Food supply is long overdue for elevation into national security policy. As The Australian reported on 19 February, there are persuasive arguments for Australia to follow the United States in treating our agricultural capacity and supply chains as core strategic assets, backed by formal links between Defence and agriculture.

The contributors to that debate have accurately identified structural policy weaknesses in this regard. Treating food as a national security priority isn’t just a technical problem of bureaucratic coordination across Canberra agencies; it requires bridging the gap between national security planning and our globally embedded commercial food system. It is a whole-of-nation resilience challenge.

This distinction matters.

Jennifer Parker’s proposal to create a US-style position of national security adviser is exactly the kind of structural reform required. An immediate priority for such an office must be integrating agriculture and food logistics, both run by the private sector, into national security planning.

We must ensure this translates into deep, strategic partnerships across sectors and jurisdictions, not just another layer of inter-departmental committees. While Australia’s food system is open, globally embedded, and commercially driven, the supply chains that sustain it must be secured with the same rigor we apply to defence capabilities.

Yes, Australia is a net exporter of food, but we rely on imported fertilisers, fuel, pesticides and other inputs. Without them we can’t feed ourselves and, through exports, contribute to regional stability. We’re exposed to supply disruption.

A useful step is wargaming logistics for a Taiwan contingency, as Gus McLachlan suggests. But the most likely high-impact food security threats Australia faces won’t necessarily look like war. We must wargame compounding systemic shocks: a drought in India that tightens global rice markets; simmering geopolitical tensions that disrupt maritime routes; cyber incidents that choke logistics hubs; or pandemics and climate extremes that simultaneously stress food, energy and transport systems. These are more diverse strategic risks that demand a more nuanced mindset.

So what should Australia do?

First, we should recognise that resilience is delivered by collaboration, not just coordination. Defence must be at the table, but it should be a partner, not the architect of agricultural resilience. States and territories, the private sector, and such departments as Agriculture, Industry, Transport and Treasury must share ownership of risk assessments and mitigation plans. That means co-investment, sharing data, joint planning and sustained engagement.

Second, strategic policy requires disciplined analysis to distinguish between structural national security vulnerabilities and everyday commercial risks. Protecting our sovereign capabilities must be done in a way that works with market forces, rather than distorting them.

Finally, a national security adviser could help anchor a long-term strategy but only if empowered to work across government and with industry. Australia will build resilience through trust, shared responsibility and a clear understanding of constitutional and economic factors.

Elevating food and agricultural security is vital. But the task ahead is now about collaboration: binding diverse partners into a purpose-driven whole-of-nation effort. That is the real test of strategic maturity in 2026. Passing that test is our best chance to keep Australia, our neighbours and our allies stable, secure and well fed in a volatile world.