Australia urgently needs sovereign biomanufacturing capability to reduce its exposure to fragile global supply chains, especially those tied to agri-food systems. A national biomanufacturing strategy is essential to achieve this.
China and the United States have already elevated food security within their national security agendas. They understand that domestic control over industrial inputs is critical to sovereign resilience in an increasingly fragmented world and have committed major public investment to biotechnology and large-scale biomanufacturing to strengthen their agri-food systems.
Biomanufacturing uses living systems such as microbes to produce food, fuels and fibres at commercial scale. It enables countries to complement conventional supply chains by producing strategically important goods onshore, thereby reducing exposure to supply shocks, geopolitical disruption and petrochemical dependencies.
China is planning to build at least 43 new pilot biomanufacturing plants focused on key inputs, as part of its latest efforts to accelerate bioindustrial capabilities and reduce economic vulnerability. Having evaluated the risks of importing critical ingredients from Western countries, President Xi Jinping has declared food security to be a ‘foundation for national security’.
Beijing is reinforcing these investments with coordination in national policy. It prioritised biomanufacturing during its parliament meeting in March, unveiling a five-year plan that emphasises resilient new protein sources. Provinces are also rolling out initiatives to scale up industrial biomanufacturing.
China’s new biomanufacturing facilities are impressive in their scale and maturity, say experts from the Good Food Institute Asia Pacific, an alternative protein think tank based in Singapore, who toured them recently. For example, at a first-of-its-kind factory the size of 50 football pitches, global biotech firm Angel Yeast is producing a new protein through biomass fermentation at half the cost of whey protein, with applications across baked goods, protein shakes and plant-based meat.
The United States is also investing in food security. In April 2025, its National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology released a landmark report that placed biotechnology at the centre of national security, highlighting its role in agri-food supply chain resilience. And earlier this year, the departments of agriculture and defence launched a new partnership that embeds food production within national security infrastructure. These developments reflect the US’s strategic competition with China, as well as its efforts to reduce exposure to geopolitical and environmental shocks.
By contrast, Australia has not yet fully recognised the vulnerabilities in agri-food supply chains and the subsequent risks to national sovereignty and security.
Part of the problem may be complacency. Australia’s position as a globally competitive net food exporter could be creating a false sense of resilience. But its food industry is still exposed to global supply chains.
Australia is well placed to act, given its robust research capability, globally prominent companies such as Cauldron Ferm and Vow, and its position as one of the world’s leading sources of biomanufacturing feedstocks.
Australia’s access to domestic feedstocks will make it easier to reduce dependence on global supply chains for biomanufacturing inputs. Biomanufacturing relies partly on conventional supply chains, but Australia’s potential for making inputs needed for feedstock production, such as fertiliser and fuel, means it is better positioned than other countries.
Despite the cost-of-living crisis and geopolitical instability, Canberra should prioritise long-term investments in sovereign industrial capability, because supply chain vulnerabilities can emerge unexpectedly.
The current conflict in the Middle East illustrates this. Disruptions in shipping have created supply bottlenecks and spiked fuel and fertiliser costs, prompting Canberra to fast track its national food supply chain assessment in March. The assessment needs to address not just the immediate issues but also longer-term preparedness, including the role of biomanufacturing in preserving national sovereignty during crises. Otherwise this reactive cycle will repeat.
The government did take a step towards long-term preparedness in September 2025 when it committed A$1.1 billion to biofuel production to address fuel supply vulnerabilities. But investment remains fragmented and is not part of a national biomanufacturing strategy.
This fragmentation suggests that Australia needs a better understanding of the shared technology underpinning biomanufacturing industries. Biomanufactured goods all rely on common technologies, but food biomanufacturing is particularly exposed to cost and scale pressures. Australian innovators are addressing these pressures by redesigning hardware, software and wetware that improve performance and reduce costs across the broader biomanufacturing stack. But without coordinated high-level support, progress will be constrained.
Australia needs a national biomanufacturing strategy to turn its latent scientific strength into sovereign industrial capability through coordinated policy and targeted investment. Done well, that strategy could help safeguard Australia’s ability to feed and fuel itself for decades to come. Without it, fragmented efforts will fall short of the scale, competitiveness and resilience needed to protect national security.