‘Australia is secure when Papua New Guinea is secure, and Papua New Guinea is secure when Australia is secure.’ So said Billy Joseph, PNG’s minister for defence, at the ASPI Defence Conference in June.
This sentiment underpinned the intent of both governments this week to sign the Papua New Guinea-Australia Mutual Defence Treaty (the Pukpuk Treaty, named after the pidgin term for a crocodile). It contains ambitious measures to deepen the integration between the two nations’ defence forces and elevates their defence relationship to an alliance. It would mark the first such treaty by PNG with another country and would be Australia’s first since the 1950s.
But attention now rests on the failure of the signing to go ahead, reportedly due to the PNG government’s inability to achieve a cabinet quorum. In a country like PNG, with its rugged geography and sometimes unreliable transportation, this isn’t unheard of—especially during a week of national celebrations for the 50th anniversary of independence, when politicians were expected to be in their electorates.
However, it’s notable that this treaty was an initiative of the PNG government of Prime Minister James Marape, not Australia, and needed investment of significant political capital on his part, notwithstanding Joseph’s clear articulation of the interdependency of PNG and Australia’s security. So, Marape’s failing to pull his cabinet together in time for a significant signing while Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was in the country for the anniversary celebrations is odd.
Likely at play here is a mix of some cabinet members’ concerns over sovereignty (heightened by the anniversary being one of independence from Australian colonial administration), a variety of special interests, and China’s campaign across the region against such partnerships, which weaken its influence and coercive hand.
Whatever the cause for the delay, the prospects are still good for an eventual signing, though the treaty would still be subject to parliamentary ratification. The strategic trends and fears shaping the region towards greater integration aren’t going away. Indeed, they’re accentuating. Hence Marape’s statement that ‘in the interests of protecting the country, I’m making this call’ and his ensuring that at least a communique was signed with Albanese before he left.
A constant thought plaguing the minds of regional capitals is the deterioration of the geopolitical environment, typified by Beijing’s military parade this month, which complemented its decades-long bellicosity and military intimidation of neighbours—ranging from Japan to Taiwan, the Philippines, India and beyond. Concerns can only have been accentuated by President Xi Jinping’s invitation of a who’s who of international autocratic leaders who shared his penchant for military intimidation and revanchism.
Such concerns had already driven PNG down the path of integration with a trusted partner in Australia. As Joseph noted in his address in June, ‘PNG stands with Australia and those countries that share the same values and that we have strategic trust in, and also countries that subscribe to an international rules-based order and a free and open Indo-Pacific.’ This belief has already manifested in a deeper defence relationship in recent years. Examples are Australian investments in key defence infrastructure, the appointment of a PNG officer as deputy commander of the Australian Army’s 3rd Brigade while Australian officers are stationed with PNG units in Wewak and Port Moresby, and PNG’s hosting this year of part of Exercise Talisman Sabre. Indeed, PNG became the first country other than Australia to ever do so.
For Canberra, deeper regional integration is a key theme in Pacific policy, as reflected in the 2023 Falepili Union treaty with Tuvalu, the 2024 Nauru-Australia Treaty, the 2025 Nakamal Treaty with Vanuatu and in the earlier rugby league deal with PNG. The areas dealt with in such initiatives, ranging from climate to critical infrastructure to security and development, speak to shared interests across the region in stability, good governance and prosperity. Canberra sees an integrated approach to defending these interests as necessary inoculation against the converging threats and malign interests that now characterise the more dangerous world we live in.
As our closest neighbour, PNG has occupied Australian strategic thought and invoked concerns about being a launch pad for threats to Australia since the 1800s. Initial anxieties about German and French colonisation manifested in Australia’s first independent military operation, against Germany’s northern New Guinea colony in World War I, and were realised starkly in World War II when Imperial Japan invaded New Guinea as a precursor to isolate and potentially invade Australia. These fears borne of strategic geography are still in Australian thought today, with Canberra having worked closely with Port Moresby since independence to ensure that their mutual security interests are safeguarded through bilateral defence cooperation.
Canberra will also be mindful of Papua New Guinea’s growing status as a gateway between Asia and the Pacific, helped by its resource wealth, energy potential and ambition to exercise regional leadership. Its estimated population of almost 11 million vastly eclipses the combined total of Pacific Island countries and is expected to double every 30 years, putting it on a path to be potentially bigger than Australia’s by mid-century. Among the states of the southwest Pacific, it is the power already and will only become increasingly so, shaping its neighbours and the region as it does so.
This proposed alliance is not just about dealing with the problems of today. It is a choice between two sovereign neighbours to invest in their shared future, to their mutual benefit and to the region’s.