Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web has fundamentally redefined the nature of drone warfare and highlighted just how vulnerable Australia’s precious cache of exquisite systems truly is.
The 1 June operation’s ingenious use of small, cheap, commercial drones to strike at Russian air force targets was the very definition of asymmetry. The attack that caused billions of dollars in damage was achieved using drones costing in the thousands. It was orchestrated across airfields as far as 4,000 km from the front line in Ukraine (or Sydney to Perth), purportedly destroying one third of Russia’s strategic bomber force, a force that cannot be easily replaced.
Similarly, Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, which began on 13 June, reportedly used drones launched within Iran to strike Iran’s surface-to-air missile batteries. The drone base was established well in advance of Friday’s attack.
From this, it’s not hard to see the implications for the safety of Australian defence equipment and facilities. But it may surprise you to learn that the biggest barrier preventing the Australian Defence Force from countering drones on Australian soil is not technological but legislative.
First, let’s understand the scenario.
Spider’s Web has demonstrated that rear-area assets and defence facilities, once considered secure due to the perceived luxury of long distances from threats, are now vulnerable targets if left in the open without hardened hangars and active protection measures.
The asymmetric potential of small, smart drones to conduct long-range strike objectives is now clear. Advances in AI enable drones to perform complex tasks with minimal human control, while drone swarms can overwhelm sophisticated defence systems. Enhanced sensors, machine vision and stealth features further increase their effectiveness. For example, Ukraine’s drones used Russia’s cellular networks to bypass radio frequency detection and jamming equipment. This technique has been developed only recently and is extremely effective at both controlling the drones and keeping them hidden. Such technologies are being developed rapidly, and the threat grows bigger every week.
We have now seen that Australia’s defence personnel and scarce high-value assets stationed in bases across Australia can be threatened by adversarial state or non-state terrorists. So, what does Australia need to do to protect its personnel and platforms?
There has been a lot of talk recently about the lack of spending on counter-drone equipment to protect the critical ADF bases. While some of these criticisms and the belief that we are not spending enough are valid, it’s not the whole story.
The ADF is rapidly implementing a program called Land 156 to counter small drones that threaten deployed forces. In addition, the Royal Australian Air Force has begun trialling state-of-the-art counter-drone equipment from my company at RAAF Darwin. This equipment has been designed, tested and proven in the most austere active military hazard zones in the world and would have detected a Spider’s Web type attack, despite the sophisticated navigation techniques that rendered them invisible to most other counter-drone systems.
The good news is that the technology exists and the ADF is spending on expanding and scaling this technology across its bases in Australia. The bigger challenge is that the legislative environment that governs the use of counter-drone equipment has not kept pace with these emergent threats.
While the ADF can employ systems that detect drones, Australia’s current legislative framework blocks the armed forces from using drone countermeasures on Australian soil. Yes, you read that right: the ADF’s hands are tied by outdated legislation.
If an event like Spider’s Web happened at RAAF Darwin today, the base security forces would have an early warning of the attack but would have no legal authority to stop the drones slamming into F-35 Lightnings, P-8A Poseidons, E-7 Wedgetails or, worse, a building full of ADF personnel.
The legislation that governs the use of counter-drone technology is complicated, with eight pieces of legislation covering everything from the safe operation of airspace activities to the use of electronic countermeasures. While these regulations affect the use of counter-drone systems in Australia, they don’t outright ban them. Designated civilian government agencies, such as the Australian Federal Police, have the statutory authority to use drone countermeasures under prescribed circumstances. This begs a question: why aren’t these authorities extended to our defence forces?
The primary legislative constraint stopping the ADF from using countermeasures against drone threats is the Defence Act 1903, which outlaws military intervention on domestic soil without ministerial approval. The ADF, from its inception, has been designed to protect the nation from external threats coming from far away. Approval for it to operate domestically must be within well-defined limits, and only under exceptional circumstances in a proclaimed emergency. While we would all agree that the ADF should be constrained by legal provisions governing the use of force domestically, the Defence Act 1903 is a product of its time and isn’t fit for domestic drone threats. The act includes prohibitions against sketching, drawing or painting defence installations. Clearly in 1903, drone threats were well beyond the wildest imagination of its authors, with the first powered aeroplane flight in Australia not taking place until 1911.
It’s essential that the Government urgently review the act to allow Defence to take reasonable and proportionate actions against drones operating around Defence facilities to protect Defence personnel, assets and infrastructure.
Global commentators rightly call Spider’s Web a revolution in drone warfare. However, it also sounds an urgent call for the ADF to invest in fit-for-purpose counter-drone technology at the speed of now, and to modernise the statutory frameworks to enable our armed forces to protect themselves. We don’t have the luxury of time or long distances, but we do have the luxury of advanced capability ready and available to protect our nation.