Japan’s Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework, established in 2022, is emerging as one of the most innovative military diplomacy frameworks to engage with maritime South Asia. An extension of the country’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it focuses on providing military assistance, limited to defensive support in surveillance, capacity building, and coastal defence.
As OSA reach in South Asia is currently limited to Bangladesh, Japan should expand the program’s coverage to improve its deterrence value. It should collaborate and consult with partners, such as India and the United States, to better facilitate this expansion.
Bangladesh signed an agreement on OSA in 2023, during then prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to Japan. The objective was to enhance Bangladesh’s security and deterrence capabilities by providing equipment, supplies, and assistance for developing infrastructure.
Under the OSA, the Japanese government provided a grant of 575 million yen ($6.1 million) to Bangladesh to support the purchase of patrol boats for surveillance and disaster relief.
While the next OSA phase is expected to include Sri Lanka. This expansion underlines an increasing interest of South Asian countries in OSA and Japan’s deepening military engagement with the region. Increasing the OSA budget from 3 billion yen (A$31.5 million) to 8 billion yen (A$84 million) highlights Japan’s strategic commitment to regional maritime security and stability.
One of the objectives of OSA’s expansion is to counter the deepening Chinese military presence in the region, particularly around countries, such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, that are on critical trade routes. By expanding the OSA, Japan aims to help maintain the region’s political, economic and strategic stability and ensure that regional countries don’t depend entirely China.
Japan will face challenges as it expands OSA coverage. The OSA budget, for example, remains small compared with China’s economic aid and military support. Also, Japan’s military export restrictions prevent it from expanding the OSA framework to include lethal support. To overcome this obstacle alone, Japan would need to take advantage of technicalities or pursue regulatory changes.
To better facilitate an expanded program, Japan should work with partners that also have a presence in the region, such as India and the US. With these countries, Japan should formulate a coordination and consultation mechanism that ensures that all military diplomacy action is complementary.
Better coordination and working mechanisms around OSA with countries wary of Chinese military expansion are in the best interests of all stakeholders. For India, an increasing presence of democratic countries that face similar threats would support its efforts to maintain a free and open Indian Ocean region, adding to its political stability. Better military ties between Japan and regional countries through OSA would also help to ward off Chinese military presence.
The OSA program is limited to non-lethal support. While Japan is exploring new mechanisms to provide lethal military equipment, it is still constrained by its strict military export laws. Japan’s partners, particularly India, could fill these gaps, starting with the South Asian region.
India could leverage its booming defence industry to export offensive and lethal military equipment, improving recipient countries’ military capabilities. It should also consider extending this beyond the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia. Additionally, institutions such as the Quad—composed of India, Japan, Australia and the US—could further enhance OSA initiatives, addressing capability and budgeting gaps.
Going forward, India should work with Japan to ensure that countries in South Asia and beyond have access to military assets essential for regional security and stability. Any inhibitions about China’s reaction should have ended after the clashes with Pakistan in May, which were to a large extent enabled by China’s supply of military equipment to Pakistan.