Australia should support the Trump Administration’s proposed Golden Dome missile defence system. By participating in development, deployment and operation of Golden Dome, Australia could rely on it partly for defence against attack by long-range missiles.
This would help close the gap left by Canberra’s repeated failure to get an integrated air-and-missile defence (IAMD) system into service.
Australia also would gain technologically and industrially from participating in Golden Dome.
The primary goals should be to enhance protection of military infrastructure in the north and to benefit strategically from enhanced defence cooperation with the United States and other allies in the Indo-Pacific. Such collaboration can produce valuable opportunities for burden sharing in meeting a serious military threat, not only to Australia but also to its allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific.
Despite promotion by the Trump Administration, the proposed network of ground-based and space-based sensors and interceptor systems will not provide a leak-proof astrodome that shields against a massive attack of nuclear-armed ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles. An attacker could always flood a defensive system with more warheads, penetration aids and decoys, or begin by attacking the defences themselves.
But such enemy action would amount to a massive nuclear attack, guaranteeing an equally massive retaliation by the US. Even with Golden Dome, the principles underpinning mutually assured destruction (‘MAD’) and deterrence still are relevant.
Where Golden Dome may become most useful is in countering limited missile threats, either against the US and allied military forces that are forward deployed as part of a coalition in a future war or against the territories of key allies, including Australia. Strengthening deterrence by denial is the best justification for developing and building Golden Dome, and for Australia’s participation in the program.
Meanwhile, the need Australia to build an IAMD complex is clear. Working on Golden Dome could help.
China’s rapid expansion of its long-range missile capabilities has given it the ability to hit targets across northern Australia with conventional or nuclear warheads, such as the DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). The hypersonic DF-27 has similar range and poses an even greater threat due to the manoeuvrability of its hypersonic glide vehicle. Air-launched ballistic missiles carried on H-6N bombers and advanced cruise and ballistic missiles launched from the air or from submarines and ships could easily strike Australia.
The ADF must be able to counter such threats—but doesn’t. Although development of a Joint Air Battle Management System (JABMS) under the IAMD program, AIR 6500, has made some progress, and short-range air defence missiles such as NASAMS are being acquired, there is little progress on acquiring long-range interceptor missiles. The government points to the anti-ballistic missile capabilities of SM-6 missiles on the navy’s three destroyers, but these are no substitute for land-based systems.
The 2024 Integrated Investment Program (page 67) pushed back any consideration of acquisition of interceptor missiles until 2026.
As I’ve argued previously, Australia needs IAMD systems fast, including land-based interceptors that can protect vital military facilities in the north against intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles.
Participating in Golden Dome it would open the opportunity for the Australian Defence Force to contribute, and benefit from, boost-phase interception. Space-based sensor and weapons can destroy a missile in this phase, when it’s still gathering speed.
Certainly, there are technical challenges with using space-based boost-phase intercept, particularly building and launching enough sensors and interceptor systems for continuous coverage of likely adversary launch locations. But we are in an era of mega-constellations of small, low-cost satellites and high-payload, low-cost reusable space launch.
So we can achieve much more on a given budget than could be at the time of 1980s and 1990s US space-based missile-defence programs. The SpaceX Starship launcher, still under development, will cut costs further, by hurling 100 tonnes into low Earth orbit at a cost of perhaps only US$10 million.
Australian support for Golden Dome could initially take the form of local assembly of space-based sensors, then using Australian launch providers operating from Australian launch sites, and even via landing and re-launch of Starship from Australia to augment and where necessary reconstitute Golden Dome’s orbital equipment a crisis. The importance of resilient satellite communications to support the command and control of Golden Dome could allow Australia to play a vital role in the southern hemisphere. Hosting enhanced space-domain awareness to support the defence of Golden Dome against adversary counterspace threats is another possibility.
Golden Dome is controversial, with critics saying it would threaten deterrence stability and arms control in space. But the space domain is already rapidly becoming a warfighting domain, as China and Russia deploy a full range of counterspace capabilities.
The criticism also ignores a more nuanced perception of the role of space-based missile defence to counter the very real threat of limited strikes. It won’t be a leak-proof shield against a massive attack, but when seen in the context of strengthening deterrence by denial in partnership with allies, Golden Dome is worth supporting.