A rise in anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese public in the past month is not unprecedented, but rather an extension of a steady rise since 2023. The surge, which followed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remark on Taiwan and her stricter policies toward foreigners, is unlikely to exceed the peak that appeared amid disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2013.
During a 7 November parliamentary debate, Takaichi said that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a ‘survival-threatening situation’ for Japan, and that such a contingency could prompt Japanese military intervention. This remark triggered strong protest and punitive measures from China including travel and study warnings; free flight cancellations and rearrangements; suspension of Japanese seafood imports; and cancellations of Japanese artists’ concerts.
In the past few months, the Japanese government has announced plans to tighten laws related to foreign visitors and residents, as well as increase fees and requirements for visas and residence procedures. Takaichi and Kimi Onoda—the minister responsible for promoting ‘a society of well-ordered and harmonious coexistence with foreign nationals’, have repeatedly highlighted illegal activities committed by foreigners.
A study published in October examined the positivity and negativity of terms referring to Japan and Japanese people in the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party. The findings, based on analysis of issues released between 1950 and 2019, showed that official rhetoric was more negative in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Negative sentiments peaked in 2013, coinciding with territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
The study also found that sentiments towards Japanese people have been more stable over time than sentiments toward Japan as a country. References to Japanese people have been less negative than references to Japan.
While this analysis illustrated shifts in official rhetoric, survey data has revealed changes in public opinion. Through annual surveys, Japan-based think tank Genron NPO tracks Chinese people’s impressions of Japan. Results of the surveys from 2005 to 2024 have shown sharp increases in negative impressions on three separate occasions.
The first jump emerged from the 2009 survey, in which 65.2 percent of participants expressed negative opinions, compared with 40.6 percent in 2008. The second jump was the most extreme: the proportion of negative responses rose from 64.5 percent in 2012 to 92.8 percent in 2013. This was the highest percentage recorded, corresponding with the results of the study into the People’s Daily. While negative sentiment declined overall after 2013, a third jump was observed between 2023 (62.6 percent) and 2024 (87.7 percent).
China’s current surge in negative sentiment toward Japan was not a sudden shift, but a continuation of the upward trend already underway since 2023. It’s also not unusual when compared to fluctuations in public sentiment since 2005. Takaichi’s Taiwan comments seem unlikely to affect public opinion as strongly as the 2013 territorial dispute did, at least based on the severity of the reactions so far. Beyond rhetoric, public reactions have been relatively subdued. In comparison, reactions to the 2013 disputes were far more extreme: for example, there were reports of Chinese citizens damaging their neighbours’ Japanese cars in the aftermath of the incident.
Diplomatic relations have followed similar patterns to public opinion. The Sino-Japanese relationship has undergone twists and turns since diplomatic normalisation in 1972. It has remained strained in the 21st century, despite expanded tourism and other cultural exchanges, as well as Japan’s soft-power growth.
In the mid-1990s, both countries maintained a form of mutual recognition: China viewed Japan as a former aggressor and economic leader, while Japan acknowledged China as a developing nation and a victim of past aggression.
However, this routine began to break down in the early 2000s. There was a growing gap in international roles and national identity: Japan sought recognition as a peaceful contributor to global prosperity, distancing itself from its wartime past. At the same time, China began its quest for great-power status and emphasised its historical victimisation. This was supported by patriotic education such as state-sanctioned textbooks; tours to museums and memorials; television programs portraying Japan’s past imperialism; and the establishment of the National Memorial Day for the Nanjing Massacre.
Former prime minister Koizumi Junichiro’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in the 2000s and territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands further strained relations. A complex mix of historical grievances, national identities, political leadership decisions and state-led education has shaped Sino-Japanese relations and public sentiments in recent decades, creating a pattern of persistent volatility.
The health of the China–Japan relationship will depend on various factors, such as whether China continues punitive measures or intensifies patriotic education. In the longer term, it will also depend on how Takaichi’s plans to revise national security documents, accelerate defence spending and tighten immigration policies unfold under the coalition between the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Innovation Party.