ANZUS obligations to New Zealand.

9.22 Beyond these bilateral commitments under ANZUS, our defence relationship with New Zealand reflects the fact that as Asia-Pacific countries we share a wide range of interests in the security and stability of that region, particularly in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific. New Zealand actively participates in regional security efforts and activities in pursuit of common goals. We welcome continued New Zealand engagement in South-East Asia. Australia and our partners benefit from New Zealand's participation in the Five Power Defence Arrangements. New Zealand also contributes significantly to the stability and well-being of the South-West Pacific.

9.23 Continuing cooperation in a wide range of activities throughout our region will become increasingly important in our defence relationship with New Zealand. We look forward to New Zealand playing a sustained, and if possible, enhanced role in regional security. This includes New Zealand participating in exercises involving regional countries.

9.24 Australia and New Zealand will also continue to work together in support of our shared commitment to global security, especially through the United Nations. We have deployed combined detachments of Australian and New Zealand personnel to major UN operations, including Namibia and Cambodia. These very successful examples of regional cooperation in support of the United Nations draw on the close and long-standing links between our defence forces, and serve as a model to develop wider regional cooperation in support of UN operations.

9.25 Our strong alliance means both Australia and New Zealand are interested in the effective development of our respective defence forces and the enhancement of our

capability to fight effectively alongside one another if needed. Increased cooperation in defence between Australia and New Zealand over the period of this White Paper will depend on sustaining modern capabilities and ensuring a high degree of interoperability between our defence forces. We have the highest regard for the dedication and professionalism of the New Zealand Defence Force, and we will seek opportunities in areas of mutual interest for closer cooperation between it and the Australian Defence Force.

9.26 This will require sustained effort so that necessary capabilities are maintained and developed in each country's defence force, consistent with national policies. New Zealand's smaller economic base imposes constraints on the total size of its defence effort, but Australia will seek a continued commitment to sustaining defence capabilities in the New Zealand Defence Force which can contribute to our shared strategic interests, consistent with our mutual alliance obligations.

Closer Defence Relations

9.27 Since 1991, under Closer Defence Relations, closer consultation on defence planning and management issues has improved cooperation and coordination with New Zealand on the development of our respective defence forces. Closer Defence Relations aims to ensure that we take full advantage of opportunities to enhance our respective capabilities through cooperative programs, including those which use our resources more efficiently, and that we develop habits and procedures of cooperation which allow us to work together effectively in a crisis.

9.28 We expect that Closer Defence Relations will continue to provide important benefits to both sides. With appropriate commitment, we see the potential to increase substantially the mutually supporting activities which both countries have undertaken in recent years.

9.29 We will also continue with New Zealand to seek the military and economic benefits flowing from cooperative defence equipment projects. They have provided substantial opportunities for both Australian and New Zealand industry, and offer significant operational and logistic advantages, the result of operating similar equipment and realising savings through shared training and support activities.

9.30 We continue to regret the dispute arising from New Zealand policy between the United States and New Zealand over ship visits. We believe it is an issue for the two nations themselves. The dispute has not prevented the development of our defence relations with either party, but valuable additional opportunities for cooperation with New Zealand would arise from progress on the issue.

9.32 ÷ We benefit from strong intelligence links, and from defence science cooperation through The Technical Cooperation Program, which also includes the United States, Canada and New Zealand.

9.33 ÷ Australia has concluded cooperative logistic support arrangements with France, Germany and Italy to complement those we already have with the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.

10.5 With New Zealand we have already cooperated in peace operations in Namibia and Cambodia, but we can increase this cooperation, perhaps by combining contributions. Such contingents would build on the existing high level of interoperability of the respective forces; add to the flexibility of both countries to participate in peace operations; and enhance defence cooperation in a practical way. By collaborating more with New Zealand, both the goals of our peace operations and our defence relationship should benefit.

11.2 ð Australia's defence industry capacity is supplemented by New Zealand's. Under the terms of the ANZAC Ship Treaty and in accord with closer economic and defence relations, New Zealand industry together with Australian industry are considered as a single defence industrial base. Australian and New Zealand firms are therefore treated equally in our Defence industry policies, except in regard to a small number of high-security or third country collaborative projects.

11.43 ð Australian collaboration with our traditional partners is well established, and includes cooperating with the United States in developing the NULKA antiship missile decoy and collaborating with New Zealand to build the ANZAC frigates.

12.24 Australia benefits in many ways from the Government's interaction in defence science with Australia's friends and allies in North America and Europe. These connections comprise, in particular, The Technical Cooperation Program involving the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, and our separate bilateral arrangements with each of these countries.

S.27 We value our alliance with New Zealand, and seek mutual benefits through Closer Defence Relations and a shared responsibility for the promotion of regional security.

2000 Defence White Paper

Executive Summary: New Zealand will remain a very valued defence partner.

3.34 Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea share the Southwest Pacific with 13 other countries.

4.8 Our second strategic objective is to help foster the stability, integrity and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood, which we share with Most people believe that the first and foremost task for the ADF is the defence of Australia. An integral part of this belief is an expectation that the ADF, alone or with coalition partners, should be able to undertake significant operations within the region, particularly in our nearer region. Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, East Timor and the island countries of the Southwest Pacific.

5.38 Australia's membership of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) commits Australia, along with New Zealand and the United Kingdom, to assist Malaysia and Singapore against external aggression.

New Zealand

5.47 Like other aspects of the trans-Tasman connection, our defence relationship with New Zealand shows the imprint both of our strong similarities and of the sometimes surprising differences between us.

5.48 The similarities start with our strategic interests, which are closely aligned. We both assume that as a matter of course we would come to each other's help in time of trouble. That assumption is given formal expression in the undertakings of the ANZUS Treaty, which remains in force between Australia and New Zealand, notwithstanding the suspension of its United States-New Zealand element.

5.49 But New Zealand's strategic perceptions and outlook differ from Australia's in significant ways. New Zealand's view that its strategic circumstances may not require the maintenance of capable air and naval forces differs from Australia's view of our own needs. We would regret any decision by New Zealand not to maintain at least some capable air and naval combat capabilities. Such forces would allow a more significant contribution to be made to protecting our shared strategic interests, especially in view of the essentially maritime nature of our strategic environment.

5.50 On the other hand the high quality of New Zealand's forces is beyond question. They made an outstanding contribution to INTERFET, and Australia is grateful for the speed and generosity with which they were committed and supported. We appreciate New Zealand's recent decisions to ensure that its land forces will be equipped adequately for a range of more likely contingencies, and we know that the men and women of the New Zealand Defence Force will continue to constitute a highly professional force. New Zealand will remain a very valued defence partner for Australia.

2009 Defence White Paper

Executive Summary. Our next most important strategic interest is the security, stability and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood, which we share with Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, New Zealand and the South Pacific island states. While we have a wide range of diplomatic, economic, cultural and other links with those countries, from a strategic point of view, what matters most is that they are not a source of threat to Australia, and that no major military power, that could challenge our control of the air and sea approaches to Australia, has access to bases in our neighbourhood from which to project force against us.

5.7 Our next most important strategic interest is the security, stability and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood, which we share with Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, New Zealand and the South Pacific island states. While we have a wide range of diplomatic, economic, cultural and other links with those countries, from a strategic point of view what matters most is that they are not a source of threat to Australia, and that no major military power that could challenge our control of the air and sea approaches to Australia has access to bases in our neighbourhood from which to project force against us.

5.11 We share many of these strategic interests with New Zealand, and maintaining a strong bilateral defence and broader security relationship with that country is itself in our strategic interests in terms of ensuring a secure immediate neighbourhood.

6.36 This includes efforts to increase the interoperability of our forces with those of selected allies and partners, such as the United States, New Zealand, and our partners in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which include Singapore and Malaysia.

11.6 Formal undertakings to support each other in time of need underpin our defence relationship with the United States. Those undertakings are stated in the Australia-New Zealand-US (ANZUS) Security Treaty of 1951, in which the parties agreed to "act to meet the common danger".

11.24 The FPDA with Singapore, Malaysia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand remains a useful mechanism to confront both traditional and emerging challenges.

New Zealand

11.27 Our defence relationship with New Zealand continues to be reinforced by our work together on successive deployments and combined operations in East Timor, Solomon Islands and elsewhere. Security crises in East Timor, instability in Fiji, and insurgency in Afghanistan underscore the coincidence of our security interests and the critical need for close coordination of defence postures and forces.

11.28 The Government especially reaffirms its commitment through this White Paper to working with New Zealand to promote security, stability and development in the Pacific and East Timor. This requires that we continue to align our approaches to defence relations and capacity-building and preventative diplomacy. But we must also plan together on the basis that our combined operations in pursuit of our common security interests, as has occurred over recent years, are the new norm. It is therefore critical that our two defence forces maximise interoperability and align our operational planning, logistics, communications, capability development and procurement activities to the maximum extent practicable.

11.29 As the ADF incorporates new systems and capabilities, maintaining the current level of interoperability between our separate defence forces will require a concerted effort on the part of both countries. With this in mind, Australia and New Zealand should look for opportunities to rebuild our historical capacity to integrate Australian and New Zealand force elements in the Anzac tradition. This operational integration would of course be without prejudice to our respective policy choices. It could be as modest as integrating our air transport logistics support to operations, or as ambitious as an Anzac task force capable of deploying seamlessly at short notice into our immediate region. To be effective, any integrated force elements would need to exercise regularly together as a unified capability.

11.30 ð While continuing to lead by example, a key to the success of our efforts will be enlisting the support of regional governments and coordination with other donor countries in the Pacific, including the United States, France, Japan, China, and New Zealand.

17.25 ð Our prime multilateral science and technology relationship is through The Technical Cooperation Program with the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand.