Australia’s spending on the Boeing MQ-28A Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) is set to soar to new heights after a successful test in which the fighter-like drone demonstrated its ability to shoot down an aerial target.

It did so with a Raytheon AIM-120 AMRAAM missile while working in support of a Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter and E-7A Wedgetail air-surveillance aircraft, both from the Royal Australian Air Force. By destroying a high-performance Phoenix jet target, the Ghost Bat proved its ability to add to the RAAF’s ability to defend Australia’s air space.

As Boeing announced the achievement, the government said it had allocated more funding for the Ghost Bat project, A$1.4 billion to buy six additional MQ-28A Block 2 aircraft and to develop a further enhancement, the MQ-28A Block 3. The money also covers a Block 3 prototype.

This will take the Ghost Bat project from a test and evaluation program to a level that lays the foundation for an operational air combat capability. Defence Minister Richard Marles said, ‘… the successful weapons demonstration underlines [the Ghost Bat’s] growing potential to deliver an operational capability for the Royal Australian Air Force.’

The live-fire test is a vital step forward to prove the Ghost Bat’s capability beyond intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy noted, ‘… the Ghost Bat transforms a single fighter jet into a formidable team—capable not only of surveillance but also of engaging adversaries. This delivers a vital layer of protection for our aviators who remain our most valuable asset.’

Ensuring the Ghost Bat can be armed gives the opportunity for Defence to accumulate combat mass—sheer numbers of aircraft—building a larger and more powerful air combat capability. Mass challenges an enemy’s ability to project effect: the enemy faces more threats in more places, or perhaps too many targets in one place.

As I noted in an 8 December ASPI report, the RAAF can also gain survivability and thus resilience when Ghost Bats and other autonomous systems operate with, but ahead of, crewed fighters, such as Super Hornets and Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightnings. Similar effects are gained when the high-performance uncrewed aircraft work with support units, such as E-7A Wedgetails.

All this allows innovative new approaches to air combat operations in support of a strategy of denial, including establishing an Australian version of Ukraine’s drone wall. This would defend Australia’s air and maritime approaches.

In this regard, arming the Ghost Bat is crucial. If all the Ghost Bat could do were ISR, crewed aircraft would still have to move forward as shooters and take the risks of doing so. It is much more effective to deploy larger numbers of armed, uncrewed and much less costly Ghost Bats ahead of the crewed aircraft, using them as missile trucks. The crewed fighters and air-surveillance aircraft, hanging back in the rear, can coordinate and command the Ghost Bats. Humans would thereby remain on the loop in an oversight and management role but not in the loop as remote pilots (like those who pilot the RAAF’s Northrop Grumman RQ-4C Triton maritime surveillance aircraft).

The air-interception test of the Ghost Bat thus marks an important step towards this future of enhanced air combat capability for the RAAF.

So, what should happen next?

Putting more funding into the Ghost Bat program to deliver additional Block 2 aircraft and develop a Block 3 prototype is already a very good move. Ideally the money will ensure that the RAAF can move to an initial operational capability with the Ghost Bat as soon as possible. But there needs to be discussion on what constitutes an effective force of MQ-28As for the RAAF.

As I have argued in the ASPI report mentioned above, building combat mass, at speed, really matters, and it’s important that Defence and the RAAF seize this chance to build a much larger number of Ghost Bat aircraft in a manner that takes advantage of rapid acquisition and continuous modernisation ecosystems, to exploit fast innovation cycles.

The development of an MQ-28A Block 3 fits into this process. The Ghost Bat exploits open architecture and modular design, so potential upgraded versions could have on-board sensors rather than having to rely on datalinks from crewed platforms, which an adversary might jam. In the live-fire air-to-air test, part of a set of development work to be conducted from RAAF Woomera from 17 November to 12 December, the Ghost Bat that took the shot was very probably controlled by datalink.

Furthermore, the data gathered from this test will feed into digital twins (the design in digital form) in a synthetic environment to inform development of the Block 3 prototype. An important step forward would be modelling the design to ensure internal weapons carriage, a feature lacking in the MQ-28A that fired the AMRAAM. (A pylon for carrying the AMRAAM under the aircraft is visible in official photos.)

Internal carriage preserves stealth. If Australia is to employ CCAs in collaboration with stealthy aircraft such as the F-35A, then it’s important to deny an adversary an ability to detect the Ghost Bats, otherwise the Lightning’s stealth becomes pointless.

First look, first shot and first kill—with large numbers of Ghost Bats. This would give the RAAF a tactical edge in future battles.