Patrol boats, infrastructure, training and other security supports given to Pacific island countries aren’t entirely gifts. The givers are hoping for something in return, even if they don’t say so.
Many partners seek to provide support and engagement in the Pacific security sector. This Strategist series, Friends to All, has examined the partnerships of the region’s five largest security assistance contributors—Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and the United States—with nine Pacific island countries and outlined what each Pacific country wants from its security partnerships. But each partner country is also guided by its own interests and overarching vision for the region. While some partners are aligned in their support for the region, competition stems from a desire to grow partnerships that can shape the region to match those visions.
The Pacific continues to be an important region for Australia due to proximity and longstanding shared historical ties. Ultimately, Australia is seeking a stable and secure near region. Since 2018, it has stepped up its support and engagement in the Pacific with the aim to be the ‘security partner of choice’, although it has always maintained a vested interest in the region, particularly across Melanesia.
Australia’s security cooperation with Pacific island nations reflects a broad and encompassing whole-of-government effort, guided by regional frameworks spanning defence, policing, law enforcement, border management, climate and disaster resilience, human security, and cyber security. It has established strong bilateral ties with all Pacific island nations, underscored by initiatives such as the Defence Cooperation Program and the Pacific Maritime Support Program. The value of these programs alone dwarfs security assistance contributions made by other partners in the region, without even including the bilateral agreements and support that has been made and delivered in recent years.
Australia understands that paying for capabilities of Pacific partners is in its own interest, to realise a vision of a stable and secure near region. Due to proximity, Australia also seeks to collaboratively tackle regional issues that coincide with its national priorities such as transnational crime, maritime security and climate change.
Australia also sees the value in addressing security concerns as a region and building regional capabilities to mitigate the risks associated with small populations, vast distances, diverse security threats and limited resourcing. Australia has made significant investments into regional initiatives such as the Pacific Policing Initiative and Pacific Response Group, which are designed to reduce vulnerability and increase capability and resilience across the region.
The Pacific also remains critical to New Zealand’s identity and security due to that country’s proximity and strong ties to the region through history, culture and politics. Strategically, stability in the Pacific directly underpins New Zealand’s own national security and resilience. New Zealand seeks to achieve a stable and secure region by enhancing bilateral partnerships and supporting existing regional architecture such as the Pacific Islands Forum. While less vocal on the threat that other actors, such as China, may pose to the region, New Zealand recognises the importance of collaborative efforts in responding to regional strategic challenges, and is a strong supporter of regional networks focused on policing, customs, immigration and countering transnational crime. Most recently, New Zealand’s tougher stance towards Kiribati may indicate a shift in its approach to assisting the region. An overly reactive New Zealand could jeopardise existing relations and partnerships it’s built over the years.
In contrast to Australia and New Zealand, China is seeking to create a Pacific that defers to the Chinese Communist Party’s interests at the expense of the region’s traditional relationships. China aims to cultivate influence over the political elite and Pacific populations through a spectrum of aid and assistance, including in the security, economic, diplomatic, medical and media spaces. China’s security assistance is part of its effort to cultivate influence and normalise its military and police presence in the region.
Since at least 2018, Australia and the US have publicly shared concerns that, if China sought to establish military bases in the Pacific, it would present complications to force-design during peacetime and pose a significant threat to Australian and US territories and sea lanes of communication in a conflict. China has staunchly denied that it wants bases and has reiterated that its engagement in the Pacific security space is focused on development and ‘win-win cooperation’.
However, in practice, its approach to Pacific security doesn’t always reflect this sentiment and has sometimes appeared blunt and ill-considered. In 2022, China attempted to obtain a sweeping regional security agreement with 10 Pacific island countries with little to no consultation with Pacific leaders. The agreement was rejected, and while some smaller agreements followed, the approach hindered China’s progress in the Pacific security space. In 2024, China launched a missile with a dummy warhead across the Pacific without notifying any Pacific island countries of its test.
Elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific, across Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, China has displayed a willingness to use its military, paramilitary and maritime militia forces to provoke countries and advance its strategic interests. Its coercive and antagonistic actions, such as making excessive claims over territory and conducting dangerous military intercept behaviour, are designed to undermine partnerships and challenge international rules and norms. Similar behaviour is possible in the South Pacific as China continues to grow its naval capabilities and extend its military presence beyond the first island chain. Beijing seeks to establish itself as a legitimate military presence in the region to support its own strategic aims and objectives. This will pose a threat to existing strong and cohesive Pacific security frameworks.
The threat posed by China’s presence in the Pacific factors heavily in Japan’s increased proactivity and expanded security role in the region. However, Japan’s broader imperative remains set in realising its vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Japan seeks to support a rules-based maritime order that promotes regional stability and rule of law in the region. To this end, its efforts include initiatives led by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and training facilitated by the Japan Coast Guard. Increasing Chinese influence in the region’s economic and security spheres threatens Japan’s vision and risks destabilising the regional order.
The US has also sought to be more active in the Pacific in recent years with the aim of preventing China from gaining a foothold in any Pacific island country that could prove advantageous in an Indo-Pacific conflict, while expanding its own footprint. However, much of the meagre progress the US had made in growing its diplomatic and security presence outside of Micronesia has essentially been undone by the second Trump administration.
Despite the current lack of support, Washington still desires a peaceful and prosperous Pacific region. Maritime security is the US’s main area of engagement with the Pacific. Many Pacific island countries have shiprider agreements with the US that enable Pacific countries’ forces to board US Coast Guard vessels in their exclusive economic zones. By these means, Pacific forces can patrol waters and counter transnational crime and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.
Although Washington would likely prefer to have greater influence as a partner in many Pacific island countries—particularly compared with China—the US is currently not providing enough assistance and support to be considered a core security partner for most Pacific governments. Further questions and concerns loom around the US’s diplomatic presence in the region and its ability to continue to support countries through non-security focused mechanisms such as USAID, weakening its overall value to the region. However, through the Compacts of Free Association, the US will stay heavily involved in the security space of Palau, the Republic of Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. In doing so, it will still play a role in regional security, including through large regional exercises, despite its waning presence in other nations.
Security partnerships in the Pacific region are underpinned by what Pacific countries need for their security development and what foreign partners want in exchange for providing that support. Because Pacific island countries depend almost entirely on foreign assistance to develop their security forces, there is a balance between meeting those security needs and ensuring that foreign partners are achieving their goals through the support they provide. When examining the relationships between Pacific countries and their development partners, the intent and aims of those partners must be acknowledged. Australia and its like-minded partners—Japan, New Zealand, and the US—should be more transparent and active in making their intent and concerns known publicly as well as privately to Pacific governments.
ASPI’s Friends to all: Competing for Pacific security partnerships series can be found here.