Through a mix of subsidised tours, university scholarships, TikTok-style propaganda and influencer outreach, Beijing is trying to win over the generation in Taiwan that has grown up with democracy, freedom and a deepening sense of Taiwanese identity separate from China.

But how successful has this campaign been? And what are the political consequences? While Chinese soft power has made cultural inroads—especially through popular apps and lifestyle content—it has largely failed to shift the political convictions of Taiwan’s youth. The result is a more politically aware generation—one increasingly fluent in the coercive tactics used against it.

At the heart of China’s strategy lies a simple idea: if it can’t win over Taiwan’s government, it can win over its youth. Beijing is attempting to influence them by showing attention and affection in an overt and attributable manner through cross-strait youth exchange programmes. This form of soft power includes inviting Taiwanese students to China for subsidised trips featuring choreographed cultural activities and friendly political messaging. Scholarships have also been offered to study at Chinese universities, where students are exposed to Chinese Communist Party ideology and are encouraged to become ambassadors for Beijing’s unification message.

More insidious, and often misattributed, is the CCP’s growing focus on online influencers and social media. Beijing has actively courted Taiwanese YouTubers, TikTok stars, and musicians, offering them sponsored trips and VIP treatment in exchange for content that subtly (or not so subtly) echoes CCP talking points. In one case, a Taiwanese rapper admitted to inserting anti-government messages into his lyrics at the CCP’s behest. Meanwhile, Chinese-owned apps such as Douyin (the Chinese version of TikTok) and Xiaohongshu (known in English as RedNote) have quietly flooded Taiwanese smartphones with lifestyle content that often carries an undercurrent of CCP nationalist messaging.

United-front work targeting Taiwan is orchestrated by a network of Chinese party-state organisations that aim to influence, cultivate and co-opt key figures within Taiwanese civil society. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, the agency responsible for cross-strait relations, has described united-front work as ‘an important magic weapon for the Communist Party of China to unite people and gather strength’. Events that are facilitated by united-front agencies, such as the Taiwan Affairs Office, are intended to co-opt participants, exert malign influence on or redefine Taiwan, its people and its history solely on the CCP’s terms.

As shown in the graph below, last year events targeting Taiwan organised by different parts of the CCP’s united front system heavily focused on outreach to Taiwanese youth and online influencers.

Events hosted by united front organisations for Taiwanese civil society in 2024. Source: ASPI’s State of the Strait Database.

It is clear what Beijing hopes to achieve: a long-term shift in public sentiment in favour of its position on annexation. By shaping how Taiwanese youth see China, how they see themselves, and how they interpret democracy, the CCP wants to erode support for independence and weaken resistance to any unification process. If young people come to view China as modern, friendly and culturally similar, Beijing hopes they may become less willing to defend Taiwan’s distinct identity and separate status.

Yet the reality is more complex. While Chinese soft power has made some cultural inroads, especially among apolitical or disengaged youth, it has not translated into widespread political conversion. Most young Taiwanese still identify strongly with Taiwan, value their democratic freedoms, and remain sceptical of Beijing’s intentions. The memory of Hong Kong’s crushed democracy looms large. So does the daily reality of China’s military and diplomatic pressure.

Popular social media apps now double as vectors for political messaging. What Beijing’s influence campaigns have achieved is to blur the boundaries between culture and politics. Online content is disguising propaganda as entertainment. And some young Taiwanese are absorbing pro-China narratives without realising they originate in the Chinese government.

Taiwan’s government has responded with new laws, public awareness campaigns and digital literacy initiatives. Pro-Beijing influencers have been investigated and even deported for comments advocating a military solution to unification. TikTok and other Chinese apps have been banned on official devices. But in an open society, policing influence is never easy. The CCP is betting that its message will find fertile ground in disillusionment, economic uncertainty, or simple curiosity of Taiwan’s young people.

The stakes are high: if Taiwan’s next generation becomes apathetic or fatalistic about its future, the CCP won’t need to invade. It will have already achieved the overall goal of its coercion strategy: to divide, distract and demoralise Taiwan into giving up without a fight.

But there is resilience too. Taiwanese youth are not easily fooled. Many are critically aware of Beijing’s tactics. Some are even pushing back, turning digital platforms into spaces for satire, resistance and civic debate. The battle for young minds is real, but it is multi-dimensional.

China’s efforts to charm Taiwan’s youth are part of a broader campaign of influence and coercion. The challenge for Taiwan is not only to expose these tactics, but to offer a better story: one grounded in freedom, identity and the right to choose their own future. That, more than any app or influencer, is what will determine the outcome of this generational contest.