As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrapped up a high-profile swing through Japan and China this week, the question was whether the hand holding equated to a meeting of the minds.
At this week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping urged that ‘the dragon and the elephant must come together.’ This representation of the China-India relationship was as poetic as the Dragonbear description of the China-Russia partnership, and the strategic subtext was just as plain: Beijing is looking for ways to draw Delhi closer at a time of tension between Delhi and Washington.
But for the Quad—comprising Australia, the US, India and Japan—its shared principles are stronger than its differences. That is what revitalised the grouping in 2017 and what keeps it alive. It is here that Australia can play a pivotal role.
US President Donald Trump looks increasingly unlikely to travel to Delhi for the Quad Leaders’ Summit later this year. For some, these developments collectively are proof that the grouping is on the verge of collapse. The Quad’s dormancy from 2007 to 2017 gives that conclusion some credence. But much has changed, and reports of the Quad’s impending death have been greatly exaggerated. For the Quad, a leader missing a single summit represents turbulence, not tectonic shift. What matters is not whether one president shows up but whether the four capitals remain aligned in their national policies and in their willingness to hold China to account.
The Quad is a coalition of willing democracies, not a treaty alliance. That makes it inherently cyclical. Leaders come and go with different instincts: Trump has a transactional outlook; Modi is insistent on strategic autonomy; Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba presses economic security; and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is focused on diplomatic cooperation and Southeast Asian engagement. The chemistry is not always perfect.
But such coalitions rebound when interests re-align because core principles remain static. Alignment on principles—including enforcement of international rules such as freedom of navigation—separates the Quad from the SCO. Quad interests continue to converge as Chinese coercion intensifies and the demand for regional resilience grows.
There has been softening at the political level. Trump’s rhetoric toward allies has grown more transactional, pushing Modi to reinvest in Delhi’s familiar strategy of hedging. Japan’s political churn and Australia’s policy setting of stabilisation with Beijing have constrained both countries’ public messaging.
But strategic alignment still holds. Australia continues to push back against coercion. The government yesterday committed to strengthening the Foreign Arrangements Scheme, which allows the foreign minister to veto any agreements with foreign entities antithetical to the national interest. And just last month, a Chinese national was arrested on foreign interference charges in Canberra.
India is unlikely to compromise on border and territorial disputes with China and continues to deepen its defence and technological alignment with Western democracies. Japan is investing heavily in economic security and defence modernisation, committing to a massive boost in defence spending. And the US remains locked in strategic competition with China on trade, technology and security. For now, what binds the four is greater than any tension, so unity is more likely than division.
Australia is uniquely positioned to help bridge current gaps. It’s not a hegemonic power, it isn’t limited by a doctrine of strategic autonomy, and it isn’t restrained by constitutional handcuffs. Instead, it sits astride the Indo-Pacific seam, with security bound to both oceans. The Quad’s priorities also fit neatly with Australia’s strengths: since 2017, the group’s priorities have evolved to include critical minerals, resilient supply chains, Pacific engagement and infrastructure financing.
Albanese’s re-election has given him political continuity at a time when Washington is recalibrating its global engagement, Tokyo is reforming under new leadership and Delhi is hedging to ensure its Quad partners do not repeat the mistake of 2007. By advocating for a Quad leaders’ meeting to be held at the upcoming United Nations General Assembly, Albanese can enhance his reputation as a consensus-builder who prizes practical cooperation. It is also an opportunity for Canberra to send Washington a clear signal that the Quad is not simply US-led but genuinely shared—an essential point for Australia’s and the group’s credibility in Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific.
Albanese could champion an agenda that shifts from declarations of principle to broadened implementation in an era of global instability. Only leaders can cut across economic, defence, climate and industry portfolios to drive action. Without leader-level energy, the Quad risks a period of inertia. But the four countries could ride out this turbulence by complementing existing foreign ministerial meetings with defence and home affairs ministers’ meetings.
By doing this, the Quad could continue with practical delivery even in the event of a hiatus on leader-level meetings. This would provide continuity on initiatives such as common standards for supply chains; joint investments in ports and infrastructure; cooperation on critical technologies, cyber norms and climate security; and increased defence engagement, including relating to the South China Sea and Taiwan. Renaming Malabar exercises as the Quad military exercises could be an easy, short-term way to signal solidarity.
The Quad will not collapse because one summit slips. It will collapse only if its members stop competing, stop holding China to account and stop believing their security is bound together. Foreign ministers can keep the Quad alive, defence and home affairs ministers could strengthen it, but only leaders can make it matter. Albanese is well placed to steady the Quad and guide it into a new phase of practical delivery.