A US request for advice on the Australia’s stance in the event of a major crisis over Taiwan is being badly misunderstood. Australia isn’t being asked to hand over command of its armed forces, and it can satisfy the request with just in-principle guidance.

That’s all that the US would expect.

Australian commentators seemed surprised and affronted by the reported request by the undersecretary for policy in the Pentagon, Elbridge Colby.

‘Colby needs to get his own house in order before he starts making demands of alliance partners,’ said Peter Dean of the United States Studies Centre. ‘Alliances are also not transactional in this manner and no country should be giving away its sovereignty.’

The ABC’s Patricia Karvelas wrote, ‘It’s the equivalent of one partner in a marriage demanding that they receive an ironclad commitment that you will never leave them while they strongly reserve the right to walk out whenever they like.’

And Paul Kelly, a senior journalist at The Australian, asked in his commentary on 16 July, ‘Has the US had ever asked any other ally for such a statement of intent about future involvement in military conflict?’

But Colby was not asking the government to hand over its authority to commit Australia to war. And allies’ providing statements of intent about their involvements in future military conflicts is commonplace.

For instance, under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, all members of that alliance commit themselves to fight if any is attacked. Moreover, there are agreed plans for how allied forces would deploy, what strategies would be used, command arrangements and much else besides. Very similar allied commitments have long been in place in Korea. None of this combined planning and in-principle commitment abrogates the right of each government to redirect its forces if national priorities change.

Colby’s request concerning the Australian government’s intentions in the event of a crisis over Taiwan is unexceptional. Indeed, such guidance is needed for effective allied planning.

Few Australian commentators appear to understand the lead-up to the request. Colby, with whom I have had long professional association, has been commissioned not only to review the AUKUS agreement but also to prepare the new US National Defense Strategy. Both documents will be guided in part by how much the US can depend on its close Indo-Pacific allies in future crises.

To prepare these reports, Colby needs to know whether the US can rely on uninterrupted Australian intelligence flows in future crises. Can the US plan on unfettered access to Australian bases and facilities? Can it expect strong logistic support from Australia? How much combat support can the US plan on receiving from the Australian Defence Force? And can Washington assume that, if it exerts itself mightily to transfer three, four or five Virginia-class submarines to Australia from 2032 to 2042, those boats will be available for combined operations in a subsequent Indo-Pacific crisis?

These are perfectly reasonable questions for Colby to want clarified. He needs some in-principle advice before the new US National Defense Strategy and the AUKUS review can be written. A US strategy for future Indo-Pacific crises without in-principle Australian commitment would be markedly different to a US strategy with combined campaign planning in place. And bust-a-gut US efforts to supply the promised submarines to Australia will be much more likely if the Pentagon has a reasonable assurance that they will be available to support US operations in any major Indo-Pacific crisis in the 2030s.

So what should the Australian government do?

First, relevant officials should engage Colby in a positive manner. They should emphasise that, just as the US cannot easily make absolute commitments to many future contingencies without knowing the precise circumstances, nor can Australia.

Second, the government should reaffirm its strong commitment to all aspects of the ANZUS Treaty and that Australia will continue to support the planning, operations and other activities of the US and other allied forces in the Indo-Pacific.

Third, so the US and Australia can prepare for a range of possible security crises in the Indo-Pacific, the government should say it will make Australian personnel available to work with US staffs to prepare combined contingency plans. Australia will try to make high-value and innovative contributions to this work, it should say.

Fourth, the government must emphasise what both sides already know, that Australian military involvement in future security crises will always be determined by the Australian government of the day.

This type of response would fully protect Australian sovereignty and its decision prerogatives. It would be consistent with Australia’s decision-making in similar situations during the past century. Importantly, it would also reaffirm the continuing strength of the alliance between Australia and the US and reinforce its deterrence value.

According to a recent Lowy Institute Poll, 80 percent of Australians believe the alliance with the US is either important or very important for their country’s future security. Close allied cooperation in contingency planning is likely to be warmly applauded in both the US and Australia.