Somewhere in Solomon Islands lies a security agreement with China that has never been made public, despite assurances from the government of greater transparency. Even today, almost three years after its signing, the agreement still worries many watchers of the region. Nonetheless, the Solomon Islands government has shown that it values all its foreign partners’ support. This includes Australia, which will likely remain the country’s security partner of choice despite China’s efforts to grow its presence in the region.

As always, decisions around security-sector partnerships ultimately remain in the hands of the Solomon Islands government and their politicians, who have become adept at juggling partners and their offers of support to maximise the benefits, both personally and for their country. But the long-term effect of this on the country’s development is unclear. Showing how difficult it is to keep multiple partners happy, the Solomon Islands government has responded to pressure over Taiwan’s participation in the Pacific Islands Forum leaders’ meeting in Honiara in September by indicating it could exclude all non-members of the forum—notably China and the United States.

Solomon Islands is one of the more populated Pacific countries, with nearly 800,000 people. The ground on which they live and work serves as a constant reminder of the effects of war between great powers as millions of dollars are spent each year searching for and removing unexploded ordnance from World War II.

The Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF), with around 1,500 personnel, has its own scars left from the tensions that divided the country in the early 2000s. But the country is using its strong partnerships with countries that helped it through its difficult past—and potentially some newer partners—to steer its security forces towards a future where they can demonstrate and use their sovereign capabilities to a greater extent without relying on partners for help.

Australia signed a bilateral security treaty with Solomon Islands in 2017, which replaced the expiring RAMSI treaty. The treaty was first activated in November 2021, when Australian police, defence and diplomatic personnel were deployed through the Solomons International Assistance Force (SIAF) in response to civil unrest. Over 1,600 Australian personnel participated in SIAF through to 2024, working alongside partners from Fiji, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand to restore law and order in Honiara.

Solomon Islands signed a security agreement with China just a few months later in early 2022. This was met with both domestic and international criticism and concern. For example, the then opposition leader, Matthew Wale, said it was ‘counterproductive to the security interests of Solomon Islands and the region’. Three years and a change of leadership later, the agreement is still in place and not public. Nevertheless, Solomon Islands appears to be preferencing Australian security support above others, while maintaining a sovereign right to a range of partners and opportunities.

In 2024, Australia agreed to help grow the size and capability of the RSIPF over the next decade in a security deal worth $190 million. Unlike other significant security deals Australia has signed with some Pacific island nations, this one provides Australia with no formal conditionality or veto power that would prevent the island partner’s further engagement with China.

Australia would likely have preferred to obtain such guarantees. Instead, it has settled for maintaining its status as a ‘security partner of choice’ with the reasoning that the comprehensive package will reduce Solomon Islands’ ‘reliance on external partners over time’.

The diagram below gives an overview of Solomon Islands’ key security partners and the types of support they provide to its security forces. The icons don’t reflect the full scale of assistance. For example, support could involve a single event with a specific outcome or a comprehensive, ongoing support package.

Australia’s security support to Solomon Islands is underpinned by the Bilateral Security Treaty and a police partnership program. There are several long-standing programs, such as the Defence Cooperation Program and Pacific Maritime Security Program, that support maritime security, explosive ordnance disposal, disaster response capabilities and infrastructure. Australia has provided significant police training and infrastructure support, including a new police training centre in Honiara, as well as provincial maritime border outposts. In 2017, Australia supported the initial rearmament of the RSIPF following the conclusion of RAMSI and has since provided more weapons and training. Australian forces have also contributed to and led multiple assistance missions in response to civil unrest in Solomon Islands.

China and Solomon Islands signed a security agreement in 2022, but the details have not been made public. China has provided the RSIPF with more than 50 vehicles, including two with water cannons, and riot control equipment. China has provided local training and donated replica rifles. China’s hospital ship, the Peace Ark, also visited Honiara in 2023.

New Zealand forces have contributed to multiple assistance missions in Solomon Islands and the New Zealand Police provides an ongoing training package through the Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme, which includes locally embedded advisors. Despite this, the Solomon Islands government has criticised New Zealand for not doing enough. Other members of the Pacific Islands Forum, such as Fiji and PNG, participated in RAMSI and have recently also provided operational security support to SIAF in 2021–2024.

The US delivers training, support and exchanges to the RSIPF with a focus on explosive ordnance disposal. The US hospital ship, USNS Mercy, has also visited Solomon Islands for health assistance. The US and Solomon Islands signed a status of forces agreement in 1991. In the past few years, the US has been accused on multiple occasions of political interference in Solomon Islands, including involvement in plots to assassinate former prime minister Manasseh Sogavare, and by favouring direct support to Malaita province, known at the time for strongly opposing a Chinese presence in the province. These unsubstantiated rumours have at times impacted the US’s image and ability to deliver meaningful support throughout the country.

Japan’s efforts to increase maritime security cooperation with Solomon Islands have been stymied in recent years by concerns over the release of wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Other countries such as France and Britain have also provided humanitarian assistance and maritime security support to Solomon Islands.

In the future development of the RSIPF, Solomon Islands has stated that it would enact a three-tier security framework. This constitutes a strengthened RSIPF first, support from Melanesian countries second, and support from members of the Pacific Islands Forum third. However, this framework does not feature heavily in its recent National Security Strategy. Solomon Islands, to extract maximal support from its partners, will likely seek to remain ‘friends to all, enemies to none’.

Instead of focusing heavily on concerns over China’s presence in Solomon Islands, Western countries should spend more time highlighting the loss of value in having training and equipment provided by too many different partners. Other Pacific island countries were reportedly upset with Australia and New Zealand’s ‘overreaction’ to the security agreement. More recently, Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele has stated ‘it’s important for [Solomon Islands] to be in the driver’s seat’ when it comes to identifying support from foreign partners, including Australia.

Australia should not expect to reach an agreement with Solomon Islands that would entirely exclude China’s involvement in the security sector. However, Australia should continue to make it clear when and where certain assistance from other foreign partners will jeopardise the effectiveness of Australian training and support. In the future, Australia and other Pacific Islands Forum members should also be prepared to provide security assistance to quell unrest in Solomon Islands alongside Chinese security forces.

In the meantime, encouraging Solomon Islands to participate in regional security initiatives such as the Pacific Policing Initiative can reinforce Solomon Islands’ ability and desire to rely less on partners outside of the region for its security needs.

ASPI’s Friends to all: Competing for Pacific security partnerships series can be found here.