Australia and Indonesia can no longer afford to treat hybrid threats as an afterthought. From cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns to economic coercion and grey-zone coercion at sea, these challenges are already reshaping the Indo-Pacific’s security environment. If Canberra and Jakarta are serious about regional stability, tackling these threats together should become a strategic priority.
That’s the central message of ASPI’s report published today, Australia–Indonesia Defence and Security Partnership: overcoming asymmetric aspirations to tackle common threats. The report urges both countries to seize the momentum created by the 2024 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and build a more functional, problem-solving security partnership.
The Australia-Indonesia relationship has long been defined by its strategic importance and mutual benefit. However, political crises and fluctuating bilateral dynamics have, at times, hindered the full realisation of the partnership’s potential. The DCA is best understood as a continuation of, rather than an acceleration in, strategic partnership. It provides Canberra with useful avenues to expand its defence relationship with Jakarta, boosting maritime security and humanitarian assistance, at a time when Indonesia finds itself courted by countries that don’t share Australia’s security interests. In particular, the DCA could serve as a springboard for joint efforts to address hybrid threats, representing a timely and necessary step forward in adapting to the evolving security landscape.
Hybrid threats—blending military and non-military tactics—don’t respect borders or alliances. They strike where societies are most vulnerable, including their infrastructure, media ecosystems and economic foundations. Australia and Indonesia, despite their different strategic alignments, face similar risks. Jakarta’s non-aligned stance and Canberra’s alliance with Washington may set them apart geopolitically, but both governments understand the real-world consequences of cyber disruption, fake news and coercive pressure.
That shared understanding creates an opening. By investing in coordinated responses to hybrid threats, the two countries can build a more adaptive and resilient partnership—one grounded in problem-solving rather than abstract notions of strategic convergence.
The DCA offers the tools to do this. It makes it easier for both countries to conduct joint training, exercises and deployments, including at each other’s military bases. Crucially, this cooperation isn’t limited to conventional defence activities. It extends to areas such as technical cooperation, cyber defence, and science and technology exchanges—all essential to building hybrid threat resilience.
Australia and Indonesia should go further. A bilateral hybrid threat taskforce would create a formal mechanism to align their efforts—sharing threat assessments, coordinating responses and bridging military and civilian approaches. Including officials from cyber agencies, foreign ministries and civil society would ensure a whole-of-government, whole-of-society perspective.
Training must be at the heart of this partnership. Both countries should design joint exercises focused on cyber-enabled threats and information warfare. These scenarios aren’t hypothetical; they reflect the evolving character of conflict in the 21st century. Building the capacity to respond together means ensuring that hybrid threat expertise is not confined to a narrow group of defence officials but shared across institutions.
The DCA also facilitates deeper personal and institutional links through expanded education and training exchanges. More Indonesian officers studying in Australia, and vice versa, means a new generation of leaders who understand each other’s strategic cultures, challenges and capabilities. That mutual understanding is vital for effective long-term cooperation.
Of course, structural differences remain. Indonesia’s deep-rooted non-alignment and Australia’s alliance commitments will continue to shape how each country sees its role in the region. A fundamental challenge lies in bridging the two countries’ differing strategic outlooks, as Jakarta’s threat perceptions and foreign policy aspirations differ significantly from Canberra’s. Perceptions of China and Russia diverge significantly when it comes to regional security. But such differences should not preclude pragmatic collaboration. If anything, focusing on shared hybrid vulnerabilities offers a way to keep the relationship anchored in practical results.
Hybrid threats are here to stay. If Australia and Indonesia want to remain secure and sovereign in the face of these evolving risks, they must move from rhetoric to results. The DCA is a powerful starting point. But its potential will only be realised if both countries are willing to invest in joint action, build trust across institutions, and treat hybrid threats not as a niche concern, but as a defining feature of today’s security landscape.
In addition, Australia and Indonesia can take their bilateral cooperation in defence and maritime security to a higher level by bringing the Philippines into their joint military exercises. A trilateral approach wouldn’t require new formal commitments but could meaningfully enhance naval interoperability, improve maritime domain awareness and signal a shared commitment to resisting coercive actions—especially in the South China Sea.
The DCA’s future success will depend on the ability of both sides to manage their differing aspirations, motivations and strategic outlooks in a rapidly deteriorating global security environment.