
Germany’s decision to permanently station a combat brigade in Lithuania is more than a military deployment. It’s a strategic signal that Berlin is finally ready to lead from the front.
The foreign basing, which began in May, marks a decisive shift in Germany’s role within NATO, from hesitant stakeholder to serious security provider on the alliance’s most vulnerable frontier.
It is Germany’s first permanent foreign troop deployment since World War II. At Rukla base in central Lithuania, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz addressed German and Lithuanian troops, saying, ‘the security of our Baltic allies is also our security’. For a country once defined by military caution, those words (and the 4,800 troops and 200 civilian personnel behind them) reflect how deeply the strategic environment has changed.
The 45th Armoured Brigade, newly created for the purpose, is a direct response to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Given their long memories of Soviet occupation, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have been sounding the alarm for years and have pushed for a more credible NATO posture in the region. Now, with the brigade expected to reach full capacity by 2027, Germany has finally delivered.
It’s a far cry from the Berlin of five years ago, still mired in debates about helmets and export licences: then, Germany sent Ukraine helmets but declined to supply it with weapons. Today, Merz, unlike his predecessor, Olaf Scholz, has embraced the role of defence leader with visible enthusiasm. He has promised to build Europe’s strongest conventional military and to hit a new NATO spending target of 5 percent of GDP by 2032—3.5 percent for procurement and 1.5 percent for military-relevant infrastructure such as roads, ports and rail. Lithuania has already pledged to reach that same figure next year.
What’s changed? The short answer is Zeitenwende—’turning point’. Scholz introduced the term in 2022 to signal a turning point in German security thinking. But Merz is putting that rhetoric into action. He has lifted the constitutional brake on government debt to enable rises on the defence budget, has backed legislative reforms to make overseas service more attractive, and has placed deterrence at the centre of Germany’s alliance commitments.
This isn’t just about Ukraine. It’s about broader European resilience in an age of geopolitical instability. Merz made that clear during his visit to Vilnius: ‘we stand firmly by Ukraine, but we also stand together as Europeans’. The underlying message: Europe can’t afford to remain dependent on the United States for its security guarantees—not when Washington’s reliability can change with each election.
That’s where this deployment really matters. It’s Germany saying to its allies (and to Moscow) that it understands the stakes and is prepared to act. It’s not a symbolic gesture or a temporary reassurance. It’s a forward posture, anchored in long-term planning and alliance integration.
Of course, it’s not all smooth sailing. Germany still faces problems with military readiness, logistics and recruitment. Deploying thousands of troops abroad brings its own challenges, especially in a force that’s been hollowed out by years of underinvestment. Earlier this year, the German parliament passed new rules to boost pay and conditions for deployed personnel, but rebuilding a robust force takes time.
Still, the political will is there—and that’s new. German leaders used to tread cautiously on anything to do with boots on the ground. Now, they’re making the case that leadership in Europe includes hard power, not just economic clout or diplomatic mediation.
This shift is also about alliance credibility. NATO has promised collective defence since 1949, but in recent years some members (particularly in Eastern Europe) have wondered whether the West would really come to their aid in a crisis. By basing troops in Lithuania, Germany’s helping to close that credibility gap.
It’s also a hedge against future uncertainty in the US. Donald Trump repeatedly called out Germany for underspending on defence during his first term, and there’s no guarantee of US consistency on NATO during his second. Merz, when asked about the possibility of a US troop drawdown in Europe, said he had no indication it would happen. But Berlin’s clearly preparing for that possibility anyway.
So what does this mean for the alliance more broadly? For one, it strengthens deterrence in the east. It also puts pressure on other European powers to follow suit. Especially those with the means but not the will. Germany’s move raises the bar for what leadership looks like in this new security environment.
And for Australia? While the immediate focus is on NATO’s European flank, the implications are global. A more militarily assertive Germany could have ripple effects across transatlantic industrial cooperation, Indo-Pacific planning, and NATO’s global partnerships—areas where Canberra is increasingly engaged.
In short, Germany has stepped into a role that many allies had been hoping for. Few expected so soon. The deployment to Lithuania isn’t just a policy decision. It’s a strategic pivot. And with it, Germany’s finally aligning its military commitments with its political and economic weight. That’s good news for NATO, and a timely reminder that leadership, when it counts, is still possible.