Concern around Kiribati’s security partnership with China has been growing since its switch in diplomatic recognition from Taiwan back to the People’s Republic of China in 2019. President Taneti Maamau’s lack of public consultation on security, aid and economic agreements with China have come at a time when his government has challenged judicial independence and pushed traditional partners away. The secrecy underpinning Beijing’s agreements and its motives has put other partners on edge.
While New Zealand has taken on a tougher stance on support to Kiribati and the United States has stepped back from supporting the region generally, Australia’s decision to be persistent and consistent with its support is sensible. The current Kiribati government is highly unlikely to sign major agreements with Australia any time soon, but Australia can demonstrate the value of its partnership through patience and enduring support.
The Kiribati Police Service is the country’s sole security force and is spread relatively thin on the ground—up to 500 members serve an estimated 135,000 people on 20 inhabited islands. In addition to its strong focus on community policing, the police service is further stretched by its prison and quarantine responsibilities and role in countering illegal fishing and maritime violations in Kiribati’s 3.5 million square kilometre exclusive economic zone (one of the largest in the world, bigger than the landmass of India). Kiribati’s economy depends on its marine resources, including fishing licenses, sea-farer remittances and export of ornamental fish.
Given these demands, Kiribati’s security development needs training and support from a range of foreign partners. The diagram below gives an overview of Kiribati’s key security partners and the types of support they provide to its security forces. The icons don’t reflect the full scale of assistance. For example, support could involve a single event with a specific outcome or a comprehensive, ongoing support package.
Australia has provided significant infrastructure, training and maritime support to Kiribati. This includes upgrades to ports and police barracks, provision of patrol boats, and training in cybersecurity, policing and peacekeeping operations. Much of Australia’s planned assistance to the country has continued, despite bilateral security treaty negotiations being put on hold.
While New Zealand’s Pacific islands prevention policing program is highly regarded across the region, that country began to review its support package to Kiribati after Maamau proposed to send a delegate to a planned meeting with Winston Peters, New Zealand’s foreign minister and, at the time, deputy prime minister, who then cancelled the visit. Peters initiated the review because ‘the lack of political-level contact makes it very difficult for us to agree on joint priorities’.
The US and Japan have provided mostly maritime support, with training delivered by their coast guards and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (navy). The US has also co-financed maritime infrastructure projects at Kiribati’s Kanton and Charlie wharves, revitalising infrastructure that was critical for US access across the Pacific during World War II.
Kiribati recognised the People’s Republic of China from 1980 to 2003. It switched recognition to Taiwan in 2003 following a corruption scandal involving China and claims that Beijing’s satellite tracking station on Kiribati was being used to observe US space activities. From 2003 to 2019, Taiwan paid for police vehicles and equipment. In 2019 Kiribati changed diplomatic recognition back to the People’s Republic, and since then China’s security cooperation has grown markedly. Chinese police are now stationed in Kiribati and support the police service in community policing and a crime database project. But no agreement underpinning China’s policing activities has been referenced publicly, so this is not included in the diagram above.
Several locations across the island nation are strategically important, so Kiribati has plenty of leverage to gain development help from a range of interested partners. Maamau is mostly focused on Kiribati’s domestic issues, but he isn’t afraid to speak his mind on geopolitics and global issues. And while Maamau has been delegating most of the responsibility of engaging with foreign partners to other members of government, he did attend the China Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers Meeting in May this year.
Maamau has previously expressed his disapproval of Western partners’ actions, including the announcement of AUKUS. He also temporarily withdrew from the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), but ultimately returned. If Kiribati permanently withdrew from a fractured PIF, the country would need significant additional support in its security sector, particularly if it also refused to take part in regional programs, such as the Pacific Policing Initiative. The current government would likely turn towards China as its main partner, as Western relationships with the Maamau government have been tense and worsening in the past few years.
Australia doesn’t want to see a Chinese security presence in any country, but transparency around Kiribati’s actions will probably remain limited. For those reasons, Australia should publicly and privately highlight the security and privacy risks of China’s policing support as much as possible. Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles has also stressed that Australia remains committed to its longstanding partnership despite the current challenges. All Western countries should be taking a similar approach, demonstrating proven long-term value and respectful cooperation through regional bodies such as the PIF.
ASPI’s Friends to all: Competing for Pacific security partnerships series can be found here.