Myanmar has rapidly become the global epicentre of a burgeoning cyberfraud industry, a crisis deeply interwoven with the dynamics of the post-coup conflict that has overtaken the country since 2021. This industry now poses an unprecedented global cybersecurity threat.
And it isn’t just a cyber or economic problem, but a humanitarian catastrophe, reliant on human trafficking and forced labour to enable malicious scamming. This shows how conflict and transnational crime syndicates intersect to build an empire of fraud.
A new ASPI report, Scamland Myanmar, reveals the explosive growth of dedicated scam compounds along the Thailand-Myanmar border since 2021, increasing from 11 dedicated compounds to 30, and being constructed at an average of 13.5 acres (around 54,000 square metres) per month for the past four years.
Myanmar’s ruling military junta is central to the problem and the continued existence of this transnational criminal ecosystem. These compounds are openly permitted and facilitated by the junta to enrich their military allies.
The scam industry has replaced traditional patronage networks that have collapsed alongside the junta’s territorial control and governance reach. So long as the junta sees itself in an existential fight, it will be both unwilling and unable to take decisive action to dismantle the extensive network of scam centres.
Indeed, throughout 2025, these centres have notably expanded into territory directly under Burmese military control and not just in areas administered by affiliated militias.
The scale of this humanitarian and cyber crisis is staggering. More than 200,000 people are estimated to have been forced into labour for these transnational crime operations, with a direct cost of hundreds of billions of dollars to victims across the world.
Through extensive satellite imagery analysis, the report shows these are not makeshift operations. Scam compounds are heavily securitised and fortified, with fences, watchtowers, checkpoints and heavy networks of surveillance. Many compounds even have dedicated, permanent ferry crossings, linking them to private wharves on the Thai side of the Moei river, circumventing official border crossings and directly facilitating forced human trafficking.
They are also incredibly adaptive. Compounds were initially clustered along the border with China, but crackdowns from China and the Burmese Resistance armies that captured most of the China-Myanmar border in late 2023 led to the significant dismantling of scam operations in key hotspots such as Laukkai.
These successes, however, merely pushed the problem elsewhere. The industry’s centre of gravity has shifted southwards to the border with Thailand and an ever-increasing network of compounds stretches along that border from Myawaddy to the famous Three-Pagodas Pass.
Although operations have not been meaningfully affected, increased pressure this year has further scattered the industry’s footprint across territory remaining under control of the Burmese military and its armed affiliates.
Despite massive and dedicated compounds, this industry does not require a large footprint. If you have an empty office building—of which there are thousands across Myanmar since the coup—an internet connection and permissive law enforcement, you can run scams from any city or town. Indeed, recent reports indicate operations being run out of such buildings in Myanmar’s largest cities, Yangon and Mandalay.
The outcome of all efforts to date has been ‘disrupt-and-displace’, rather than ‘disrupt-and-terminate’. Regional governments and multilateral organisations have so far failed to influence the conditions that allow the industry to flourish. These conditions will not be changed through bilateral engagement with the Burmese junta.
Instead, to combat this multifaceted threat, policymakers and international organisations should adopt a non-state-centric, comprehensive strategy that engages and promotes productive engagement with opposition actors, especially those with a proven track record opposing this industry.
Along the border with Thailand, a key partner should be the Karen National Union which, despite a history of enabling the industry, has comprehensively disavowed and combatted scams since the 2021 coup. This engagement should also facilitate discussions between junta-aligned militias and opposition actors to foster a productive and sustainable economic vision for areas under militia control, rejecting an armed junta presence and scam centres’ continued operation.
For its part, Thailand should pursue a more comprehensive law enforcement strategy to close the nodes and routes that enable industrialised human trafficking from Thai territory into Myanmar. Efforts to limit infrastructure and service provisions—specifically power and fuel—to scam enclaves in Myanmar have only had a temporary effect, with centres adapting by using generators and Starlink terminals. Thai authorities should look to shut down the cross-border infrastructure that allows traffickers to circumvent border authorities.
Collectively, intergovernmental organisations, development partners and individual states should coordinate to increase funding and support for work aimed at dismantling these networks and preventing cross-border human trafficking.
Despite all these recommendations, comprehensive degradation of the flourishing cyberfraud empire is not possible while the Burmese junta continues to facilitate the industry. And it will continue to facilitate the industry as long as it is entirely reliant on the loyalty of affiliated militias to maintain and exert control. Wartime Myanmar’s political economy—more than external policies—dictates how well scamland Myanmar thrives.
Still, the region cannot wait for the resolution of Myanmar’s civil war, and there is no reasonable path for the junta to gain total control of the country. Unless policymakers adopt a strategy that directly tackles the root conditions enabling scams and prioritises working with trusted partners within the resistance, this transnational criminal network will continue to destabilise the region, victimise hundreds of thousands of people and threaten cybersecurity globally.