From 1 July, work undertaken lawfully in Australia by journalists, think tank analysts, academics and others may be characterised as criminal under Chinese law.
China’s new Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law claims legal authority to pursue people beyond the People’s Republic of China who, in the Chinese Communist Party’s view, undermine ethnic unity or promote ethnic division. Beijing has not simply enacted another domestic law. It has asserted a right to judge conduct occurring inside other sovereign states.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has noted its concerns about China’s law. The Australian government should make it clear that it will not allow such laws to apply in Australia.
China is not simply exporting influence. It is expanding jurisdiction. The issue extends well beyond one piece of legislation.
The CCP increasingly uses domestic law as an instrument of strategic competition. It no longer confines legislation to governing China. It increasingly employs law to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues it considers fundamental to regime security.
Western democracies often assess Chinese legislation through the lens of liberal legal systems. However, Chinese law serves national strategy.
The CCP writes legislation to reinforce political control, protect national objectives and expand state power. The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law represents another layer in that expanding legal architecture.
The legislation institutionalises President Xi Jinping’s vision of a single Chinese national identity. Schools, universities, media organisations, technology companies, employers and community organisations must reinforce that objective. More important for Australia, the legislation authorises Chinese authorities to pursue organisations and individuals outside China who allegedly undermine ethnic unity or promote ethnic division.
Australian academics publishing research on Tibet, journalists investigating Xinjiang or policy analysts advising government on foreign interference could find their lawful work in Australia reframed by Beijing as conduct that threatens China’s ethnic unity. Whether Chinese authorities ultimately act against a particular individual is almost beside the point. The possibility alone may encourage self-censorship or deter engagement. And that is clearly the intent.
Some will argue that Australia has laws that have extraterritorial application. But those are about activities related to terrorism, espionage, drug trafficking and child sex offences, and enable the law to follow Australian citizens or residents anywhere in the world.
Others will say the new law will affect only Chinese citizens. Tell that to Australian citizen and writer Yang Hengjun, who has been wrongfully detained by Chinese authorities since January 2019, or to Swedish citizen and publisher Gui Minhai, who was kidnapped by Chinese agents while vacationing in Thailand in October 2015.
Many will dismiss the legislation’s extraterritorial provisions as symbolic. History suggests otherwise.
Operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net illustrate how Beijing has pursued people beyond its borders when it believes core national interests are involved. Although the operations were established as anti-corruption campaigns, governments and law enforcement agencies in several democracies have alleged that elements of those operations involved surveillance, intimidation and pressure directed at individuals living overseas and, in some cases, their family members in China.
The new law expands the legal foundation on which similar pressure could be justified in future.
Australia already has witnessed the broader pattern. The Hong Kong national security law asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction. Chinese authorities later issued arrest warrants for overseas dissidents (including in Australia), announced financial rewards for information leading to arrests and sought to intimidate critics living in democratic countries.
The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law extends that same strategic logic into another policy domain.
Canberra should formally reject the law’s claim to extraterritorial jurisdiction. The federal government should make clear that Australian citizens and residents acting lawfully under Australian law remain subject to Australian sovereignty, not to the political preferences of the CCP.
Universities should reaffirm their commitment to academic freedom. Think tanks should resist attempts to shape research agendas through intimidation.
Media organisations should reject efforts to influence editorial judgment through the threat of foreign legal action.
Government agencies should review travel advice and ensure Australians understand the potential implications of increasingly expansive Chinese legislation.
None of those measures constitutes hostility towards China. All of them defend Australia’s sovereignty. China continues to build an integrated legal architecture for strategic competition. Counter-espionage legislation, data security laws, anti-foreign sanctions measures, state secrets reforms and now the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law each appear incremental in isolation. Together they reveal a coherent strategy for extending Chinese state power beyond China’s borders through law as well as diplomacy, intelligence, economics and technology.
The extra irony is, in April this year, the Chinese State Council issued regulations that allowed Chinese authorities to identify and counter foreign laws and actions they deemed ‘improper exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction’.
Beijing has activated another instrument of statecraft. Canberra should respond just as clearly. Reject the law’s extraterritorial claims, reaffirm that Australian law governs conduct in Australia and protect Australians from foreign coercion cloaked in legal authority.
This is a lightly edited version of an article originally published in The Australian.