This September, Britain will rename Strategic Command as the Cyber & Specialist Operations Command (CSOC) following emphasis on the cyber and electromagnetic (CyberEM) domain within the Strategic Defence Review issued on 2 June, marking deep organisational and doctrinal transformation. While the change is high-level, and doesn’t reflect much restructuring, it is a significant expression of prioritisation and intent. This will hopefully see some level of replication within US and Australian military organisations creating more flexible and adaptable forces in light of the complexity of modern operations.
The CSOC will house a range of critical defence functions and agencies, including: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; Defence Intelligence; joint command and control for targeting; the Integrated Global Defence Network; Special Forces; Defence Medical Services; and the Defence Academy.
The Strategic Defence Review recognised that operations in the cyber domain and the electromagnetic spectrum were integral for Britain’s defence. One of the most consequential recent initiatives was establishment of a new CyberEM Command, designed to counter a range of threats through the unification of Britain’s cyber, electromagnetic and information operations into a single structure. As indicated within the Strategic Defence Review, CyberEM Command will be established within Strategic Command and aim to reach initial operating capacity this year.
Traditionally, electromagnetic warfare (EW) and cyber warfare were considered separate. However, their intertwining, a response to the modern battlespace complexity, has seen the United States and now Britain ensure that cyber and EW are capable of strategic alignment—fusing capabilities to provide centralised direction on prioritisation of, and standards for, cyber, electromagnetic warfare and information operations. The US has taken the next step by ensuring these capabilities and more can be combined at the tactical level. US Cyber Command is responsible for EW capabilities and has established a unit, the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, with the aim of operating across the spectrum of the warfighting domains within a single area of operations.
The unification of CyberEM with other capabilities under a single command consolidates Britain’s ability to counter complex threats that often involve coordinated cyber, information, electronic and kinetic attacks. The US Army’s 20th Special Forces Group demonstrated such integration in an exercise this year in which special operations forces executed coordinated actions that enabled real-time detection, tracking, identification and neutralisation of a notional biological threat. Practically, the multi-domain effects were demonstrated last month in Operation Spiderweb by Ukraine and Rising Lion by Israel and in a range of other multi-domain activities seen in Ukraine. There, cyber operations range from tactical support to strategic tools of disruption, and electromagnetic measures flood the battlespace.
Importantly, the Strategic Defence Review distinguishes the roles of the new CyberEM Command from the existing National Cyber Force. CyberEM Command is given responsibility for coherence across defence and acts as the primary military point of contact for matters related to cyber and electromagnetic capabilities. This will result in centralising the authorities and responsibilities for decision-making to avoid duplication and reduce inefficiency.
Other significant capability additions to Britain’s arsenal under the CSOC include the Digital Targeting Web and the Rapid Innovation Team. The Digital Targeting Web is an AI-driven battlefield system designed to integrate military platforms, from individual soldiers up to ships and armoured vehicles. The Rapid Innovation Team enables innovation at wartime pace by using commercially available dual-use technology to address the most urgent operational problems.
The combination of integrated targeting and the ability to scale capabilities in the face of fluid operational requirements will affect both non-deployed defensive postures and the military’s ability to impact the battlespace. Western armed forces must greatly reduce time for developing and deploying battlefield technologies.
Since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, analysts and armed forces have closely observed the growth of widespread drone use, followed by electromagnetic saturation, the rise of drones guided by optical fibre, and then artificial intelligence drone control. GMLRS and Excalibur GPS-guided munitions have been delivered and subsequently jammed, and the Russian navy has been kept in ports.
While it would be inaccurate to portray early Russian advances during the initial invasion as evidence that manoeuvre warfare has been superseded, it’s now clear that network-centric warfare through multidomain operations can shape tactical level outcomes.
Complexity of change in digital information environments is not only driven by technologies and specialists but also by culture and the will to adapt and pivot in the face of the changing nature of warfare. The raising of capabilities alone would not be sufficient for Australia to achieve what Britain has done.
To do this, Australia would need to restructure the way it conducts analysis for upcoming capabilities and significantly speed up procurement. Doctrine would need to be amended to ensure that new capabilities were positioned and used in a way that they can effectively influence the battlefield. Apart from recognising shortfalls in Australian Defence Force electromagnetic capabilities, Australia needs to change how it implements, deploys and wins conflicts within the cyber and multi domain sphere.