At a time when many Pacific leaders are expressing concerns about the impacts of geopolitical competition in their respective countries and the region, the government of Nauru, led by President David Adeang, has opted to sign a comprehensive treaty with Australia in 2024. The treaty effectively removes the concerns of competition while delivering immense benefits for Nauru. It’s understandably not a model for every Pacific island country, but for Nauru, it’s one that brings confidence and stability for years to come.
At the beginning of 2024, Nauru was threatened by the planned withdrawal of its only remaining bank. Given its population, geographical location and risky financial history, there’s usually little profit or other incentive for a commercial entity to invest in providing services. This threatened severe economic consequences for the country, even if a Chinese state-owned bank stepped in to replace the physical presence of Australia’s Bendigo Bank.
In the security sector, Nauru’s police force of around 100 personnel was undergoing a significant modernisation process, including in surveillance and information and communications technology. Beyond community policing, Nauru faced challenges common to the Pacific, including transnational crime and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The Nauru government itself was also facing some budgetary challenges off the back of the Covid-19 pandemic, effecting the delivery of services and development.
The Australian and Nauruan governments worked tirelessly to find a solution that kept a bank in the country and supported Nauru’s other challenges. They did so in a unique way that fit the long-term plans of both partners. Banking ended up being a key part of the Nauru-Australia Treaty, which was signed in December 2024.
In addition to ensuring a bank remains in the country, Australia agreed to provide $100 million in budgetary support to the country over five years and $40 million over the same period for policing and security through recruitment, training and infrastructure.
Nauru could have taken a different approach: expanding its relationship with its new diplomatic partner, China, having just cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan in January 2024. But, as President Adeang said, Australia is ‘not just a friend, but family,’ reflecting regional language on ‘Pacific family’ and the importance of regional cooperation to Nauru.
This means that the future of Nauru’s security partnerships will likely look different to what we are seeing in many other parts of the Pacific, perhaps except for Tuvalu.
The treaty states that ‘Nauru shall mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other State or entity on matters relating to Nauru’s security including maritime security, defence, policing, border protection and cyber security sectors, and Nauru’s critical infrastructure concerning banking and telecommunications.’ This effectively gives Australia veto power over any other foreign partner involvement in Nauru’s security and critical infrastructure space in return for its support and investment into the country.
From an Australian perspective, it’s about protecting its assets and investment. With a historical offer of assistance, Australia wants to guarantee that it remains Nauru’s closest partner, as it has been since the country’s independence.
Other partners can still contribute to Nauru’s security development, when Australia does agree to the terms. And, as we have seen across the Pacific, like-minded partner cooperation will deliver benefits.
The diagram below gives an overview of Nauru’s key security partners and the types of support they provide to its security forces. The icons don’t reflect the full scale of assistance. For example, support could involve a single event with a specific outcome or a comprehensive, ongoing support package.
Australia gave comprehensive support to Nauru even before the treaty was signed. It has provided training, equipment, vehicles, maritime support and infrastructure under previous agreements. Notably, unlike other Pacific nations, the police maritime unit in Nauru does not operate a Guardian-class patrol boat, as it cannot muster a crew. Instead, Nauru operates two smaller rigid-hull inflatable boats given by Taiwan in 2022. Taiwan also donated 30 rifles to Nauru before the end of the diplomatic relationship.
Japan and the United States have also previously supported Nauru’s maritime security, including a ship-rider agreement with the US and a planned donation of another small patrol boat from Japan to help counter illegal fishing. This kind of support from like-minded partners should remain welcome in Nauru and encouraged by Australia as the US and Japanese Coast Guard can provide a different scale of assistance, and it is something that is being replicated in many of Nauru’s neighbours.
New Zealand doesn’t have a strong bilateral partnership with Nauru in the security sector but provides support in other areas. Likewise, China’s presence in the security sector is limited due to Nauru’s previous diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. While China is unlikely to become a security partner for Nauru given the Nauru-Australia Treaty conditions, it will likely continue to seek alternative ways to support the country and grow its footprint outside of the security, banking and critical infrastructure sectors.
When Nauru cut ties with Taiwan in 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with President Adeang and said ‘there is no first or second in friendship’. However, as Adeang had said, Australia isn’t just a friend. There was seemingly little public pushback against the signing of the Nauru-Australia Treaty from within Nauru’s system, indicating support for Australia as the security partner of choice for the country.
Now that the treaty has been signed, Australia must ensure that it delivers on its promise to provide enduring support to Nauru far beyond its security components, including in the vital banking sector. Australia should allow and encourage further support and engagement from like-minded partners such as Japan, New Zealand and the US, with a focus on maritime cooperation and climate security threats. Nauru’s participation and acceptance of support from Pacific regional security initiatives such as the Pacific Policing Initiative should also be supported by Australia.
Every Pacific country must chart its own path. But, in years to come, Nauru’s decision to step away from geopolitical competition and towards greater trust in its existing strong partnerships could become a lesson for others in the Pacific.
ASPI’s Friends to all: Competing for Pacific security partnerships series can be found here.