On the Indo-Pacific geopolitics gameboard, Indonesia stands as a potentially pivotal piece—a country whose strategic choices could reshape regional dynamics for decades. Yet, as revealed during a recent panel discussion hosted by ASPI USA, Indonesia under President Prabowo Subianto appears as a power adrift: a country with outsized ambitions but lacking the vision and institutional capacity to realise them.
The challenge at hand for Australia and the United States is unlocking Indonesia’s potential and uncovering opportunities for collaboration at a time when conventional institutions are changing.
This was made clear at the 13 May webinar, focused on the security relationship between Indonesia, Australia and the US. Indonesia possesses the geographic expanse, population, and economic potential to be a leading regional player. But its foreign policy is stuck in strategic incoherence: grand pronouncements without sustained follow-through; personalised diplomacy that lacks institutional depth; and a persistent gap between aspirations and capabilities.
A notable emergence from the panel’s insights is the outsized role of presidential personality in Indonesian foreign policy. As ASPI senior analyst Gatra Priyandita observed, Prabowo ‘hasn’t really explained how he seeks to achieve’ his vision of Indonesia as ‘a great power … that has to be respected.’ We instead see a concerning pattern of personalised decision-making disconnected from institutional wisdom.
In contrast, The Asia Group’s Mehu Sitepu noted that to target the most important sectors for trilateral collaboration, the US and Australia needed to ‘begin with the priorities set by President Prabowo … to create jobs, eradicate poverty … and make Indonesia stronger and smarter.’ This indicates a need to lay out Prabowo’s vision as showcased and understand the obstacles and openings that come with this new leadership.
Under Prabowo, Indonesia is looking beyond the Association of Southeast Asian Nations while maintaining its nonaligned foreign policy. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, Indonesia could extract concessions by threatening to align with the opposing bloc. This tactic is far more complicated in today’s multipolar environment. Indonesia’s January accession to BRICS, according to Priyandita, reflects Prabowo’s ‘way of trying to find leverage’ in a complex strategic environment. But leveraging today’s multipolarity requires sophisticated institutional capacity that Indonesia appears to lack.
A recurring theme in the discussion was the gap between Indonesia’s strategic ambitions and its capacity to implement them. This results in abandoned or underdeveloped initiatives. The global maritime fulcrum, envisioned by former president Joko Widodo to transform Indonesia into a proper maritime power, never materialised. Similarly, Indonesia’s attempt to revive the Indian Ocean Rim Association stalled. Even Indonesia’s much touted ASEAN Indo-Pacific strategy has become merely a notable notion with little to back it.
This pattern of grand pronouncements followed by minimal implementation represents a profound strategic weakness. A nation’s credibility in international affairs depends not on what it says, but on what it does. Indonesia’s tendency to announce ambitious initiatives that subsequently wither from neglect damages its reputation as a reliable partner.
Indonesia’s vague strategic direction may make it a less dependable partner in regional security arrangements, but this very uncertainty also presents engagement opportunities for both Washington and Canberra.
The panel suggested that both the US and Australia would benefit from engagement strategies that strengthen Indonesia’s foreign policy institutions rather than focusing exclusively on personal diplomacy with Prabowo. Building institutional capacity within Indonesia’s foreign policy establishment could prove more valuable in the long run than securing fleeting commitments from a mercurial leader.
Moreover, both countries should recognise that Indonesia’s potential as a regional partner depends not just on shared external threat perceptions but on the internal coherence of Jakarta’s strategic outlook. The most valuable Western contribution to Indonesian foreign policy may be support for the development of robust policy institutions that can provide continuity and strategic depth.
The most advantageous areas for the US, Australia, and Indonesia lie in multisectoral opportunities such as agriculture, higher education, and healthcare, as Sitepu discussed. Prabowo’s administration is pursuing bold, populist initiatives that can be met with international collaboration.
In agriculture, Prabowo is leading an ambitious initiative that provides free food to school students. The US and Australia can support this resource-intensive initiative, given their key supplier roles in soybeans and dairy. Additionally, increased focus on food security in Indonesia opens doors in the agricultural technology sector, including logistics, fertilisers, and GMO crops. These efforts could address Indonesia’s trade deficit to the US and boost advanced solutions between Indonesia and the two allied nations.
Investment in higher education provides valuable opportunities for international collaboration. Indonesia understands that it needs to enhance its talent-base to attract foreign investment, especially in competition with regional partners. The Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education, a scholarship focusing on overseas education, has pivoted to domestic education to boost student numbers. The US and Australia could establish campuses in Indonesia, enhancing cross-cultural competency between the nations, facilitating foreign investment, and strengthening Indonesia’s talent base.
Indonesian Minister of Health Budi Gunadi Sadikin is seeking to completely remake Indonesia’s healthcare infrastructure. Sitepu reported that Indonesia had introduced a new program providing annual health checkups that would eventually extend to all citizens. The US and Australia could support this program by providing advanced medical devices, hospital system and insurance models, and clinical expertise. This could benefit all three countries by improving the quality of healthcare in Indonesia and establishing greater trade and investment opportunities for Australia and the US.
If Prabowo plays his cards right and connects on these opportunities, Indonesia could find itself in a more stable position to improve its critical infrastructure, build up its workforce, and establish long-term relationships for foreign investment.
Whether Prabowo can transcend this pattern remains an open question. What is clear is that Indonesia’s current foreign policy approach—drifting between great power nostalgia and diplomatic entrepreneurialism without institutional ballast—falls short of what the moment requires.
Despite the perilous nature of geopolitical shifts across the Indo-Pacific, the new president can prove to be a necessary player, for Prabowo is an opportunist. The real challenge is whether Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and President Donald Trump can focus on Indonesia before the opportunity slips away. Australia may need Indonesia more than Indonesia needs Australia, and the US cannot afford to lose Indonesia as a strategic partner.
For a nation with Indonesia’s potential, strategic drift may threaten regional stability. The Indo-Pacific needs an Indonesia that knows what it wants and has the institutional capacity to pursue it. Until Indonesia develops that strategic clarity, the country will remain Asia’s next great power without ever becoming it.