In 1940, with much of Europe under fascist domination, US president Franklin Roosevelt declared that the United States must become ‘the great arsenal of democracy’. US industry mobilised, producing ships, aircraft and ammunition on an unprecedented scale. That industrial power underpinned allied victory in World War II and the creation of the trans-Atlantic security architecture that followed.
Eighty-five years later, the lesson endures but the geography has changed. The Indo-Pacific is now the centre of strategic competition, and the challenge is no longer to outproduce an adversary but to outlast disruption. The contest ahead will not be won by industrial scale alone, but by industrial resilience.
ASPI’s new compendium Sea Lines and Strategic Frontiers illustrates how the Northern Territory’s geography has become central to Australia’s forward-defence posture. It argues that deterrence in the Indo-Pacific depends on the ability to sustain and repair forward, shortening the lines between production and projection. If Sea Lines and Strategic Frontiers explains why the territory matters to military sustainment, the next step is understanding its role in industrial integration. The ability to move capability must now be matched by the capacity to make it.
The US and Europe are already re-engineering their defence industries to meet that challenge. America’s National Defense Industrial Strategy and the European Union’s European Defence Industrial Strategy both recognise that national security begins on the factory floor. The US is rebuilding through onshoring, near-shoring and ally-shoring—strengthening supply chains to survive shocks and sustain long campaigns. The EU’s approach is different: it seeks strategic autonomy through coordinated investment, joint procurement and rules that favour EU content. One builds outward through partners; the other inward through integration. Yet both share the same goal: resilience. Together they point to an unavoidable truth: the next contest of endurance will be won or lost in the supply chain.
This convergence finds practical expression in AUKUS. Too often reduced to a submarine program, it is in fact an exercise in industrial diplomacy binding together design, production and sustainment across Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. Pillar One will establish a shared industrial ecosystem for nuclear-submarine production and maintenance that will endure for decades, while Pillar Two extends cooperation into advanced capabilities such as quantum systems, undersea robotics and artificial intelligence. Together they form a trusted network linking the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific, aligning with the US drive for resilient supply chains and an EU ambition for strategic coherence. In doing so, AUKUS offers a practical pathway for turning alliance politics into allied production power.
For Australia, geography remains destiny, but industrial geography now shapes its strategic weight. The Northern Territory, long seen as the edge of the map, is in fact the hinge connecting forward operations in the north with industrial sustainment further south. Darwin’s port, its access to critical minerals, its energy potential and its proximity to major Asian sea lanes put it at the junction of strategic and industrial networks. As Sea Lines and Strategic Frontiers observes, forward sustainment is deterrence. That logic now extends beyond fuel and repair hubs to include manufacturing, data infrastructure and energy systems. The territory’s capacity to produce, process and sustain capability makes it the natural southern anchor of an allied industrial network stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific.
Projects such as the proposed Middle Arm Sustainable Development Precinct, the under-construction Darwin Ship Lift and the territory’s marine-industry facilities are more than infrastructure investments; they are foundations for a new model of deterrence built on trusted industry and reliable energy. If developed in partnership with the private sector, allied governments and Traditional Owners, they could transform the Territory from a logistics outpost into a strategic manufacturing base. Potential energy from Beetaloo gas and renewables, critical minerals from projects such as Arafura and Tivan, and digital capacity from subsea cables and data centres together could create a production ecosystem that underwrites allies’ readiness.
To realise that potential, Canberra must ensure that defence, industry and regional-development policy work as one. Northern Territory projects should align with AUKUS and allied industrial standards so that components and maintenance tasks flow seamlessly between partners. Energy, transport and digital infrastructure must be treated as strategic enablers of capability, not merely as economic opportunities. Defence and industrial estates must be integrated so that ship-repair facilities, logistics systems and workforce programs directly contribute to readiness. Industrial policy and defence strategy can no longer operate in separate silos.
The Northern Territory’s role in the Indo-Pacific’s arsenal of resilience will not emerge by chance. It will require intent, coordination and investment in capability that endures. The territory’s geography offers reach, its industry can deliver endurance and its partnerships can confer legitimacy. Together, those elements form the backbone of a new kind of deterrence that is as much about what we can build and sustain as what we can deploy.
Where Roosevelt’s arsenal of democracy was forged in steel, the Indo-Pacific’s must be built through collaboration and trust. Australia’s task is to ensure that the Northern Territory becomes not just a forward operating area, but the industrial hinge on which allied resilience turns.