Reforms outlined in a July ASPI report, aimed at strengthening the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s (PJCIS), are insufficient. The recommendations don’t go far enough to fully address concerns around parliamentary oversight of Australia’s national intelligence community (NIC).
The committee’s composition is a source of ongoing disagreement. Contentious amendments to the committee’s membership, particularly the possible inclusion of crossbenchers, have sparked concerns about politicisation disrupting the institution’s traditionally bipartisan and confidential culture. However, preserving the status quo hinders greater rigour and objectivity.
I disagree with the idea of Labor and Coalition members monopolising the committee. Appropriate safeguards can be applied, and further improvements can be obtained by directly involving the parliament on all sides, in both chambers and independent of the executive.
Intelligence agencies’ willingness to inform the PJCIS should not be dependent on the traditional parties of government, especially since intelligence agencies are accountable to parliament. While securing the trust and confidence of the agencies is critical, Australians are entitled to expect that intelligence agencies are independently scrutinised and are held to account by their elected representatives.
As a representative institution, parliament is at the heart of Australian democracy. Given today’s diverse parliamentary composition, all parliamentary committees, including the PJCIS, could benefit from a diversity of backgrounds, perspectives, opinions and levels of experience. Greater contestability in the committee could lead to positive policy outcomes in the public interest.
Further reforms are also required to alleviate the strain on the core functions of the PJCIS due to its increasing scope and limited time and resources.
As noted by former PJCIS chair Peter Khalil, mounting pressures on the committee to manage its work are diminishing the quality and quantity of evidence it can gather to review bills, potentially undermining relationships with key stakeholders.
While the authors of the 2024 Independent Intelligence Review (IIR) assessed the resourcing for oversight bodies as ‘adequate’, Kahlil’s concerns highlight fundamental weaknesses that need to be addressed to ensure effective and rigorous parliamentary oversight.
One of those key weaknesses is understaffing and insufficient support for PJCIS members. Unlike other parliamentary committees, PJCIS members’ electorate or personal staff cannot assist with committee functions. Only the secretariat, staffed by parliamentary service employees, can.
Recommendation 66 from the 2024 IIR proposed the inclusion of an additional staff member for the PJCIS chair and deputy chair seconded from either ‘the policy or intelligence community’. However, adding secondees from the very intelligence community the committee is overseeing could present a major compromise of independence, whether actual or perceived. Due consideration should be given to this possible conflict of interest.
When it comes to intensifying staffing pressures, the PJCIS is not alone. The committee’s British counterpart, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, identified its own ‘oversight crisis’. As emphasised by its chairman, ‘An oversight body should not sit within, and be beholden to, an organisation which it oversees’.
Encouragingly, since the release of the report, the Australian government has introduced the Strengthening Oversight of the National Intelligence Community Bill 2025 to provide enhanced oversight of the NIC. The bill succeeds the lapsed Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2023.
While the introduction of the bill is a welcome development, an eight-year delay to crucial reforms to the PJCIS and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, outlined in the in the 2017 Independent Intelligence Review, is indefensible.
If the legislation governing intelligence agencies must undergo reviews to ensure effectiveness and accountability, then so too must the legislation that governs the operation of the committee.
After proper legislative scrutiny, the bill should be passed promptly. These reforms will benefit not only the committee but also intelligence agencies, the Australian government and the Australian public.
ASPI’s report is a valuable contribution to public discussion of intelligence oversight, especially around the role of the PJCIS. I agree with the report’s assessment that the committee is at a crossroads.
Policy observers will unavoidably have competing views about who should be accountable for what and how. Nevertheless, there is one key thing we agree on: given the current climate, the need for an empowered and well-equipped PJCIS is stronger than ever.