Addressing the common threats facing the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific will require effective cross-regional mechanisms. Hybrid threats are among the most pertinent given their increasingly transnational, multidimensional and persistent nature. The European Union and Australia, given their converging interests and unique expertise, are ideally placed to jointly establish a framework that connects governments, shares intelligence and expertise, and supports practical capability-building across both regions.

In a previous article, we argued that despite geographic distance, Canberra and many European capitals have recognised the growing strategic alignment between the two regions. That strategic alignment unfortunately stems not from opportunities but from the challenge of Moscow’s and Beijing’s hybrid threats and coercive statecraft.

Strengthening our own national security is mandatory. But authoritarian and coercive regimes prey on the most vulnerable individuals, institutions, systems and countries through diplomatic threats, cyber intrusion and territorial incursion. Regional security therefore requires collective action.

The weakest link in the Indo-Pacific’s resilience is neither Australia nor Europe. Rather, it’s the lack of a regional security architecture focused on strengthening collective capabilities against hybrid threats.

Australia’s network of bilateral engagements in Europe is strong and diverse, but it risks remaining an accumulation of parallel relationships. The same is true for the EU’s partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, as well as those of individual European nations. Sustaining an expanding web of bilateral engagements will become increasingly difficult as crises multiply and grow more complex. The need for instant intelligence and coordinated responses will only increase.

Nations that absorb coercion daily and whose choices shape the regional order need to be part of the equation as well. This includes capable partners, such as Singapore and Taiwan; sizeable Southeast Asian nations, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines; and smaller developing nations, such as Fiji and Vanuatu, whose vulnerability makes them priority targets. As regional powers, Japan, South Korea and India also need to be included in any serious multilateral framework in the Indo-Pacific.

This is where the EU and Australia can act as connective tissue.

Since 2025, the EU has signed Security and Defence Partnership agreements with South Korea, Japan, India and Australia. It’s also funding a variety of initiatives that seek to contribute to improve on-the-ground capabilities. These include multi-year, multi-million-euro initiatives such as Enhancing Security Cooperation In and With Asia (ESIWA), which focuses on technical assistance on specific security issues; Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (CRIMARIO), which aims to facilitate information-sharing around maritime security; and the Global Gateway Initiative, focused on physical infrastructure investments.

In this context, the EU has engaged ASPI to analyse the feasibility of setting up an overarching framework for cooperation among European and Indo-Pacific partners to share information on and address hybrid threats. Such a framework should facilitate consultations among partners, provide evidence-based assessments of emerging security trends, and offer access to technical assistance, tools and capability-building platforms.

This pilot initiative reflects the EU’s recognition that its economic and security interests are entangled with Indo-Pacific stability, where hybrid threats are intensifying most rapidly. It also recognises the mutual benefits of both taking in lessons and sharing experiences. Building this capability could change the calculus of adversaries, but the real value lies in strengthened Indo-Pacific preparedness.

There is no lack of existing regional security initiatives though. ASPI’s cursory review found 40 such efforts, often with Australia as a key partner. However, most are focused either locally, around forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Pacific Islands Forum; thematically, constrained to maritime, cyber or information security; or functionally, mandated narrowly to only engage in intelligence fusion, knowledge production or the delivery of technological solutions. The challenge of hybrid threats is that these domains interact and therefore must be addressed together.

A new initiative would have to be a light-footprint, experience-sharing and coordination platform that combines the building of evidence, networks and expertise. In the first instance, it could focus on select priority domains including cyber and digital threats, foreign information manipulation and interference, and critical infrastructure resilience; and could be anchored around coalitions of willing and able partners.

Australia is no stranger to this operating environment. In 2018, it started the countering foreign interference ministerial. It initially brought together ministers from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Britain and the United States before expanding to a larger group of trusted partners, including from Asia and Europe. This Australian government-led network allows partners to discuss issues of malign interference by foreign states and share respective threat assessments, response mechanisms and prevention tools.

It shows that inter-regional cooperation is possible and that collaborative forms of security assistance are in demand.

Australia’s experience, the EU’s resources and convening power, and both countries’ combined network of Indo-Pacific partnerships provide= a strong foundation for trialling an inter-regional framework to counter hybrid threats. If successful, it could provide the connective tissue needed to transform an expanding web of bilateral partnerships into a more cohesive regional architecture for resilience against hybrid threats.