China is moving quickly to shore up its long-term energy ties with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states through fixed purchasing agreements with Gulf suppliers.
A series of agreements reached over the past few months have anchored Beijing’s energy security to Gulf producers at a time when trade friction between it and Washington, regional instability and threats to key maritime chokepoints are threatening global energy flows. These agrements are to some degree shielding China from market volatility while giving Gulf states stable demand and strategic footholds in Asia’s largest energy markets.
In April, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation signed a five-year agreement with the United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) for 500,000 tons per year beginning in 2026. Days later, ADNOC signed deals with two more Chinese companies, including a 15-year, 1 million-ton-per-year contract with ENN Natural Gas and a five-year deal with Zhenhua Oil. These agreements lock in volumes and pricing formulas, protecting Chinese buyers from market volatility—a growing concern amid US crackdowns on sales of sanctioned Iranian oil.
For ADNOC, the deals guarantee steady demand as the UAE ramps up export capacity. For Beijing, they are strategic hedges at a time of intensifying US–China trade friction, tariff effects on US liquefied natural gas, and rising political costs of pursuing Russian gas—a lesson India is now learning under Trump’s threat of 50 percent tariffs.
Meanwhile, in neighboring Iraq, China’s third largest crude oil supplier, the rapid expansion of Chinese independent oil firms has enabled Beijing to further diversify its energy supply. The collective output of these firms is expected to double to 500,000 barrels per day by 2030, pushing Chinese daily crude oil imports from Iraq beyond the current 1.2 million barrels.
These deals confirm the Middle East as a central pillar of Beijing’s future energy security. The Persian Gulf has been strategically important for China’s rise, supplying nearly half of its energy imports. Beijing’s decision to double down on its Gulf partnerships despite regional risks is a calculated bet that durable GCC partnerships can outlast regional turbulence. Long-term contracts create shared incentives to manage turbulence and avoid mutual losses. Beijing has tried to play a diplomatic mediator in Gulf tensions by helping broker the 2023 Saudi-Iran reproachment. However, the complexity of the region’s rivalries often goes far beyond China’s willingness to engage, particularly when it risks confrontation with the US or Israel.
For Gulf producers, the calculation runs both ways. China is their largest customer and offers a demand profile stable enough to underwrite decades of export capacity. With Europe’s fossil fuel appetite in decline, Beijing’s partnership represents growth and predictability. Qatar’s Energy Minister, Saad al-Kaabi, has called his country’s long-term gas deals with China ‘important milestones’ that strengthened relations with ‘one of the most important gas markets in the world’. And Gulf states are willing to go further by investing in China’s own refining, petrochemical and clean-energy assets. This two-way capital flow creates a web of interdependence, shifting the dynamic from the usual power imbalance smaller states face when dealing with an economic giant like China. In this case, Beijing secures supply, and the GCC secures returns and gains major footholds in Asia’s largest energy market.
These energy ties extend beyond the Gulf. Trump’s tariffs have strained US–Southeast Asia relations, giving Beijing an opening to knit the Gulf into its wider Asia-centered energy network. By embedding GCC producers into Southeast Asia’s energy markets, China can diversify its import routes, reduce their exposure to Western pressure and build redundancy around key maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca.
At a trilateral summit in May, China, the GCC and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations agreed to boost both traditional and clean energy cooperation—strengthening natural gas supply chains, investing in hydrogen and other new fuels, developing cleaner technologies and expanding energy links between countries. This comes as ASEAN members are seeking more diversified liquefied natural gas import partners to fuel domestic growth. For Gulf exporters, this new regional partnership offers wider access to ASEAN markets. For Beijing, it develops an interlinked network of suppliers and partners that extends its energy security perimeter deeper into Asia. For ASEAN countries, it creates the potential for GCC infrastructure investment, diversified energy imports and greater regional interconnectivity between the Middle East and China.
China’s Gulf energy strategy remains vulnerable. Regional rivalries, proxy conflicts, and chokepoint vulnerabilities show little sign of easing. Iran and Israel’s 12-day conflict and Iran’s missile strike on Doha underscored how quickly escalation can imperil Beijing’s energy access and expose GCC partners to attack. Long-term contracts, ASEAN integration and diversified suppliers give China more room to maneuver crises, but they cannot fully shield its energy lifelines. If another major escalation or regional crisis disrupts flows, the foundation of Beijing’s Gulf strategy could fracture.