Thank you for the invitation to appear today in relation to the Royal Commissions Legislation Amendment (Protections for Providing Information) Bill.

I register my strong support for the establishment of the royal commission to inquire into the 14 December 2025 terrorist atrocity at Bondi. A royal commission was the only appropriate response to the worst terrorist attack yet carried out on Australian soil, against a background of sustained political violence, extremism and antisemitism. It’s only appropriate too that the Richardson Review’s work be folded into the royal commission’s proceedings.

It’s my hope that the input from that review will serve as starting point for the royal commission’s consideration of the matters captured in term of reference C relating to intelligence and security—notably c(vi) through c(ix)—and not an end point. That’s why it’s important that the royal commission is able to question, and take evidence from, intelligence community witnesses, both representatives of agencies but also those who might have additional knowledge of the matters in question (including those volunteering that information).

Indeed, passage of this bill will itself likely send a positive signal to those who might have information to volunteer.

My strong support for Australia’s current secrecy provisions leads me to support the bill’s requirement that information imparted be through arrangement made between the royal commission and the Commonwealth.

It’s my belief that it was not the intention of the parliament in having previously passed those secrecy protections for them to inadvertently hamper the work of royal commissions—given they are the highest form of judicial inquiry in the country and commissioned by the executive.

Ideally testimony and evidence given to a royal commission should be made publicly where possible. But the reality of the national-security classified and other sensitive information that is the subject of this bill means that it may need to be provided in camera. This reflects the intensity and potential consequences of Australia’s intelligence contest with adversaries and other bad actors.

It also reflects undertakings given to intelligence partners when exchanging intelligence information. In this regard I do note that article 4.2(c) of the Intelligence Information Protection Arrangement [struck between intelligence agency heads and the royal commission] seems to require the written approval of a head of an intelligence entity for any disclosure to the royal commission of ‘foreign government information’ as distinct from other forms of intelligence information that might be volunteered.

I do note one misgiving, which first arose in reading the amendments to division 122 in Part 5.6 of the Criminal Code establishing a defence to an offence under that division where a person communicates or deals with information for the primary purpose of providing it to a royal commission and the person has a reasonable belief that the information is relevant to the inquiry.

My concern on first reading was not with the intent of the amendment but with potentially inadvertent consequences for security.

I understand now from evidence given by the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) yesterday that this particular amendment provides a defence only in relation to general secrecy offences and not to the other offences specific to particular legislation concerning the intelligence agencies.

But despite that clarification, and the broader discussion in yesterday’s hearing, I still harbour concerns about the potential for persons with privileged access to sensitive information to take actions such as the removal, copying, unofficial storage and communication of that information in ways that might prove to be insecure, exposing that sensitive information to loss or acquisition by adversaries.

I am well assured by yesterday’s statements from both AGD and the Office of the Royal Commission about how a volunteer’s verbal testimony can be securely imparted. I am less assured about how—as a practical matter—related documents and artefacts are to be treated—including the generation and handling of classified notes made in support of verbal testimony.

It seems to me also that there is a certain responsibility on the part of agencies in this regard to provide suitably secure (and protected) means for any such preparatory action by staff members seeking to exercise this option. For example, by classified email connectivity that keeps classified material relevant to the royal commission within a classified system. And to ensure all staff are confident that use of those means for this purpose will be protected and respected—including from administrative actions.

This situation is not wholly alien to the agencies—after all there are existing requirements to provide staff with similarly secure means for handling and communication of classified material—coupled with protection of the staff making such disclosures—in relation to bodies like the Inspector-General of Intelligence & Security, or even internal ombudsmen.

Further clarifying this issue—i.e. through recommendation of the committee—could avoid an unwelcome gap in security arising between origin inside an agency and information’s receipt and secure storage by a royal commission. It could also avoid the more general undermining of agency security practices and culture.

My thanks again for this opportunity.

This is a lightly edited version of Chris Taylor’s opening statement at the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence & Security’s 6 March 2026 hearing into the Royal Commissions Legislation Amendment (Protections for Providing Information) Bill 2026.