Counter-disinformation should become a bilateral Australia–Japan priority, an explainer published today by ASPI and Japan Nexus Intelligence argues. Mission leads should be appointed in Australia’s Office of National Intelligence and Japan’s newly established National Intelligence Agency.

An information offensive against Japan is being conducted through overt propaganda tools, including Chinese state media, as well as by exploiting an online network of social media influencers, inauthentic accounts and bots to spread disinformation and boost Beijing’s narratives. Beijing has ratcheted up its campaign since Sanae Takaichi became prime minister in October. Nonetheless, Takaichi’s resounding general electoral victory in February this year gives her government a mandate to push ahead with reforms that will improve Japan’s resilience to disinformation and other types of coercion.

Takaichi’s reforms have included the establishment in May of a new ministerial-level National Intelligence Committee, served by the equally new National Intelligence Agency, to better direct Japan’s multiple intelligence institutions. (The agency’s name is also translated as National Intelligence Bureau.)

China’s foreign affairs spokesperson reacted to these reforms by labelling them a return to imperial-era militarism and preparation for international aggression. She urged Tokyo to learn lessons of history. Tellingly, she said the reforms were ‘not only Japan’s internal affair’, seemingly challenging the right of a democratically elected government to make sovereign decisions in the national interest.

This should resonate with Australians, who weathered years of China’s economic sanctions and other forms of coercion after their government, with bipartisan support, adopted a suite of counter foreign interference measures around 2018. Beijing then, as now in relation to Japan, tried to conceal its responsibility for coercing Australia behind lies in public and more subtle disinformation online. The lesson that Canberra and Tokyo can learn from their recent history is that information warfare is fundamental to Beijing’s statecraft. So it makes sense for them to work together to counter it.

Australia and Japan have complementary strengths that can help them collectively tackle disinformation. Australia has passed legislation and set up institutions to counter foreign interference, including a transparency register to distinguish between lawful lobbying and malign activities, as well as mechanisms for attributing hybrid attacks to specific groups and countries. Australia also has unrivalled networks across much of the Pacific. Shifting to Japan, its size, location and regional economic weight gives it unique insights into China and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Tokyo’s trailblazing approach to economic security provides a novel perspective on protecting critical industries and technologies from information warfare.

The explainer recommends that these strengths be brought together in a joint counter-disinformation mission, endorsed by national leaders and embedded in bilateral coordination mechanisms. Rather than pursuing full intelligence integration, Australia and Japan should establish a bilateral counter-disinformation cell, initially operating virtually. The mission priorities would include establishing a shared taxonomy of hostile information activity; tracking recurring disinformation narratives across the Indo-Pacific; agreeing thresholds for coordinated public attribution; and developing joint protocols for responding to disinformation that threatens key national activities, such as elections and referenda, and crisis preparedness.

The report envisions the mission leads in both countries would be senior officials with the authority to coordinate counter-disinformation work across intelligence, foreign affairs, defence, home affairs, electoral integrity and strategic communications agencies. These operations would need legislative oversight and democratic safeguards, developed in part through stronger engagement between Australia’s Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and its counterparts in the Japanese Diet.

The report also proposes a standing Australia–Japan forum on information integrity, bringing together officials, technology companies, media, think tanks and civil society. It should include experts on the conduct of elections. If properly resourced, the forum could produce annual narrative-risk assessments and conduct crisis simulations. The Australia–Japan leadership dialogue announced in May could help lay the groundwork, but an inclusive forum dedicated to the counter-disinformation mission is also required.

This article is a product of a partnership between ASPI and Japan Nexus Intelligence addressing state-sponsored information operations and hybrid threats in the Indo-Pacific. The ASPI explainer mentioned in the article can be found here.