Indonesia’s recent arms procurement spree underscores its pursuit of middle-power autonomy. By diversifying suppliers, it has sought to reduce reliance on the United States and China as the Trump administration disengages from Southeast Asia and Beijing asserts itself in the South China Sea.
On 26 July, Indonesia signed a contract to procure 48 Kaan fighter jets from Turkish Aerospace Industries. This deal was followed closely by the acquisition of two Istanbul-class frigates, also from Turkey. This further expands Indonesia’s procurement from Turkey, including the Khan/Bora tactical ballistic missile and the Hisar-O and Siper air defence systems.
In just five years, Jakarta has signed contracts for two new fighter jet types, one new class of submarines, three new classes of frigates, a tactical ballistic missile system and two air defence systems. These have been sourced from at least four countries: Britain, France, Italy and Turkey.
This effort can be seen as Indonesia’s deliberate strategy to maintain autonomy. President Prabowo Subianto has made defence modernisation his priority program. Yet, mounting pressure from geopolitical competition has made relying on great powers as main arms suppliers unfeasible. In response, Indonesia’s procurement agenda emphasises diversifying suppliers and technological transfer to support Indonesia’s national defence industries and reduce dependence on arms imports.
The US has long been one of Indonesia’s prominent defence partners, with military sales totalling more than US$1.1 billion between 2014 and 2024. Yet Jakarta has become wary of overdependence on Washington. More recently, the unpredictable foreign policy of the Trump administration has underlined the risks of relying too heavily on the US. President Donald Trump’s imposition of 19 percent tariffs on Southeast Asian states—including Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam—indicated an attempt to distance itself from the region. If such political volatility were extended, Indonesia’s military readiness could be severely hampered.
Meanwhile, China continues to pressure Southeast Asian states through expansive maritime deployment. Currently, Indonesia faces regular Chinese incursions into its exclusive economic zone, especially in the Natuna area. Furthermore, heightened competition between the US and China risks conflict in the South China Sea that would affect Indonesia’s airspace and sea lanes. As such, Indonesia would be prioritising strengthening is naval and air power.
Currently, Indonesia has limited capacity to project power and secure distant sea lanes. Despite its enormous maritime area, it has only seven ocean-going frigates and four attack submarines, capable of covering only the critical chokepoints. Furthermore, its air force is also short on aerial fighting capability, with only 49 fighter jets supplemented by 42 light fighters and advanced trainers.
It is in this context, diversification of defence suppliers makes strategic sense. Indonesia has consistently sought to avoid entanglement in great-power alignments, practicing a hedging strategy: engaging major powers economically and diplomatically while simultaneously building independent capabilities. The logic of spreading procurement across multiple partners is reinforced by Indonesia’s past experiences of embargoes, including, at different times, by the Soviet Union and the West.
Furthermore, diversification also aligns with Jakarta’s ambition to strengthen its domestic defence industry. Countries such as Turkey, France and Britain have proven more willing than the US to offer technology transfers and industrial partnerships to non-allied states, providing strategic options for Indonesia’s long-term defence self-reliance. Turkey has pledged to share drone and fighter jet technologies with Indonesian firms, while Britain and France have collaborated with PT PAL, Indonesia’s largest shipbuilder, to develop expertise in constructing submarines and frigates.
This modernisation effort may create opportunities for regional cooperation. A stronger Indonesian navy could bolster joint maritime patrols with Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam in contested waters. Similarly, Australia—which recently upgraded its defence cooperation with Indonesia to a treaty-level partnership—may benefit from Jakarta’s more capable fleet, enabling extensive joint patrols in strategic chokepoints, such as the Arafura Sea.
However, diverse assets also risk creating logistical and maintenance bottlenecks. Since different weapon systems may have different spare parts and ways to maintain, crews should adapt to these varieties to ensure combat readiness. This will obviously increase spending, which will strain Indonesia’s limited budget. The plan to increase the defence budget—from 166 trillion rupiah (US$10.22 billion) in 2025 to 185 trillion rupiah (US$11.33 billion) in 2026—might help address these risks. Unless carefully allocated, procurement risks outpace Indonesia’s ability to sustain and integrate its growing arsenal. To mitigate this, defence policymakers should direct resources to maintain naval and air power as strategic priorities, while investing in interoperability and communications integration.
By spreading procurements across multiple suppliers, Jakarta not only fills urgent capability gaps but also secures autonomy in its foreign relations and strengthens its domestic defence sector through technology transfers. Risks of logistical overstretch and budget strain can be managed through careful prioritisation, especially on naval and aerial power, and joint-warfare capabilities.