When European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen offered Australia a security and defence partnership in early 2025, Canberra barely noticed. That wasn’t surprising. Canberra’s strategic focus had long been anchored in the Indo-Pacific, with the United States at its core and arrangements such as AUKUS dominating attention. The EU, by comparison, has often been seen as distant – important economically but secondary on security.
But the world has changed fast and so did Canberra’s appreciation of the EU as a security partner.
The new EU–Australia Security and Defence Partnership, concluded this week during a visit by von der Leyen, signals a quiet but important shift. Australia is becoming one of a small group of Indo-Pacific partners to formalise such ties with Brussels. This reflects a growing recognition by both Australia and the EU that today’s security challenges – geopolitical competition, economic coercion and technological disruption – are not confined to one region.
This is still not a defence pact. It creates no binding obligations or security guarantees. Instead, it provides a framework for consultation and co-operation across areas such as cyber security, counterterrorism, defence technology and emerging capabilities. It also builds on existing arrangements that allow Australian personnel to contribute to EU missions and facilitate the exchange of classified information.
In one sense, the agreement consolidates what already exists. In another, it opens the door to something more consequential.
For Canberra, the most immediate attraction is economic. The EU’s €150 billion (A$249 billion) defence financing initiative offers Australian defence firms a potential pathway into a rapidly expanding market. If granted meaningful access, and provided they meet EU and NATO standards, Australian companies could compete more effectively in the EU market at a minimal participation fee for Australia.
But it would be a mistake to see the partnership as mainly commercial.
Some of the most valuable opportunities lie in less visible areas. The EU and Australia are both grappling with hybrid threats, foreign interference and disinformation – challenges that blur the line between peace and conflict. Australia has been on the frontline of these challenges and has developed policy tools that are now being studied internationally. The EU, meanwhile, has built its own expertise in responding to hybrid threats, particularly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Combining these experiences delivers practical benefits for both sides – and for countries across the Indo-Pacific.
The case for closer cooperation is just as strong when it comes to China. Europe is increasingly interested in understanding Beijing’s strategic behaviour, and Australia brings decades of regional experience to that conversation. At the same time, the EU has developed a more robust economic security toolkit to counter coercion and reduce strategic dependencies. Closer alignment with these measures could strengthen Australia’s own resilience.
None of this will happen automatically. Agreements of this kind often generate carefully worded communiques but fall short on delivery. If this partnership is to matter, it will need to produce tangible outcomes, whether in joint initiatives, capability development or co-ordinated policy responses.
That will require sustained attention. For Australia, it means treating the EU as more than a secondary theatre. For the EU, it means showing up more consistently in the Indo-Pacific – politically, diplomatically and, where possible, operationally.
The EU is becoming a more serious strategic actor, including in areas that matter to Australia. The EU–Australia partnership will not attract the headlines of AUKUS, nor should it. It serves a different purpose: complementing high-end military capability with broader security cooperation and diplomatic alignment.
Canberra is right to engage. But it should do so with clear intent. Europe is no longer just an economic and investment partner but an increasingly relevant player in Australia’s security architecture. The risk is not overcommitting to Europe but underusing this new partnership.
This article was originally published in The Australian.