
Australia should offer to help Pacific partners by employing private military and security companies (PMSCs) in the Pacific to counter Chinese influence in grey-zone operations, allowing the Australian Defence Force to remain focused on high-end warfighting.
To prepare for this, Australian legislative changes would be needed.
Chinese PMSCs are increasingly establishing themselves in fragile states, creating dependencies and quietly extending Beijing’s influence without deploying conventional military forces. Australia should seek to displace these Chinese PMSCs in the roles they are undertaking, such as maritime infrastructure protection in Pacific ports and security training for local police forces, or at least to fill new requirements before they do.
The most effective way to do this would be to offer to deploy ADF units, since they are well equipped and trained for such tasks, but the most efficient way would be to use Australian PMSCs. Our armed forces have other priorities.
Australian PMSCs could be used in safeguarding critical infrastructure, bolstering partner capacity-building, supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) requests and delivering targeted security assistance. This would enhance Australia’s standing in countries that need such help, such as Pacific island states.
Without this strategic use of PMSCs, Australia risks dispersing and overstretching its limited military resources. Assigning the ADF routine security tasks, such as regional maritime patrols, infrastructure protection, or training regional security forces would significantly diminish its combat readiness. Allocating navy patrol vessels or army units to safeguard undersea cables and ports across scattered Pacific islands (as might be necessary during periods of heightened regional tension, major natural disasters, or when fragile Pacific states request urgent security assistance in response to unrest or foreign interference) would divert resources from preparing for high-end conflicts.
China’s use of PMSCs underscores the effectiveness of this model. Chinese companies such as DeWe Security and Frontier Services Group protect Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative assets worldwide while creating long-term political influence in host countries. In the Pacific and other regions, these operations subtly but significantly bolster Chinese geopolitical interests, challenging Australia’s traditional role as a primary regional security partner.
Australian PMSCs are well suited for counterbalancing this influence. Firms such as Unity Resources Group have demonstrated their effectiveness in challenging environments, providing security for Australian diplomats in Iraq and logistical support in Afghanistan. Translating this proven capability into the Indo-Pacific context would enable Australia to rapidly secure critical infrastructure and enhance local resilience in vulnerable states.
PMSCs have high operational agility, characterised by rapid deployment capabilities and specialised expertise. This makes them ideal for rapid responses to crises or emerging threats, helping to stabilise vulnerable regions swiftly and effectively. Australian PMSCs, operating transparently and accountably, could offer an appealing alternative to Chinese security firms, reducing partner nations’ dependence on Beijing and strengthening Australia’s diplomatic leverage.
Australia can learn from international examples to refine its approach. British and US international operations have demonstrated both the potential and the risks of deploying PMSCs. Successful operations, such as Britain’s anti-piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean and the United States’ logistical support in the Middle East, demonstrate the strategic utility of effectively regulated PMSCs. Conversely, incidents of misconduct underscore the need for stringent oversight and clear operational guidelines. Cases such as the 2007 Nisour Square incident, involving the US company Blackwater, highlight potential pitfalls, including human rights abuses and diplomatic fallout. Robust regulatory oversight is crucial.
Australia lacks comprehensive domestic legislation governing PMSCs’ overseas operations, relying instead on fragmented policies and guidelines. Introducing a clear legislative framework that aligns with international best practices, such as the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, would mitigate ethical risks and ensure accountability. This legislation should mandate strict licensing, regulatory oversight, adherence to human rights standards, and clear contractual accountability.
Embedding civil-military cooperation principles within PMSC operations would further strengthen Australia’s regional influence. Tasking Australian PMSCs to fly the flag while facilitating humanitarian assistance, infrastructure development, or local training could improve regional resilience and Australia’s reputation. By operating collaboratively with local authorities, these companies would visibly reinforce Australian strategic objectives, rather than operating independently or appearing as rogue entities.
With regional HADR demands forecast to increase, employing PMSCs as described would ensure the ADF remains focused on high-end military capabilities and preparation for major regional contingencies. Rather than diluting the ADF’s combat readiness by dispersing units in routine tasks, PMSCs would become a force multiplier, augmenting military capability without sacrificing operational depth.
As Pacific grey-zone challenges intensify, Australia can no longer afford to rely exclusively on state forces. A carefully regulated integration of PMSCs into Australia’s defence posture represents a practical solution—one that can maintain regional stability, enhance diplomatic influence, and ensure the ADF’s conventional warfighting focus remains undiluted.
The window to implement this strategy is narrowing. China continues to expand its use of PMSCs across the Pacific, shaping regional outcomes that often conflict with Australia’s security interests. The adoption of PMSCs within a transparent and regulated framework offers Australia a vital tool to effectively compete in the grey zone and safeguard its long-term regional standing.