Australia’s 2018 espionage laws are instrumental to defending against espionage, foreign interference, sabotage and theft of trade secrets. A current review of them by Independent National Security Legislation Monitor’s (INSLM) should recommend their retention and refinement, as I made clear in my submission ^[1] to the inquiry.

Australia today faces a threat environment that is more complex, more hostile and more unpredictable than at any time since World War II. The rise of China, erosion of the international rules-based order and proliferation of hybrid threats have fundamentally altered the landscape. Espionage, sabotage and foreign interference are no longer theoretical risks; they are ongoing challenges to our sovereignty, democracy and prosperity.

The offences introduced in 2018 aimed to fill critical gaps in our legal framework. Prior to their passage, Australia lacked adequate criminal provisions to deal with foreign interference and trade secret theft. Espionage and sabotage laws were outdated and ill-equipped to handle the modern threat landscape. Given subsequent strategic developments, the reforms were not only timely; they were prescient.

Critics warned of potential overreach and unintended consequences. Yet, seven years on, those fears have not materialised. The laws have been applied proportionately and judiciously. They have not stifled academic freedom or press liberty. Instead, they have provided a sound legal backbone to our national security strategy.

Foreign intelligence activity directed at Australia has intensified since 2018. Director-General of Security Mike Burgess has repeatedly warned ^[2] of the scale and sophistication of these threats. We’ve seen prosecutions for espionage and foreign interference, including the cases of Kira and Igor Korolev, Alexander Csergo and Di Sanh Duong.

Sabotage, once considered a relic of the Cold War, has re-emerged globally. From arson attacks on aid warehouses in London ^[3] to cyber-enabled sabotage of critical infrastructure ^[4], hostile states are increasingly outsourcing operations to criminal proxies. Australia will not be immune. The offences enacted in 2018 provide a considered basis for legal response to these resurgent threats when they manifest in Australia.

Foreign intelligence methodologies are evolving rapidly. China has shifted to a foreign-directed model, recruiting non-ethnic Chinese agents and targeting officials abroad (notably in the United States). Russia continues to deploy ‘illegals’ under non-official cover ^[5], often using innocuous business fronts. Even minors are being recruited, as seen in the arrest of a Canadian teenager ^[6] in Poland. These developments underscore the need for laws that are suitably broad, flexible and anticipatory. The 2018 offences, with their extended definitions of ‘foreign principal’, are well-suited to this challenge.

Prosecutions are only one tool in our national security arsenal. The offences anchor a broader spectrum of responses—disruption, attribution, diplomatic expulsions, and administrative reviews (for example, security clearance reviews). They act as a deterrent, signalling to foreign actors that Australia is not a soft target. Some argue that the laws are unnecessary as we have seen relatively few prosecutions. I disagree: this approach reflects strategic restraint, not redundancy. It aligns with the principle of using the least restrictive means to protect national interests.

The INSLM’s May issues paper ^[7] rightly asks whether the definition of ‘national security’ is sufficiently clear. In my view, it needs to be broad enough to reflect our strategic reality. National security today encompasses not just defence and intelligence, but also economic resilience, technological sovereignty and institutional integrity. Economic security is now central to strategic posture. The 2024 Independent Intelligence Review ^[8] highlighted the rise of economic nationalism, coercion and fragmentation. Australia must be able to protect its trade secrets, intellectual property and supply chains from foreign exploitation. The 2018 offences help us do just that.

State-sponsored economic espionage is a growing threat. Countries are industrialising their cyber espionage efforts, including targeting commercial firms and universities. Australia must treat trade secret theft not just as a commercial issue, but as a national security imperative. The offences under Division 92A of the Criminal Code are a critical part of that response.

No law is perfect. The INSLM review has already identified sensible opportunities for refinement, such as extending protections to local governments and considering interference with foreign political processes inside Australia. These are prudent adjustments that would preserve the intent of the original legislation.

The 2018 offences were an important investment in Australia’s sovereign future. They are helping us navigate increasingly stormy geopolitical waters. As Minister for Home Affairs Tony Burke said in January, ‘Foreign interference and espionage threaten our most valuable national assets—our social cohesion, our trusted democracy, our security and prosperity’. Now is not the time to weaken these laws. It is time to reaffirm their importance and ensure they continue to serve Australia’s national interests in the years ahead.