Taiwan urgently needs to overhaul its air defence strategy to prevent the rising threat of low-cost drone saturation attacks from China.

This demands three major reforms: expanding air-defence capability with low-cost weapons; improving survivability with hardening and greater mobility; and strengthening early warning, logistics and resilience through enhanced cooperation with partners.

China’s inventory of drones, encompassing both reconnaissance and strike types, has increased ^[1] significantly in recent years. Systems such as the CH-4 ^[2], WZ ^[3] and the extensively distributed ASN series provide multirole ^[4] capabilities at various altitudes, ranges and speeds.

The most notable aspect of this threat is the deployment of expendable, low-cost drones that could significantly alter the dynamics of the cross-strait conflict. Taiwan’s principal interceptor missiles, such as the Sky Bow and the US-supplied Patriot PAC-3, cost many times as much per round as the drones.

This easily exploited disparity could prove fatal for Taiwan. Drone swarms each costing several million dollars might deplete Taiwan’s interceptor inventories.

Conflict between India and Pakistan in May and the Israel-Iran crisis in June have demonstrated that conventional air defences, intended to intercept fast, high-value aircraft and missiles, are more susceptible to mass, low-cost drone assaults. Pakistan executed ^[5] a coordinated operation by sending 300 to 500 drones into Indian airspace. Although most were knocked down inexpensively by anti-aircraft guns, some got through, compelling India to fire many costly interceptors. Concurrently, Pakistan said it had intercepted several Indian drones. Some were used against Pakistani radars.

In the brief Israel-Iran war ^[6], Iran reportedly overwhelmed Israeli air defences with Shahed ^[7] drones, helping ballistic missiles to bypass ^[8] Israel’s Arrow defence systems. At one point, experts speculated ^[9] that Israel may have depleted its supply of interceptors for Arrow systems. Despite a stated effective interception rate, Israel suffered damage and casualties.

Taiwan’s existing air defence system is multi-layered. At the upper level, it uses the US-manufactured Patriot system ^[10] and locally made Sky Bow III ^[11] missiles, supported by a comprehensive ^[12] early warning radar network. A the lower level, other missile and gun systems are designed to intercept low flying cruise missiles. Taiwan’s equipment is optimised for high-speed, high-value aerial threats, rather than for slow-moving drones that operate covertly and overwhelm through sheer numbers.

Taiwan must realign its systems to prioritise cost-effective interception. This encompasses the incorporation of short-range rapid-fire gun systems, such as the Phalanx CIWS ^[13]. The Taiwanese Thunderbolt 2000 ^[14] rocket-artillery system should be modified for air defence. Taiwan also needs directed energy ^[15] weapons, such as lasers. Electromagnetic warfare capabilities designed specifically to jam ^[16] and spoof drone navigation may be advantageous. Interceptor ^[17] drones, which Ukraine has begun using, can knock down strike drones.

While these solutions require compromises in power, range or weather conditions, they provide a scalable and appropriate defence against low-cost saturation attacks.

Taiwan must also distribute assets to mitigate vulnerability, particularly around airbases and radar installations. Mobile missile batteries and decoys should be dispersed throughout the island to guarantee their survivability. Passive defence techniques, such as fortified shelters and concealment, would extend the survivability of valuable installations.

China no doubt intends to blind and paralyse Taiwan in an initial strike. Taiwan must keep sensors, such as radars, and command and communications systems in operation. This can be achieved through a combination of hardened and mobile radar units and redundant communication networks—through satellite-based systems and fibre-optic backups—and the dispersal of command centres.

Taiwan’s air defence must also be coordinated with capabilities of partners. Although direct Japanese or US military involvement with Taiwan in peacetime would be politically contentious, the island needs collaboration with partner intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance systems and logistics networks. These partnerships could help Taiwan by providing early warning of incoming threats, detecting launches of long-range missiles and enhancing real-time targeting accuracy. In addition, Taiwan would heavily rely on wartime supplies of interceptors, radar components and spare parts. As supply would be difficult during a possible Chinese naval blockade, stocking critical items in advance can ensure Taiwan’s air defence will remain in operation for a prolonged period, allowing it to absorb the initial attack and continue defending against the follow-up strike.