The Antarctic Treaty is glorified as evidence of managing cooperation in a contested world. Forged in the Cold War, the treaty system has effectively held conflict at bay for almost seven decades. Geopolitics has been artfully managed, if not facilitated, with clear rules to obstruct strategic intent.

But effective is not efficient. Seven decades have ushered in technological advances not dreamt of in the Cold War era of rather basic definitions for ‘peace’, ‘war’ and notions of what constitutes ‘militarisation’.

The Australian Antarctic Territory accounts for an area roughly twice the size of India – a vast sovereign claim, along with Canberra’s other external territories, that so often falls from our national defence and security agenda. With a meagre 2 percent of GDP going into the defence pie, it is no wonder the icy end of the Earth isn’t prioritised.

Yet Antarctica is much more than her dormant territorial claims or history as an arena for the heroic age of global exploration; the continent is a real-time litmus test for the international rules-based order.

Our national discourse centres on upholding an international rules-based order, and we are spending billions to deter threats to it, so this certainly makes last week’s 48th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting an important one to unpack.

More than 400 international delegates came together for 11 days of negotiations in Hiroshima. Not even the City of Peace could cultivate meaningful co-operation on Antarctic affairs, and once more the annual meeting concluded with failure to reach consensus agreement on several key issues.

Treaty consultative parties recognised the need to prioritise the protection of the emperor penguins but failed to agree on binding measures to do so. Delegates celebrated a resolution that encouraged greater information exchange and transparency between treaty parties. But this is, at best, simply a restatement of existing treaty obligations, not genuine progress.

Consensus was also out of reach on arguably the lowest-hanging fruit: the regulation of Antarctic tourism. There is a burgeoning influx of Antarctic tourists (with some 120,000 people heading south in the 2024–25 season alone), but delegates couldn’t reach consensus on a framework to facilitate it.

It also failed to grow the Antarctic Treaty System. Requests from Canada, Belarus and Turkey to gain consultative party (voting) status within the treaty system were discussed but not granted. Consensus was again elusive.

The Antarctic Treaty states the continent ‘shall not become the scene or object of international discord’. Yet, conflict beyond 60 degrees south penetrated the meeting. The Ukrainian delegation flagged that one of its scientists was being detained by Russia on false charges and demanded his immediate release. Russian delegates refuted the claim.

This Ukraine-Russia exchange should have been staved off at the gate by collective Antarctic delegations. Instead, it is probable it will be cited as further evidence of the treaty’s futile nature, not least by Moscow, to exit the agreement.

In previous years, Moscow has sought to kickstart discussions around the utility of the treaty system in contemporary times. This year, Russia did not take the same approach. Moscow moved away from sparking a debate over the relevance of the treaty to the international political environment in which it exists. Instead, Russia homed in on the treaty itself, using this year’s meeting to voice concerns of its operational effectiveness. It cut to the core of its efficiency.

Moscow argued that international cooperation was a ‘binding legal duty’, suggesting parties should ‘report on possible restrictions’ in place that could negatively affect operations in Antarctica. This was less a constructive proposal than a name-and-shame exercise aimed at highlighting double standards on the continent.

Madrid presented a proposal for treaty parties to establish and operate an international Antarctic station. This modest step toward more integrated international arrangements on the ice was clearly an effort to foster cooperation. It also reflected the incredibly limited ambition now embodied by some treaty parties.

The ill-health of the Antarctic Treaty System is also evident through lack of substantive engagement with it. There is clear evidence that major powers are engaging less in treaty governance mechanisms. Take, for example, working papers. These are used by consultative parties to propose specific actions, decisions or legally binding measures.

The United States submitted four working papers in 2024, none in 2025, yet returned with four in 2026. Australia submitted five in 2024, two in 2025 and five again in 2026. Russia submitted three working papers in 2024, two in 2025 and just one in 2026. China submitted one in 2024 and one in 2025, but none this year. China and Russia have clearly reduced their engagement with the Antarctic Treaty System.

The rules-based order in Antarctica has probably stagnated for longer than some corners of our breathtakingly naive Australian Antarctic community would like to admit. Militarisation fears or the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms available are surely no longer principal concerns for Australian interests in Antarctica. The core of the continent’s management framework is rotten.

The 48th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting failed to reach consensus on an accord to protect the emperor penguin. Preservation efforts to safeguard endangered species is an example of the fundamental basis of the Antarctic Treaty System. How can we seriously claim the system is functioning?

We cannot wish away realpolitik to our south, unfolding on sovereign Australian soil. Continuing to do so, at best, reflects a starry-eyed illusion of a world long gone. At worst, it suggests a rather effective foreign influence operation has long captured Australia’s Antarctic strategy.

This article was originally published in The Australian.