Australia’s latest national wastewater monitoring report confirms what many in law enforcement already know: methamphetamine consumption is soaring, hitting record highs nationwide. The central problem is that while Australian police and border agencies continue to seize staggering volumes of drugs, these successes are dwarfed by the industrial-scale production in Myanmar’s Shan State. To combat the drug trade, Australia should reconsider whom to work with inside Myanmar, and it should engage more with Southeast Asian countries.

The post-coup surge in methamphetamine production in Shan State has created a transnational drug crisis that now directly undermines Australia’s security. Despite strong interdiction efforts, the scale of domestic consumption revealed by Report 24 ^[1] of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission’s National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program underscores the futility of enforcement efforts alone. Methamphetamine consumption rose to 12,815 kilograms in 2023–24, up 21 percent on the previous year and an unprecedented record. This entrenched demand shows that even as the Australian Border Force and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) seized 33.7 tonnes of illicit drugs and precursors last year, supply lines remain unbroken.

The crisis is not entirely homegrown. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has documented ^[2] how the Golden Triangle—the remote jungle-covered borderlands of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand—has become the epicentre of synthetic drug production. Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar has fractured into widespread conflict. Yet in Shan State, areas linked to drug production have remained relatively stable. That combination of instability elsewhere and stability in production zones has created an environment ideal for cartel-style expansion.

New trafficking routes reflect the industrial scale of operations. UNODC reports that one of the fastest-growing channels now runs from Shan State through Laos into Cambodia, with onward flows to Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. In parallel, methamphetamine is pouring through India’s porous northeast border ^[3]. Diversification of routes makes addressing the issue harder and stretches regional law enforcement capacity thin.

For Australia, the consequences are stark. AFP estimates ^[4] suggest around 70 percent of the crystalline methamphetamine consumed in Australia originates in northeastern Myanmar before moving through Southeast Asia and on to this country by sea. This means that Australian efforts alone, no matter how effective, cannot disrupt the supply chain at its source.

Australia’s upstream engagement is deeply compromised. Despite scaling back cooperation with Myanmar’s junta-controlled police, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission reports ^[5] that the junta continues to share intelligence on drug exports. But the credibility of this intelligence is questionable. The same military-backed militias and networks accused of profiting from the trade sit at the core of the junta’s apparatus. To rely on their information is to risk legitimising or even enabling the very actors driving the meth boom.

In such circumstances, Australia should reconsider whom it engages with. It should shift attention away from the junta and toward more credible and legitimate stakeholders. That means building information-sharing channels with Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), which enjoys democratic legitimacy, as well as with civil society organisations working on drug harm reduction and community resilience. These groups, while lacking the coercive power of the state, offer a pathway to address root causes, including corruption and poverty, without reinforcing the junta’s stranglehold.

Regionally, the scale of the methamphetamine crisis demands a collective response. No single nation can dismantle these networks. An October 2024 pledge ^[6] by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to strengthen action against synthetic drugs provides a valuable foundation. Australia should collaborate with ASEAN partners, including Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaysia, to expand joint operations, enhance intelligence exchange and invest in coordinated enforcement along trafficking routes. Importantly, these initiatives must be inclusive of non-state actors, such as the NUG and credible non-governmental organisations, ensuring that the fight targets the fundamental drivers of the trade rather than bolstering complicit regimes.

This approach is not without risk. Engaging with the NUG or civil society may provoke pushback from the junta or complicate diplomatic relations. But the current strategy, relying on intelligence and cooperation from actors with vested interests in sustaining the drug trade, has already failed. The meth crisis is no longer a distant regional problem; it is fuelling record consumption and record profits that fund instability across Southeast Asia and reach deep into Australian communities.

The wastewater data is a warning, telling us that methamphetamine is entrenched in Australia. Seizures, though critical, are not reducing consumption, and the industrial heart of the trade remains untouched in Shan State. To shift the tide, Australia must recalibrate. That means rethinking whom it partners with, doubling down on regional multilateral action and recognising that counter-narcotics is inseparable from the broader struggle for legitimacy and stability in Myanmar.

Failure to act decisively will see the meth boom continue unchecked, fuelling addiction at home and instability abroad. The alternative is more complex but necessary: targeting the problem at its source through smarter, more legitimate partnerships and a coordinated regional response that strips profit and power from those who thrive on this deadly trade.