Australia’s national security conversation often focuses on critical minerals, undersea cables, sovereign cloud and satellite capabilities. Yet one area remains underexamined: the quiet, high-resolution eyes flying above our farms.

Drones are increasingly used to survey farmland. They measure soil health, water use, crop stress and harvest progress. They’re becoming essential for farmers. Most, however, are made by Shenzhen-based DJI, the dominant global drone supplier. This raises a key question: who else might be gaining insight from these operations?

Chinese drones are on their way towards ubiquity over Australian farms. But they’re not there yet, and we can, and should, contain and regulate their use before they are.

Modern drones do more than take pictures. They use multi-spectral and thermal sensors to assess plant health, optimise fertiliser use and forecast yields. Aggregated across regions and seasons, this data reveals insights into Australia’s production systems and vulnerabilities.

To farmers, this is a productivity tool. But it can be a strategic asset for actors aligned with foreign states. Agricultural intelligence carries geopolitical weight in an era of climate volatility and food insecurity.

Concerns about DJI’s data practices are well documented. The company was added to the US Department of Commerce’s Entity List in 2020, placing it under trade restrictions. Several US agencies have since restricted its use, citing security concerns. DJI maintains that it transmits no user data to China, and it highlights local storage and audit features. However, under China’s National Intelligence Law, companies may be required to assist state agencies. This creates uncertainty even without direct interference.

This mirrors earlier concerns over Huawei’s role in telecommunications networks. In both cases, the issue is not proven wrongdoing but whether critical infrastructure should rely on technologies subject to opaque foreign legal obligations.

Drone adoption in Australian agriculture is still maturing. In 2020, about 10 percent of Australian farms reported using drones. The Australian drone market is estimated at US$28.8 million in 2024 and projected to reach US$118.6 million by 2030. Much of this growth is driven by government programs such as the Climate-Smart Agriculture Program.

This leaves a window of opportunity. Large-scale adoption has not yet occurred, and there is time to shape how drone technology is integrated and how risks are managed.

Australia’s food system is among the world’s most productive and export-reliant. Around 70 percent of Australian agricultural output goes to overseas markets. A foreign actor with insight into planting schedules or harvest cycles could anticipate disruptions, influence pricing or shape negotiations.

Not every drone flight is a threat. But the scale of DJI’s global market share, combined with the value of agricultural data, calls for scrutiny.

That scrutiny is already underway. In 2023, the Australian Defence Force banned DJI drones because of data concerns, even as emergency agencies continued using them. This fragmented approach highlights the need for consistent standards, especially as uptake grows in agriculture.

ASPI’s National Food Security Preparedness Green Paper reinforces this concern. While Defence is planning for conflict, the food system lacks comparable foresight. The report highlights surveillance, digital and supply chain vulnerabilities and calls for structured risk assessments.

Removing DJI drones overnight is unrealistic. Their cost-effectiveness explains their popularity. But framing the issue as a choice between full adoption and banning misses the policy opportunity.

A smarter approach would segment risks. Which datasets are sensitive? How are telemetry and storage configured? Should drone use near water catchments or export terminals face extra scrutiny?

Australia could establish a certification regime for aerial platforms used in regulated environments, based on supply chain trust frameworks applied in telecommunications and defence.

There is also an opportunity for Australian self-reliance. A growing group of Australian drone firms, including recipients of the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator’s Sovereign Uncrewed Aerial Systems Challenge, is developing platforms suited to local conditions. With targeted procurement and regulatory support, they could reduce dependence on foreign hardware and strengthen domestic capability.

AUKUS Pillar Two may also offer a path to co-develop aerial systems with trusted partners, especially in dual-use areas, including environmental monitoring and disaster response.

Food security has long underpinned national resilience. What has changed is how that security is monitored, and who might be watching. Drones have given farmers visibility. They have also created new exposure points in an era when data is both commodity and leverage.

Managing that exposure requires more than caution. It demands updated standards, clear regulation and investment in resilient alternatives. Australia’s paddocks may stretch for miles, but the strategic picture is tightening. It is more connected, more valuable and more contested every day.