Almost six years since Covid-19 shocked the world, the risk is that pandemic readiness slips precisely as the conditions for the next outbreak intensify.

At the end of 2019, the world was not dealing with wars in Europe and the Middle East, escalation of tensions in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, nor inflation and political fragmentation. Yet even then, the global system struggled to respond to a pathogen emergence that hadn’t been forecast. Today, the same vulnerabilities persist—but the geostrategic environment is more divided and distracted. Have we learnt enough lessons to be both better prepared and more resilient?

In this context, the work of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI)—creator of the 100 Days Mission to deliver a safe, effective vaccine within 100 days of identifying a new pathogen—remains essential, and the organisation itself has become a critical component of the international health security architecture. CEPI’s mission is simple but transformative: to accelerate the development of vaccine and biologic medical countermeasures against epidemic and pandemic threats so they are accessible to all in need. Endorsed by G7 and G20 leaders, the 100 Days Mission is one of the century’s most consequential public-health undertakings.

CEPI’s plan for 2022 to 2026, which is known as CEPI 2.0 and is nearing completion, has largely delivered on its goals: demonstrating the feasibility of rapid vaccine development, building global scientific networks and advancing the 100-day target. But the next phase, CEPI 3.0, will require scale and endurance. Vaccine equity, regulatory standards and supply-chain positioning have become new arenas of geostrategic competition. The tide of antivax sentiment, spread through the channels of misinformation and disinformation, has risen, and new threats are on the horizon: viruses with targeted biological activity and novel genomes, generated by artificial intelligence, have recently been created by scientists using large language models.

Australia’s engagement with CEPI to date is a story of trust and impact. CEPI 3.0, for 2027 to 2031, offers the opportunity to move from proof of concept to full operational readiness: embedding the systems, partnerships and manufacturing capacity that can make pandemic prevention a practical reality. Sustaining momentum requires continued investment in vaccines, diagnostics, genomic sequencing, surveillance, clinical-trial infrastructure and manufacturing and delivery mechanisms.

But CEPI and the global health-security landscape face their most demanding phase, amid conflicts, climate change, trade wars and social unrest, all against a backdrop of fiscal constraint. Climate change is altering vector patterns and pathogen dynamics for known threats. It is also, understandably, taking up significant government resources; in Australia’s case with a focus on the COP31 meeting in 2026. That focus can’t be at the expense of health security. Strengthening vaccine research, manufacturing and delivery systems in Southeast Asia and the Pacific is no longer optional; it is a core global risk-reduction measure.

The potential reduction of US government global health funding—historically among the top three contributors for nearly every priority viral family and the principal funder for most—means that other countries will need to step up if we are to make progress towards the 100 Days Mission and maintain the vaccine-development pipeline. Countries such as Australia must not expect the United States to cover the rest of our health bills, just as we must be self-reliant in terms of our national defence. Investment is in our national interest and will encourage the US to retain its global security outlook, not despite an America First policy but as a part of achieving it.

That’s because health security is national security—assisting sovereignty and regional stability. Fiscal counting rules determine whether government funding of pandemic preparedness is recorded as discretionary aid, sunk health expenditure or as investment in national resilience. If we measure such investment as contributing to core economic and security infrastructure, rather than as optional welfare spending, the value proposition changes. Genuine government investment in the health security protecting Australia and the region could be considered under a defence funding framework more like the way NATO calculates its new target for defence spending of 5 percent of GDP, made up of 3.5 for direct military spending and 1.5 on the enablers.

We know that military-civil integration played a key role globally in responding to Covid-19, with the involvement and planning of the defence apparatus engendering trust in the most uncertain times. But subsequent defence strategies and royal commissions have reiterated that the military should be the last resort for such crises, not the first call. These reminders of Defence’s primary role to deter aggression by human actors are important but will no doubt be tested by the next crisis—more so if we haven’t prepared.

The key therefore is to invest now in health security preparation to avoid later having to pay more and use the military more. It is one of many commonalities between defence and health security: invest now, save money and lives later. Don’t let our social cohesion be divided by what we know is certain to come, whether from the spread of hate by terrorist groups, foreign interference by authoritarian regimes, disinformation by agents of disruption, or disease by pandemics.

Such thinking tests whether nations can plan beyond annual budget cycles to fund crisis prevention, not just response.

Australia’s world class biomedical research ecosystem—anchored by the Australian Institute for Infectious Diseases, CSIRO’s Pandemic Therapeutics Centre and a network of agile biotechnology firms—shows how small, focused teams can deliver global public goods. However, no country can deliver true health security on its own. Leveraging the best science around the world is crucial to speed and effectiveness.

With around 90 percent of global health research and development spending ultimately returning to high-income economies, participation in CEPI is not an act of charity; it is an investment in local jobs and innovation along with regional resilience and security.

In Australia’s case, Canberra’s $114 million contribution to CEPI has already generated more than $170 million in research returns to Australian institutions—including substantial support for the University of Queensland’s vaccine-platform breakthroughs, which have resulted in the billion-dollar acquisition by Sanofi of a company spun out from the university, Vicebio. (The total value of the deal could exceed US$1.5 billion, depending on milestone payments.) This is global cooperation delivering measurable national economic, scientific and security benefits.

CEPI’s mission relies on regional anchors, countries that bring capability and credibility. Across the Indo-Pacific, trust in practitioners, regulators and governments has diminished in the wake of the pandemic. Waves of misinformation and disinformation have eroded public confidence, leaving health authorities struggling to counter vaccine hesitancy. Rebuilding that trust is a security imperative.

Doing so requires leadership, bipartisanship and cross-sector partnerships to explain to the public—in Australia and the region—the need for health security and vaccine preparedness. And they’re needed to bring people, including indigenous and remote, on the journey rather than making them feel unheard or, worse, ostracised or shamed for having hesitation or anxieties.

The Indo-Pacific sits at the nexus of population density, zoonotic spillover risk and expanding biomedical capacity and can (and should) play a critical role in preparing the world for future infectious disease threats. Yet large parts remain underserved by vaccine-development pipelines, clinical-trial networks and regulatory cooperation—and overserved with distrust. Covid-19 exposed those gaps brutally: fewer than 10 percent of Papua New Guineans were vaccinated.

Australia’s diplomatic reach, development experience and scientific strength make it a natural convener of efforts to strengthen regional health security. It has maintained support for the Gavi Vaccine Alliance while advancing regional health-security and scientific cooperation. And the role played by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade along with mechanisms such as the Quad Vaccine Partnership and new health memorandums of understanding with Indonesia, Japan and Singapore, means Australia can bridge humanitarian, development and security communities.

CEPI’s partnerships with Australia and Indonesia exemplify this model. As co-leaders of Indo-Pacific vaccine preparedness and manufacturing resilience, both nations could drive broader regional capability through joint planning, simulation exercises and co-development initiatives. Extending CEPI’s network to encompass Pacific Island and other Southeast Asian partners would help lift local innovation, regulatory cooperation and regional voices.

The next pandemic is not hypothetical; it is certain, with just the timing unknown. CEPI 3.0 gives the world a plan to meet it within the first 100 days, but only if nations act together now. For Australia, ongoing contribution to global health is an investment in Indo-Pacific resilience, regional trust and national security.