History haunts Solomon Islands. More than two decades after the end of the Tensions of 1998 to 2003, the fractures that prompted ethnic conflict between Guadalcanal and Malaita communities remain deep in politics, society and governance.
While the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) successfully restored peace in 2003 and laid the groundwork for institutional recovery, the underlying causes of the conflict—land disputes, regional inequality and political marginalisation—remain unaddressed. These unresolved issues continue to manifest in calls for provincial autonomy, public distrust of central government, and periodic unrest, such as the riots in Honiara in 2021.
In 2010, the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission was launched to examine the root causes of the conflict and chart a path forward for national healing. Its final report, delivered in 2012, presented a sobering record of human rights violations, systemic failures and societal grievances. The commission recommended prosecutions, reparations and structured reintegration support for former combatants.
More than a decade later, these recommendations remain largely unfulfilled. Successive governments have failed to enact enabling legislation or allocate the necessary funding. Although the commission’s report was finally tabled in parliament in 2023, it was in a condensed form, and no timeline for implementation has been established. Many victims and former fighters feel abandoned, contributing to a growing sense of disillusionment and reinforcing the narrative of selective justice.
In an attempt to address these lingering challenges, the previous Democratic Coalition Government for Advancement introduced two key frameworks: a National Reparation Policy and a National Reintegration Policy. Endorsed by cabinet between 2021 and 2022, these policies aimed to provide a framework for restitution to victims and structured reintegration pathways for ex-combatants. However, they remain unlegislated and underfunded, with draft policy paper for a proposed Conflict Prevention and Victims Commission reportedly stalled in the policy pipeline.
The Ministry of Traditional Governance, Peace and Ecclesiastical Affairs has been tasked with implementing these frameworks, and with driving forward the outstanding provisions of both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s report and the Townsville Peace Agreement alongside relevant government agencies. This mandate reflects a significant shift under the National Security Strategy 2025, which recognises reconciliation and traditional governance as fundamental to state-building. The ministry’s role is not only about healing the past, but also about enabling an inclusive, resilient state for the future. However, the ministry continues to face structural challenges—including chronic underfunding, limited staffing and a perception of being peripheral to national security planning.
Despite these constraints, the ministry continues to implement peacebuilding initiatives—facilitating reconciliation ceremonies, community dialogues, and consultations with ex-combatants—alongside its broader mandate. These are essential contributions to social stability and should be recognised as core components of the national security ecosystem. Without stronger political backing and strategic investment, however, these efforts risk being symbolic rather than transformative.
Leadership commitment remains the greatest constraint. While the current Government of National Unity and Transformation has made symbolic gestures—explicitly affirming peace and unity as national priorities—implementation remains inconsistent. Parliamentarians such as Matthew Wale have criticised the lack of concrete timelines, highlighting broader institutional inertia. Without decisive political will and cross-sector collaboration, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s vision for national healing and the Townsville Peace Agreement’s recommendations will continue to stall.
This inertia has serious security implications. The National Security Strategy 2025 explicitly identifies ‘unresolved tension issues and incomplete implementation of the Townsville Peace Agreement’ as a Tier 1 threat to national security. This places internal reconciliation challenges on par with climate-induced disasters, transnational crime, and political instability. The strategy calls for renewed reconciliation processes, the implementation of the Townsville Peace Agreement’s provisions and inclusive conflict resolution mechanisms led by traditional and local authorities. It is a crucial acknowledgement: without resolving the internal legacies of the Tensions, Solomon Islands remains at risk of renewed instability.
Geopolitical dynamics only heighten the stakes. Since switching diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China in 2019 and signing a security agreement with Beijing in 2022, Solomon Islands has become a flashpoint in regional competition. The then Malaita provincial government’s resistance to these developments revived historical grievances and deepened provincial divides. In this context, unresolved domestic issues and external strategic rivalries create a volatile mix.
Australia, Solomon Islands’ closest partner, has spent more than A$800 million in law enforcement, infrastructure and governance since the end of RAMSI. Yet this support has often prioritised physical infrastructure over the human infrastructure of reconciliation. Critics argue that failing to spend on peacebuilding undermines the very stability that these aid programs aim to safeguard. Australia’s renewed Pacific ‘step-up’ and the Manele government’s openness to closer ties now offer an opportunity to realign support with Solomon Islands’ state-building priorities.
There are two immediate areas where Australia can contribute constructively. First, it can provide technical and financial assistance to support the implementation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Townsville Peace Agreement frameworks—particularly by helping the responsible ministry operationalise its policy mandates and legislative agenda. Second, it can facilitate long-term capacity-building within the ministry through advisory placements, inter-ministerial coordination, and funding for community-based reconciliation programs. These investments would go beyond symbolic partnerships and lay the foundation for sustainable peace.
For Solomon Islands, the stakes are high. A peaceful and stable future demands more than diplomatic realignment or infrastructure development. It requires confronting historical grievances and delivering on long-standing commitments to truth, justice and national unity. Reconciliation is not simply a moral obligation—it is a strategic necessity, now formally embedded in the nation’s security doctrine.
A secure Solomon Islands will be one where reconciliation is not rhetorical, but real. And for both Honiara and Canberra, investing in this vision is not optional—it is essential.