A regional network open to think tanks and universities from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea – NATO’s Indo-Pacific (IP4) partner countries – is working to enhance understanding of the common security challenges facing the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic.
NATO Assistant Secretary General Ambassador Boris Ruge gave the keynote speech to launch the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic Hub for Shared Security Challenges on 24 February. He and the event’s panellists reflect here on the importance of cooperation between NATO and the Indo-Pacific and the need to counter disinformation through public diplomacy.
Views from NATO
Ambassador Boris Ruge, NATO Assistant Secretary General, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO Headquarters
Security in the 21st century is no longer confined by geography, and there is growing recognition that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are interconnected through security, economic and political dynamics. The launch of the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic Hub for Shared Security Challenges – a public-engagement initiative virtually connecting think tanks and academic communities across both regions – underscores the importance of strengthening dialogue and public understanding at a time when democratic societies face mounting information threats.
At the same time, cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners is not new. These countries have stood alongside NATO in Afghanistan through the International Security Assistance Force and contributed to stabilisation efforts in the Western Balkans. Such collaboration has been grounded in shared values: a commitment to freedom, democracy, human rights and a rules-based international order.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a decisive turning point. The IP4 have significantly helped Ukraine to defend itself, including through vital non-lethal contributions as part of the Comprehensive Assistance Package. These have included non-lethal assistance such as medical supplies, fuel, winter equipment, counter-drone and resilience support. Australia and New Zealand have also contributed to the Prioritised Ukraine Requirement List (PURL) program to coordinate and fund the delivery of critical US-sourced military equipment to Ukraine. They have also contributed to essential training through the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine Initiative. Australia has also deployed a Wedgetail aircraft to support humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine.
Russia’s war of aggression, which passed its four-year mark on 24 February, has demonstrated how security crises reverberate globally. This is particularly true against the backdrop of expanding ties between Russia and China, including Beijing’s support for Russia’s defence industry and evasion of sanctions, as well as North Korea’s direct military assistance to Moscow.
At the same time, it should be clear: NATO’s strengthened engagement with the Indo-Pacific does not signal geographic expansion of our Alliance. NATO remains a transatlantic Alliance, with collective defence commitments under Article 5 applying exclusively to its 32 allies. Cooperation with partners is guided by Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes (ITTPs), focused on mutual interests and aims to enhance our resilience through political dialogue and practical cooperation in areas such as cyber defence, countering disinformation, emerging and disruptive technologies, arms control and defence cooperation.
At the 2024 Washington Summit, we advanced joint initiatives in the field of cyber defence, hybrid threats, disruptive technologies and sustained support for Ukraine. At the 2025 Hague Summit we took significant steps forward to ensure that we had the means to continue fulfilling our core tasks through adequate defence investments and enhanced industrial cooperation.
As NATO prioritises stronger deterrence, increased defence investment and enhanced industrial capacity, collaboration with Indo-Pacific partners will remain essential. In an era of systemic competition and complex challenges and threats, transregional cooperation is not optional; it is indispensable to safeguarding democratic resilience and global stability in our respective regions.
Sophie Larder, Officer for Indo-Pacific partners, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO Headquarters
The hub is important work for us at NATO, because alongside the significant increase in NATO’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific partners, there has been an exponential rise in disinformation and misrepresentation of what we are doing.
NATO’s engagement with the IP4 is not new; it dates back several decades. We held our first North Atlantic Council meeting with the Indo-Pacific partners collectively in 2016, at a time when North Korea was conducting deeply destabilising missile tests.
We have always operated on a few common assumptions: first, that many of the security challenges we face are global in nature; and second, that both Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security dynamics often have global implications.
2022 was, of course, a turning point. Our Indo-Pacific partners were clear in their steadfast support for Ukraine following Russia’s invasion. The IP4 contributed significantly, including through NATO’s Comprehensive Assistance Package, as well as through Australia’s and New Zealand’s military support through PURL contributions – making them the first NATO partners provide support in this way.
The 2022 Agenda for Tackling Shared Security Challenges marked the first-ever joint document between NATO allies and the IP4. In 2023 and early 2024, we agreed on new ITPPs with our Indo-Pacific partners. Alongside our multilateral work, there was a shared recognition that each Indo-Pacific partner had distinct ambitions and therefore required a tailored approach.
Going forward, NATO remains clearly committed to deepening this cooperation. In an age of increasingly complex security dilemmas, we see specific opportunities to work more closely with the IP4 in areas such as defence industrial cooperation; science, technology and innovation; interoperability; and information sharing.
However, this is not about NATO expanding into the Indo-Pacific or positioning itself as a security provider in the region. Rather, it is about working more closely with our closest and most capable partners.
A view from Australia
Alex Bristow, senior analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Targeted engagement with NATO, bilaterally and as part of the IP4, is in Australia’s interests. But some perspective is helpful.
Australia’s bilateral partnerships with select NATO countries – especially the United States, Britain and France – will remain more important than cooperation with NATO. Canberra will continue to welcome the military presence of NATO countries in the Indo-Pacific, including for operations supporting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. But these are national deployments, distinct from NATO operations.
Even so, Australia can and should do more with NATO. The partnership is already delivering support to Ukraine. Looking ahead, Canberra wants deeper collaboration with NATO on supply chains and procurement, which could yield economies of scale and unlock markets for Australian defence industry. It would also be helpful to discuss the calculation of defence spending, as this is evolving and is often compared across regions as a proxy for commitment and burden-sharing.
The priority for NATO–IP4 cooperation in the Indo-Pacific should be countering hybrid threats. Cyber-enabled threats such as disinformation transcend regional boundaries. In the same way, both regions benefit by exchanging expertise on shared challenges such as the protection of subsea cables. The hub can support this work and help explain why NATO’s activities in the Indo-Pacific are distinct from those of individual allies or EU initiatives.
Australia values practical cooperation with NATO more than the political profile of the IP4. Hopefully, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese will attend the NATO summit in Turkey in July, even though he’s missed the past two. But there seems little appetite in Canberra to build the IP4 into another minilateral like the Quad between Australia, India, Japan and the US.
A view from South Korea
Inhwan Oh, executive director and senior research fellow, East Asia Institute
The world is not returning to a new Cold War or spheres of influence – labels that are too readily applied. Despite de-risking and supply chain reorganisation, the US, China and the wider world remain deeply economically integrated, unlike during the Cold War. Nor does multipolarity capture the landscape: beyond the US and China, it is difficult to identify poles of comparable strategic weight. Russia, while a legacy great power with residual regional influence, does not carry the same weight as the US or China.
What we are witnessing is an unstable hybrid order, in which competing organising principles asserted by the US, China and Russia contest without strategic settlement. Acknowledging this reality is critical for NATO–IP4. Such an acknowledgement disentangles the partnership from disinformation that frames it as an ‘Asian NATO’ or bloc politics. It also reinforces the rationale for cooperation: it is at this juncture that middle powers of the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic can collectively reshape the international order in ways that redress its past flaws.
Despite divergent threat perceptions across the two oceans, middle powers that benefited most from the post-Cold War order share the challenges of global readjustment. NATO–IP4 offers an excellent mechanism for interconnecting cooperation in security, defence, industrial resilience, emerging technologies and AI regulation. Moreover, NATO–IP4 members and NATO itself continue to engage China bilaterally and multilaterally. Increasing transparency of that engagement while deepening concrete coordination – in maritime industrial ecosystems, civilian infrastructure protection, cybersecurity and technology standards within NATO–IP4 – will weaken disinformation and ensure NATO–IP4 connects, rather than fragments, the regions of the world.
A view from Japan
Akira Igata, project lecturer, Research Centre for Advanced Science and Technology, University of Tokyo
Cooperation between NATO, Japan and other IP4 countries has moved beyond symbolism and become increasingly substantive over the past few years. However, this cooperation is not about Japan entering NATO, nor about creating an Asian NATO; it is about practical partnership in areas that serve the national interests of NATO’s member states and Indo-Pacific partners.
Leaders on both sides have emphasised the growing interconnectedness of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific regions, a trend reflected in institutional and diplomatic developments. Japan has established an independent mission to NATO in Brussels with a dedicated ambassadorial position, and the ITPP has identified concrete priority areas for cooperation. High-level visits in both directions further demonstrate political commitment.
This deepening partnership is driven by shared hybrid challenges and converging policy responses. Both sides are strengthening supply-chain resilience and protection of critical undersea infrastructure. Arctic security is increasing its prominence in the discussions. There are also efforts to counter disinformation, bolster cybersecurity and advance collaboration in various emerging technologies.
Recent policy developments under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration create additional opportunities. Planned revisions to Japan’s three national security documents and updates to principles governing defence equipment transfers would expand the scope for defence-industrial cooperation. The strategic evolution of the free and open Indo-Pacific will clarify Japan’s diplomatic priorities, facilitating closer alignment with NATO’s Indo-Pacific engagement. Furthermore, the formulation of Japan’s first National Intelligence Strategy and various intelligence reforms will allow for more effective and substantive intelligence sharing.
A view from New Zealand
David Capie, director, Centre for Strategic Studies
Although there has been increased attention to New Zealand’s relationship with NATO in recent years, it is important to note that it is not new. New Zealand has been a NATO partner since the 1990s and has contributed to several NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Gulf, and the Mediterranean.
Militarily, the relationship provides the New Zealand Defence Force with access to doctrine, standards, training and exercises that are essential for interoperability with partners. Cooperation on emerging issues – such as disruptive technologies, cybersecurity and defence industry collaboration – is also expanding. NATO’s experience in addressing hybrid threats in the context of Ukraine also offers useful lessons for the Indo-Pacific.
Politically, NATO has become a useful mechanism for engagement with like-minded European partners, a role that has become more significant following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. New Zealand has now implemented its 34th round of sanctions on Russia and has contributed funding to the PURL and the NATO Trust Fund. Working with NATO member states, it has trained Ukrainian forces – more than 60,000 troops to date, initially in Britain and now in Poland – and participates in the British and Latvian-led Drone Coalition.
New Zealand’s support for Ukraine reflects long-standing interests in upholding international law, protecting territorial integrity and resisting aggression. It also reflects growing concern about a more contested strategic environment, including challenges posed by Russia-China cooperation, and hybrid threats that increasingly link the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.
Since 2023, New Zealand has also placed greater emphasis on cooperation with the IP4. Acting collectively helps with access to NATO and aligns with Wellington’s broader effort to deepen its ties with Japan and Korea, as well as its ally Australia. At a time of strategic flux, there is interest in further enhancing cooperation among the four, although New Zealand will be cautious about any efforts to run before the group can walk.
About the hub
The Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic Hub for Shared Security Challenges is a virtual network connecting think tanks and universities from Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and Japan (and in the next phase, also from Allied countries) and NATO countries interested in enhancing understanding of common challenges between the two regions. This public engagement initiative is supported by a grant from NATO Headquarters and it is open to relevant stakeholders from the two regions. Interested parties can contact: Dr Pietro De Matteis, Engagement Officer for the Indo-Pacific, NATO HQ ([email protected]).
The network currently involves:
—Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute; National Security College at the Australian National University.
—Japan: Economic Security Intelligence Lab, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo; Japan Institute of International Affairs; Keio Center for Strategy at Keio University.
—New Zealand: Centre for Strategic Studies; New Zealand Institute of International Affairs; Asia New Zealand Foundation.
—Republic of Korea: Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies; Hankuk University of Foreign Studies; The Sejong Institute; East Asia Institute.
This article was supported by NATO, but the authors are responsible for the content.