The European Union’s high representative for foreign affairs and security, Kaja Kallas, and Singapore’s coordinating minister for national security, K Shanmugam, on Friday called out Russian and Chinese hybrid warfare, respectively. Their complementary statements highlight the importance of coordinated action between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific.

Kallas’s warning extends beyond Europe’s security crisis to the Indo-Pacific, where Moscow and Beijing’s hybrid playbook offers a warning and the coordinated global response offers a model.

The EU and Britain imposed sanctions last week targeting Russia’s military intelligence organisation, including three operational units and several individuals. These measures were responses to a sharp rise in coordinated hybrid attacks.

NATO issued its own statement condemning Russia’s malicious cyber operations. Importantly, so did Australian Minister for Home Affairs Tony Burke. Together, these responses underscore the growing indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security.

Despite the focus on cyberattacks, Kallas and British Foreign Secretary David Lammy emphasised that Russia’s hybrid campaign extended beyond the digital domain. Their warnings highlighted a more destabilising mix of tactics being used across Europe, including information operations, critical infrastructure sabotage, migration manipulation and even physical attacks.

Russia may be the primary actor in Europe, but its operational template is unmistakably global. The mode of operation is asymmetric, deniable and designed to fracture alliances, destabilise societies and erode political cohesion. While hybrid threats manifest distinctly, treating them as isolated threats obscures their strategic purpose: to generate a cumulative malign effect that no single agency or siloed response can effectively counter.

In the Indo-Pacific, the main perpetrators may be China and North Korea, but Russia is here too, and the logic is the same: shape the information environment, exploit societal fault lines, erode trust in democratic institutions and drive wedges between partners and allies.

Information operations have targeted elections in Taiwan and the Philippines. Maritime sabotage, including tampering of undersea cables or GPS signal interference, has surfaced in the South China Sea. Cyber intrusions targeting Southeast Asian and Pacific governments and financial systems are now routine.

In Singapore, Shanmugam said the country was dealing with a ‘highly sophisticated threat actor’ targeting critical infrastructure. He specifically identified advanced persistent threat group UNC3886, which has been described by cybersecurity firm Mandiant (a Google subsidiary) as a ‘China-nexus espionage group’. It is known for targeting high-value strategic organisations. Shanmugam even said, ‘Singapore will have to reexamine its vendors and supply chains. And if we decide that we cannot trust them, then we may choose not to use them.’

This is a notable shift in posture for a country typically cautious about (being seen to be) attributing responsibility for interference to China. This potentially reflects growing resolve in the face of persistent hybrid threats. Just as Australia supported the EU in calling out Russia, we should support regional partners who publicise China’s violations of international rules and norms.

There is some way to go in holding Beijing to account, mainly due to fears of economic retribution. Statements calling out Moscow show shared strength and clarity. This is important because hybrid campaigns are designed to thrive in ambiguity and plausible deniability, relying on fragmented responses, weak attribution and the absence of collective consequence. In contrast, such clarity is often absent where China is concerned. States confronting similar threats frequently respond in isolation or remain constrained by fears of escalation or economic retaliation.

Europe and Britain’s sanctions mark a necessary shift from fragmented measures to a more systemic and coordinated framework for resilience and deterrence. Through its Hybrid Toolbox—which integrates diplomatic pressure, technical countermeasures, public attribution and targeted sanctions—the EU is building institutional muscle to confront the evolving nature of hybrid threats.

For Indo-Pacific countries, particularly Australia, New Zealand, Japan, India, South Korea and ASEAN partners, this moment is a chance to reconsider how regional cooperation can similarly evolve. For example, existing frameworks such as the Quad, AUKUS and mechanisms led by the Pacific Islands Forum and ASEAN could be adapted to incorporate shared protocols for attribution, coordinated responses to cyber and information campaigns, and joint measures to safeguard critical infrastructure. Doing so would provide a collective safety net.

The EU and British statements confirm the significance of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s decision to formalise a security and defence partnership with the EU, which offers a concrete platform to demonstrate Australia’s deepening ties with the grouping aren’t just in its national interest; they serve the broader stability and resilience of the Indo-Pacific.

For the Indo-Pacific, the coordinated EU and British action, reinforced by responses from global partners, including Australia, carries urgent relevance. It affirms the shared nature of hybrid threats, offers a practical model for collective deterrence, reinforces the importance of strategic signalling, and highlights the need for a regionally tailored hybrid toolbox. Above all, it recognises that silence, acquiescence or fragmentation can be a vulnerability that assertive actors are quick to exploit. The Indo-Pacific needs to move decisively from awareness to coordinated action. And just as Kallas is setting out so clearly, only a unified stance can resist hybrid warfare and only action now can deter a potential hot war later.