The path to a truly safe and secure Indo-Pacific is not just through military interoperability; it requires a more holistic and enduring form of statecraft that recognises food security as a foundation of cooperation. A well-fed Indo-Pacific is a more stable one—food unites, while hunger divides.
Geostrategic tensions in our region are driving attempts to coordinate an uplift in defence capability. But this effort is not being replicated in a coordinated manner across our agriculture sector and food system. This has created a gap in domestic preparedness activities and has increased our international vulnerability. Our security is inextricably linked to the political stability of the region, so we need a new approach that acknowledges the intricate web of dependencies that sustain our societies.
Australia’s engagement with our Pacific neighbours has been highlighted by security treaty talks with Fiji but punctuated by unexpected delays to agreements with Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. While formal defence pacts are an essential component of Australia’s statecraft in a contested region, they are not a complete answer to what the region needs. While the PNG treaty has been approved, delays there and in Vanuatu have shown that, in isolation, such deals are vulnerable to domestic political headwinds and concerns of sovereignty. Australia’s efforts to build successful security relationships may continue to stall if they do not run deeper than just defence agreements.
These setbacks highlight the limitations of a fragmented approach to our statecraft. While Australia’s diplomatic and defence efforts are commendable, Pacific countries rightly prioritise their own national interests, which may not always align with a sole focus on defence cooperation. The stalled Vanuatu agreement is a clear example of the need for Australia to demonstrate a willingness to listen and adapt to the needs of its Pacific neighbours beyond security. We need to build genuine, lasting partnerships that generate genuine mutual benefit and address our partners’ most pressing concerns. The new Nakamal agreement, which is intended to replace the stalled 2022 security pact, is a promising sign as it includes a focus on broader issues including climate resilience and economic development—but where is food?
Food security should be a visible pillar of these agreements because according to the Food and Agriculture Organization, one in five people in parts of Southeast Asia and the Pacific are undernourished. This makes all of us susceptible to instability, economic coercion and geopolitical influence. A nation that cannot feed its people is deeply vulnerable. Australia’s approach should address this foundational concern as we cannot expect our neighbours to be robust partners if their populations, or ours, are food insecure.
This is where food can become a more effective tool of statecraft. Australia can use our immense capability in agriculture and food production to help the Indo-Pacific become more self-reliant. This is not about aid or handouts; it is a strategic approach to trade, investment and collaboration based on genuine mutual benefit. It involves helping to build resilient supply chains, boosting agricultural productivity and addressing food insecurity. Such investments would not only lift people out of hunger and strengthen regional economies, but also make us and our neighbours more resilient partners, better able to withstand external pressures. This constitutes a direct and necessary investment in our region’s collective security, justifying a fundamental shift in our policy architecture.
ASPI’s National Food Security Preparedness Green Paper offers a policy framework to bring this vision to life. It recommends several concrete actions that would make food a central pillar of our statecraft, including a fundamental bureaucratic shift that acknowledges food insecurity as a strategic threat.
The paper suggests that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry should be formally designated as the lead agency responsible for food security preparedness, with its head included on the Secretaries Committee on National Security to ensure the strategic implications of food security are central to national security planning. It also recommends that the department be tasked with developing a dedicated regional food security, trade and investment strategy. That would require comprehensive mapping of natural advantages and should be supported by federal bodies including the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Austrade and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation.
The paper also argues that Australia should establish dedicated food security funding and performance targets within its international development program and should also expand access to concessional and blended financing to support regional agricultural initiatives without detracting from core health and education funding.
These recommendations aren’t simply administrative changes; they represent a fundamental rethinking of how we apply our statecraft.
Our existing traditional frameworks are no longer fit for purpose. As the PNG and Vanuatu examples show, we need to learn to balance short-term political wins with long-term and foundational investments in our relationships. Australia’s aspiration for a safe and secure Indo-Pacific is non-negotiable. But if our efforts are solely defined by defence, we risk being outmanoeuvred by China which engages with greater agility and on a broader range of issues.
By integrating food security into our national security architecture and our regional foreign policy, we can build relationships that are more robust, more enduring and that generate genuine mutual benefit.
This statecraft doesn’t seek to simply compete, but to equip our neighbours with the resilient sovereign capacity they, and we, need to withstand external pressure. A resilient region requires partnerships that address the deepest needs of its populations. We must never forget that food sits at the top of that hierarchy.