In fighting an asymmetric war against a much larger adversary, Ukraine has sought to leverage technology wherever possible. First came the proliferation of first-person-view (FPV) drones across the battlefield. Now, uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) are beginning to spread across the front line.

For Ukraine, manpower has been one of the war’s greatest constraints. Heavy casualties have made preserving soldiers increasingly important, driving efforts to replace people with machines wherever possible.

‘In April, UGVs performed over 10,000 missions. Most of these are logistic operations: delivering supplies to the front line and back,’ said Ihor Shmyryov, head of the UGV department at procurement organisation Brave1. He believes Ukraine should be able to meet President Volodymyr Zelensky’s target of supplying 50,000 UGVs to the armed forces this year with ease.

While both Russia and Ukraine are experimenting with UGVs, Ukraine has been the more ambitious adopter, integrating robotic systems into logistics, casualty evacuation, engineering tasks and, increasingly, combat operations.

‘UGVs can cover around 90 percent of logistics if everything is set up properly,’ said Ivan Halenko, a Ukrainian officer. ‘If the unit has the resources, personnel and clear organisation, then it works well.’

Ukrainian manufacturers are mounting machine guns and automatic grenade launchers on UGVs, creating what one developer described as small tanks able to hunt Russian infiltration teams without exposing Ukrainian soldiers to enemy fire. ‘The military increasingly views these systems as expendable,’ said Yuliia Trybushna of NUMO Robotics. ‘The goal is to lose robots instead of people.’

However, training of UGV operators remains a bottleneck. Technology-focused NGOs such as Dignitas Ukraine help address the gap by providing training, but not all brigades can afford to take soldiers from the front for the few months that may be needed.

‘Units also often lack enough people,’ said Halenko. ‘It is not enough to simply grab someone and bring them in.’ Many of the soldiers who are working on robotics simply had an interest in electronics, began working on the technology, and kept progressing, according to Halenko.

That reflects a defining feature of Ukraine’s defence innovation ecosystem. Rather than being driven by central planning, technological advances are often born on the front line, where soldiers rapidly adapt systems in response to operational needs.

‘Real change in the Ukrainian military is coming from the ground up, from volunteers and innovation,’ said Pavel Shurmei, commander of the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment.

However, fast innovation from Ukraine’s decentralised procurement model comes with its downsides. A common pain point has been a zoo of solutions. There are too many competing designs, which make it challenging at times to standardise operations. Russia, by contrast, can mandate a top-down approach, directing units to adopt a particular technology.

‘Russia lacks the decentralised, free-market tech ecosystem that we have,’ said Shmyryov. ‘They rely on a highly centralised, top-down approach – selecting just one or two solutions and funnelling state resources into them.’ However, he added that a lack of agility in the Russian system hinders robotic innovation.

Halenko says Ukrainian forces work with many different models. ‘There is no single unified model, no standard set of 10 UGV variants,’ he said. ‘Instead, there are dozens of UGV types from different manufacturers. They are not standardised. They have different parts, different nuts and bolts, different motors, different power connectors. Everything is different.’

Standardising components, developing common doctrine and reducing the number of competing platforms have become priorities as the military seeks to integrate UGVs at scale. Shmyryov noted that there are around 270 domestic manufacturers and 550 different models. ‘Only around 20 to 25 companies are producing systems at scale,’ said Trybushna.

Even then, battlefield conditions generate constant engineering challenges. ‘Different terrain requires different designs,’ she said. ‘Some areas favour tracked vehicles, while others favour wheeled systems.’

Tracks can be damaged, mobility can degrade in difficult terrain such as heavy black soil, and systems frequently require rapid modifications based on front line feedback.

As a result, manufacturers have become an extension of the battlefield support network. ‘We maintain a 24/7 service department that supports units in real time,’ said Trybushna, allowing problems identified at the front to be diagnosed and incorporated into new iterations within days rather than months.

Dmytro, a soldier with Ukraine’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, said there was a challenge with the sheer number of different models, adding that this was the reality of wartime. ‘A lot of money is flowing into this sector, and every manufacturer is trying to capture market share by improving its design, adding new features and scaling production,’ said Dmytro. ‘As a result, there are a huge number of competing platforms, with each company pushing its own model.’

Developing AI for UGVs is also proving difficult. ‘The terrain is full of obstacles, and the technical requirements are very different, which makes developing effective AI systems for UGVs an even harder problem,’ said Vitaliy Goncharuk, chief executive of A19Lab and former chairman of the Artificial Intelligence Committee of Ukraine.

Still, Ukraine’s challenge is no longer proving that ground robots work. It is scaling them. Success will depend on training operators, standardising platforms and integrating robotic units into military doctrine. Over time, Ukraine’s Darwinian battlefield innovation ecosystem will weed out ineffective designs, while the most successful systems grow in demand.

For a country with fewer soldiers than its adversary, UGVs are becoming another way to trade machines for manpower. As one Ukrainian commander put it, the future battlefield follows a simple principle: ‘Metal goes first.’