Australia’s jewels are being stolen—and yet we’re still leaving the front door open. Foreign espionage has cost the nation more than A$12.5 billion in a single year, according to new estimates from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Institute of Criminology released in late July.

But that’s just part of the picture. With espionage, other countries are stealing information for strategic advantage. With foreign interference, they’re stealing trust in the community, aiming at influencing decisions, institutions and society.

These two actions are distinct but linked. They’re components of covert, persistent efforts which erode Australia’s advantage and which influence its decisions.

Last week the Australian Federal Police arrested a Chinese national who was allegedly carrying out covert operations against an Australian community group. And we were told that ASIO had disrupted 24 major espionage and foreign interference operations in just three years.

While Australia’s spymaster, Mike Burgess, has made it clear that many countries engage in espionage and interference, China stands out as the primary and most persistent threat to Australia—a conclusion reinforced by this week’s arrest.

Authoritarian states are deliberately and systematically targeting Australia’s research, critical minerals and emerging technologies—not just through cyber hacks but with the unwitting help of Australians in boardrooms, research labs and regulatory bodies. Meanwhile, foreign interference goes further. It’s targeting diaspora groups and seeking to erode public confidence, manipulate community narratives and covertly access political networks.

Burgess is not speaking in code. From AUKUS-linked defence projects to clean energy breakthroughs and quantum research, he has made clear Australia’s strategic priorities are in the crosshairs. And when diaspora communities are watched, harassed or threatened, he has also been explicit: this country has zero tolerance.

We must recognise that the campaign is no longer limited to government systems or officials. It touches all of us. Hostile states are exploiting human habits, relationships and reputations—across government, industry and academia. Thousands of Australians in public but sensitive jobs freely advertise their access online, making recruitment easy.

The problem? Many still imagine espionage and interference as Cold War relics—spy swaps, trench coats and secret documents. But in 2025, it’s a LinkedIn message, a conference chat or a seemingly routine collaboration. Every trusted insider is now a potential vector and a victim.

Malign foreign states are exploiting open research ecosystems, professional networks, and legal investments to embed themselves in the very systems that define Australia’s future. From critical minerals and AI to agritech and biotech, our economy is rich in strategic value—and therefore a prime target. Foreign intelligence services are targeting early-stage IP, technical standards and insider access. For CEOs, researchers and investors, this is a business risk. For Australia’s diaspora communities, it’s about confidence in the democratic institutions that protect them.

For too long, Australia’s response has defaulted to the technical—firewalls, compliance regimes and protective legislation. But in 2025, the weakest link is still human. We need a national mindset shift. Security can no longer be outsourced to ASIO or confined to government. It needs to become standard operating procedure across our economy and society.

With visibility comes vulnerability. Open, collaborative systems are a national asset—but only if they’re secured. Right now, our adversaries aren’t just watching; they’re acting. They’re embedding operatives, exploiting partnerships and leveraging insider access and community groups.

This is what modern espionage and interference look like. Beyond stealing secrets, they’re about shaping systems and outcomes from within. Espionage is being used to coerce, disrupt and pre-position.

Some dismiss the risk with a shrug: ‘all countries spy.’ But not all espionage is equal. And, while foreign influence is legitimate, interference—which is covert, coercive or deceptive—is not.

If you lead a university, company, or start-up, you’re not just adjacent to the threat; you’re now on the frontline. The question is no longer whether you’re a target but whether you’re prepared to be targeted.

Preparedness means more than awareness. It requires active, structural defences. That includes undertaking security risk assessments across research and commercial partnerships, implementing controls on data access and information sharing, and establishing internal reporting mechanisms for suspicious contact or activity. It means ensuring that boards are briefed on threats, that staff are trained to recognise recruitment attempts or manipulation and that decisions about collaboration and investment are made through a national interest lens—not just a commercial one.

The government is rightly investing. ASIO’s efforts are saving the economy tens of billions. While last week’s arrest and previous arrests are useful reminders, law enforcement and intelligence is just one factor to keep us safe. Resilience cannot be built by government action alone. As important as awareness raising is, so too is empowering the public to be resilient to the threat that is being carried out against our nation, our institutions and our community on a daily basis.

This demands sharper public-private partnerships, proactive and accountable leadership, and a clear understanding across sectors that protecting Australia’s strategic advantage is no longer optional; it’s core business.