While the People’s Liberation Army has undergone a series of reorganisations in recent years, what we saw on 17 October represented a new direction. The Ministry of National Defense announced that nine military personnel had been stripped of their party and military ranks. This came shortly before the Fourth Plenum, a major meeting of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee focused on the country’s strategic outlook.
The affected personnel included He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Miao Hua, director of the CMC Political Work Department. A spokesperson for the ministry said that these people were ‘suspected of serious crimes that are in flagrant violation of Party discipline and related to their duties, involving large sums of money and having extremely negative repercussions’.
What’s peculiar is that all nine of the disgraced military officers were high-ranking tigers—senior generals—and that the purge encompassed a wide range of military service. The CMC Equipment Development Department and the PLA Rocket Force have been the main targets of anti-corruption campaigns in recent years, but the latest changes included commanders responsible for readiness. Dismissing not only officers responsible for procurement and personnel matters, but also operational commanders, may affect war combat readiness.
The purge of Lin Xiangyang (commander of the Eastern Theater Command), Wang Xiubin (permanent deputy director of the CMC Joint Operations Center) and Wang Qubin (commander of the Rocket Force) means the loss of personnel who were responsible for improving joint operational capabilities. Minister for National Defense Dong Jun, who has a naval background and has long observed the East and South China seas, was rumoured also to have lost his post. However, he was confirmed to be safe at the Fourth Plenum.
Considered alongside the 2024 reorganisation of the PLA Strategic Support Force, these changes suggest that, although President Xi Jinping is still seeking to make the military a ‘fighting and winning force’ in the long term, he does not envisage an immediate contingency.
This purge also raises questions about the Xi’s control over the military. Many of these senior generals had experience with or worked in the elite 31st Group Army (known since 2017 as the 73rd Group Army) and were considered close to Xi, having worked with him since his days as a local leader. They were all appointed as senior generals after careful observation by Xi. It is unclear whether their downfall indicates a change in trust between Xi and military cadres, or an increasingly fierce power struggle within the military. In any case, observers cannot reliably use career proximity to the president as the only criterion for promotion in the military.
Furthermore, Xi’s distrust of the military is undoubtedly deep-rooted. China’s 3 September military parade demonstrated that Xi’s authority over the PLA remained strong. However, his view of the armed forces is tinged with suspicion, and it has become clear that his tight control has not improved the military’s stability or ethics.
The promotion of Zhang Shengmin from head of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission to become its vice president demonstrates Xi’s way of controlling the military. To the surprise of Chinese observers, Zhang, a political commissar and then lieutenant general, became a member in 2017 while commanders of branches of the armed forces lost their posts in the CMC. This was a clear indication of Xi’s anti-corruption focus and his approach to controlling the military. Zhang’s elevation to the commission’s vice presidency suggests that the president’s punitive control of the military through anti-corruption measures will persist.
Another thing that became clear at the Fourth Plenum was that there was more turmoil in the military than in the party. Eight senior generals lost their Party Central Committee membership, but no appointments were announced to fill the military’s vacant seats, despite the replenishment of 11 civilian memberships. Since the 1987 Central Committee meeting, military representatives have occupied around 20 percent of Central Committee seats. If the military seats are not replaced, it will mean not a strengthening of the party’s control over the military but rather a decline in the military’s political influence in the party.
The fact that replacements have not yet been appointed suggests that the military is still in turmoil. Of the 205 Central Committee members appointed in 2022, only 168 (around 80 percent) attended the Fourth Plenum, held from 20 to 23 October. A significant proportion of military representatives were absent from the meeting, although their political disqualifications were not reported. If their absence indicates that anti-corruption investigations are ongoing, further accusations may emerge in the future.
There are quite a few unknowns at this point. The return of the minister of defense to the CMC, as well as appointments to replace the heads of the Political Work Department and the Discipline Inspection Commission, are uncertain. If currently unfilled CMC seats remain vacant, membership numbers will decline from seven to only four. While we don’t yet know the full reasoning behind the military purge, one thing is clear: the military will remain in turmoil after the Fourth Plenum.