Taiwan has dramatically stepped-up efforts to address what authorities describe as a growing espionage challenge linked to China. In 2024, 64 individuals were charged with espionage-related offences—more than in the previous two years combined. According to government data, around two-thirds of those charged had military backgrounds, including active-duty personnel. In some cases, individuals were reportedly paid to leak classified materials or filmed themselves making declarations of support for Beijing, content later circulated on Chinese social media platforms.
Espionage cases have also surfaced in the civilian and political spheres. In June 2025, Taiwanese prosecutors indicted four former officials affiliated with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), including former aides to President Lai Ching-te and former foreign minister Joseph Wu, for allegedly passing diplomatic information to China. Earlier that year, several members of the Presidential Office’s military security detail were convicted of leaking documents after being approached by Chinese agents.
Other cases have drawn attention for their use of non-state networks. In late 2024, authorities revealed an organised crime group allegedly undertaking acts of espionage operating out of a religious temple in New Taipei City, reportedly also involving retired military personnel. Prosecutors said soldiers had been recruited through temple events and paid to record videos pledging cooperation with China. Government officials linked this case to what they described as broader United Front-style tactics used to cultivate influence across Taiwanese society.
In response to the uptick in cases, the Taiwanese government has introduced a series of legislative and institutional reforms. Amendments to national security laws have increased penalties for leaking core technologies or classified defence information, with prison terms of up to 12 years. A new list of protected technologies—including semiconductor and defence-related research—has been introduced to limit potential transfer to foreign actors.
The government has also launched public education initiatives aimed at reducing recruitment risks. Awareness campaigns highlight common approaches used by Chinese operatives—such as financial inducements, online grooming and academic or business exchange offers. Universities have been asked to scrutinise cross-strait partnerships more closely, and military units have expanded their counterintelligence training.
President Lai has described these moves as a whole-of-society response, urging greater vigilance across all sectors. Officials say reports from the public have increased, contributing to ongoing investigations. However, some lawmakers, legal experts and human rights groups caution that these measures risk overreach. Similarly, advocacy groups have warned that requiring teachers, civil servants and public figures to disclose their connections to China may undermine privacy rights and create a climate of suspicion.
One of the more controversial proposals has been the plan to reinstate military courts for trying active-duty personnel accused of espionage, sedition or related crimes. The government argues this will allow for faster and more specialised handling of national security cases, but civil society groups have raised concerns about due process and judicial transparency.
Taiwan has also expanded implementation of its Anti-Infiltration Act. Individuals identified as Chinese Communist Party or United Front officials are now barred from entering Taiwan, and all levels of government personnel—including local elected officials—are required to disclose any direct interactions with Chinese authorities. Civil society organisations, such as religious groups and non-governmental organisations, are expected to report engagements with Chinese entities.
Public servants, military officers and teachers have been asked to declare whether they hold residency permits or identity cards issued by China. These documents are not legally recognised by Taipei and are viewed by authorities as a potential means of asserting Chinese jurisdiction over Taiwanese nationals. By mid-2025, hundreds of thousands of declarations had been submitted. Only a small number of violations were reported, but officials say the policy is intended to identify risks early rather than react after the fact.
Taiwanese courts have also taken a firmer stance in recent cases. In 2024, courts handed down multi-year prison sentences for aiding Chinese intelligence, targeting not only active and retired military officers but also political staff and civilians.
Professional backgrounds of Chinese spies in Taiwan in 2024. Source: ASPI’s State of the Strait Database.
Despite the arrests and policy changes, Taiwan’s security agencies acknowledge that espionage threats persist. Chinese intelligence services continue to adapt, with officials citing ongoing concerns about cyber intrusions, covert funding channels and efforts to cultivate influence through cultural and social exchanges. Identifying operatives and preventing leaks remains a significant challenge, particularly given the openness of Taiwan’s democratic system.
International partners have begun to pay closer attention to Taiwan’s experience. Officials in Taipei have shared intelligence with counterparts abroad and positioned their counter-espionage campaign as part of a broader effort to resist authoritarian influence. While the long-term effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen, Taiwan’s approach is increasingly seen as a case study in how open societies confront covert interference.
