Political leaders and representatives from New Caledonia and France have done well with an agreement signed on 12 July to settle the Pacific island’s status. Now they must seriously engage with New Caledonians to sell the deal.
Meanwhile, political fragmentation and interference efforts threaten to undermine trust.
The two sides agreed on ‘a new political organisation, a more widely shared sovereignty and an economic and social refoundation’ for New Caledonia. It would gain the unique status of a ‘state’ within France.
The provisions of the 1998 Noumea Accord—the existing agreement between France and New Caledonia on the island’s status—meant that New Caledonia was already an outlier that didn’t cleanly equate to France’s categories of an overseas collectivity, department or region. Indeed, short of full independence, New Caledonia was always going to become a unique entity with a bespoke agreement on specific powers, rights and responsibilities.
The trick, then, was to negotiate on the details. The deal is impressive in having done so. Indeed, it includes commitments to devolve authority in foreign relations and security and details on a partial opening of the electoral roll—a cause of riots last year—through definition of a New Caledonian nationality.
The deal grants New Caledonia greater competency in international relations while respecting France’s fundamental interests, particularly in security and defence. New Caledonia will also be more involved in the exercise of defence and security activities, including being consulted on France’s aims and actions in the region. New Caledonian provinces will also gain responsibility for local community policing.
The deal allows the New Caledonia Congress, the island’s deliberative assembly, to define a New Caledonian nationality—beyond the existing status of citizenship—dually held alongside French nationality.
New Caledonians will vote on the deal in a referendum in February 2026, under special rules without an expanded electoral role. It must also pass the French parliament. While initial reactions from New Caledonian political leaders were largely positive, their challenge will be to sell the deal and its compromises to their constituents.
Political leaders must not only get the deal across the line but ensure it receives convincing endorsement to avoid lingering doubts, like those surrounding the 2021 independence referendum, the third and final envisaged under the Noumea Accord.
It would be a breach of trust if any of the signatory parties were to campaign against the agreement, at least in the short term. Such actions would potentially set New Caledonia back indefinitely by dissuading parties from negotiating again.
However, political fractures have emerged. For example, the pro-independence Caledonian Union political party initially rejected the agreement, and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front, a political party that signed the agreement, expressed doubts upon returning from the negotiations in Paris, implying the deal was not final and could be renegotiated. The party’s political bureau is considering the deal.
Despite its presence in Paris, the Customary Senate—an advisory body representing the indigenous Kanak population—said France had not respected the Kanak people’s right to participate, regretting its inability to comment on the agreement. The senate called for a period of reflection before a late August Kanak congress that may adopt a position.
These political deliberations may reflect some concern over the public reaction. After the deal was announced, New Caledonian leaders expressed concerns that they would by ‘insulted, threatened’ by ‘archers awaiting us on both sides’. Politicians have since been offered police protection after threats circulated on social media.
The agreement’s focus on political organisation, economy and electoral role doesn’t fully answer the question of Kanak representation and self-determination. This was certainly the Customary Senate’s concern, and it may well become a sticking point for hardline independentists. Philippe Gomes, founder of the political party Caledonia Together, said ‘New Caledonia will continue to emancipate itself’.
The riots showed the risk of civil violence. The manipulation of rogue, extreme factions by foreign actors, notably Azerbaijan, didn’t help. As the referendum approaches, French and New Caledonian authorities are likely to be particularly attentive to public mood and efforts—domestic and foreign—to undermine or disrupt the vote.
Azerbaijani media outlets have already indicated ongoing interest in the issue, publishing articles in English and French. Interference efforts are likely to increase closer to the vote.
In any case, the referendum won’t be the end of the story. If successful, New Caledonia’s future will hinge on how the deal is implemented and how New Caledonia’s economy and society develops under the new political organisation. New demands and negotiations are sure to emerge as the reality of the deal takes hold—as indeed political divisions already are. The question then will be, at what point, if at all, will Paris and Noumea be ready to revisit and revise the deal if they must?