Unexpectedly, today’s signature weapon is the Iranian Shahed drone now in use in wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. These drones are not just a distant problem. Their range means that, if launched from Russia, North Korea or China, they can reach across all of Northeast Asia and most of Southeast Asia.

That means that Australian sea, land or air forces deployed north would also be within range of them or weapons of similar design. Moreover, much of Australia would be in range of such munitions launched by an enemy lodged on islands to the northwest, north and northeast.

And any country for which Russia, North Korea or China is a weapon supplier will most likely get Shaheds or similar weapons, so the area threatened by them will probably grow.

The principal defence problem presented by Shaheds, which are essentially piston-engined cruise missiles, is affordable mass. Large numbers can be quickly built and then used in quantity to overwhelm most nations’ air defences. Many can be bought for the cost of one jet cruise missile. The same challenge will be raised, and probably worsened, by new designs from other countries using the same concept.

While there are many types of Shaheds, the best-known is the Shahed-136, a medium size 400 kg weight drone about 3.5 metres long and powered by a two stroke piston engine. It is slow, with a maximum speed of about 180 km/h, but crucially has an astonishing claimed range of 2,500 km.

Its guidance system uses unjammable inertial navigation updated by jammable satellite navigation. The Shahed-136’s accuracy is mediocre and, since it has a warhead of only 20 kg, it is most effective when used in large numbers to attack an area. This favours long-range strikes against cities, transport networks and lightly built civilian and military infrastructure.

Australia needs to consider how it will defend itself against such weapons.

Shaheds are typically launched in large numbers in waves at night. They can fly as low as 30 metres. The pilot of a fighter can engage them using manoeuvres that would suit a ground target. But it’s hard for radars to pick them out against clutter from the ground, particularly if there are road vehicles in the area moving at speed.

If the fighters have modern radars – those with active, electronically scanned arrays – and imaging targeting equipment, as Australian F-35 Lightnings and F/A-18F Super Hornets do, they’re better able to find and shoot down Shaheds with air-to-air missiles. In the Middle East, the AIM-9X version of the heat-seeking Sidewinder missile is preferred for the job. US experience reveals that shooting down a Shahed with a fighter gun is almost impossible.

The fighter aircraft are normally positioned as a barrier that the Shaheds need to penetrate to reach their targets. The positioning can be greatly assisted by the use of air-surveillance radar aircraft, such as the E-7 Wedgetail that the Royal Australian Air Force has sent to the United Arab Emirates.

In shooting down Shaheds in Ukraine and the Middle East, many thousands of expensive air-to-air missiles designed for air combat have been fired. So, the United States and others are switching to inexpensive laser-guided adaptations of simple air-to-ground rockets. A fighter can typically carry 42 of them in six pods, so it can engage 42 drones if it has enough time on a mission and doesn’t miss any. For Australia, the problem there is that the missile design has not been integrated onto the F-35 and Super Hornet.

For close-in point defence against drones that survive and cross the fighter barrier, Australia could use the air-defence missiles and guns of warships that are in the right locations. The US Navy has had success shooting down Houthi Shahed drones in the Red Sea, though it’s extremely costly to use naval interceptors worth millions of dollars each to shoot down drones costing tens of thousands.

Once Shaheds had headed inland, the Australian Army’s NASAMs batteries, which fire AIM-120 Amraams, could be used. As the army’s AH-64E Apache helicopters become fully operational in the next few years, they could also be used to shoot down Shaheds using 30 mm guns.

But there are better and specialised ways of countering Shaheds. Ukraine has built a comprehensive defence system with sensors in the air and on the ground. These include radars and acoustic devices able to cue drone interceptors, fighters, surface-to-air missile systems and automated guns. Importantly, Ukraine is also skilled in electromagnetic countermeasures, decoys, deception, dispersion and hardening potential targets. Ukraine defeated 86 percent of the thousands of Shahed-type Russian drones fired in 2025.

Of note, Ukraine’s new very-low cost interceptor drones are now killing about 70 percent of the Shahed-like drones that Russia is launching. The interceptor drones are a major step forward, though they need skilled operators and at least favourable weather. Unsurprisingly, Russia is adopting quick fixes, such as making its drones fly higher, follow complex routes and, when engaged, manoeuvre. It’s also fitting them with electromagnetic countermeasures and even anti-aircraft missiles.

Today’s Shahed-type drones are a clear warning of the emergence of mass in modern warfare. It gets worse from here. Most air defence systems currently in service are intended for attacks by limited numbers of crewed aircraft and cruise missiles. Heterogenous air power involves not just those but also large numbers of rockets, ballistic missiles and drones used in clever combinations. Building future integrated air and missile defence systems, such as the one that Australia is planning to build, must now include countering mass heterogeneity.

This won’t be easy. Start now. Maybe start yesterday.