Chinese state media and diplomatic social media accounts intensified efforts to erode Japan’s standing as an Indo-Pacific defence and security partner in 2025, research by Japan Nexus Intelligence and ASPI shows. Whereas earlier campaigns ^[1] relied heavily on covert, coordinated and inauthentic networks, the latest findings reveal a shifting threat: Beijing is increasingly using overt, state-linked channels to push destabilising messaging into the regional information environment.

This shift serves several purposes. Overt messaging allows China to project its narratives with greater scale, legitimacy and weight, especially when targeting governments, local elites and media ecosystems in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. It also carries lower operational risk than covert influence campaigns. While covert networks remain active, their exposure by researchers and platforms’ takedown efforts have diminished their operational credibility.

In contrast, official diplomatic and state-media channels benefit from greater legitimacy and can reach larger audiences with fewer barriers, spreading their narratives further and more convincingly.

Indeed, the European Union’s 2023 report ^[2] on foreign information manipulation and interference found the use of formal diplomatic channels to be the most common content distribution technique. The 2025 EU report ^[3] noted that Beijing had used social media accounts to increase the reach of Chinese state media.

The latest example of this was a campaign to undermine Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi after she said that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could compel Japan to respond militarily. As part of this campaign, on 19 November the Chinese embassy in Australia posted four ^[4] videos ^[5] on ^[6] X ^[7] criticising Japan and Takaichi.

The transition from covert to overt operations also signals growing confidence. Pushing narratives through embassies, ambassadors and state media tends to normalise disinformation as an accepted part of diplomatic engagement. It also positions China’s messaging as a direct counter to the influence of Japan, the United States and other regional partners.

For Indo-Pacific governments, the nature of the threat is therefore changing. They now need to contest Chinese narratives which are delivered through official state channels and which blend propaganda and selective framings of history and geopolitics. These overt efforts can be more persuasive because of their apparent authority and amplification through formal diplomatic channels and because of their targeting of specific national sensitivities. The result is an information environment in which malign influence becomes more visible but also more complicated to rebut.

As Beijing asserts itself across the region, it is seeking to weaken relationships ^[1] that counterbalance its influence. Japan is particularly targeted because it is a US ally, a vocal supporter of Taiwan and the Philippines, and an increasingly active development and security partner in the Pacific.

Throughout 2025, Chinese state-affiliated outlets seeded narratives criticising Japan, which were shared on X by diplomatic channels to audiences across Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

China’s major narrative centred on the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, exploiting Japan’s wartime history to undermine its contemporary role. This underpinned recurring claims that Japan’s defence partnerships had undermined regional peace and that Tokyo was remilitarising the Indo-Pacific.

The Philippines and Fiji were prominent target audiences of these efforts. Chinese propaganda is active ^[8] in the Philippines as part of Beijing’s campaign against Manila in the South China Sea. In this case, the campaign aimed to isolate the Philippines by framing its partnerships with countries such as Japan as provocative and destabilising. China has also targeted Fiji, a diplomatic hub, using ^[9] social media to muddy the information environment and promote China’s local influence.

The WWII anniversary provided a focal point for these campaigns. Between January and October, references to ‘the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War’ surged to about 780,100 on X and in news coverage—up from around 16,800 in 2024—with a peak around China’s 3 September Victory Day parade.

Chinese embassies in Fiji ^[10], the Philippines ^[11] and Australia ^[12] amplified articles by China Daily ^[13],  Xinhua ^[14] and People’s Daily Online ^[15] respectively, criticising Japan’s historical conduct and portraying China as a peace-loving nation. Some pieces attempted to recast wartime history to align local narratives with Beijing’s, for example through references to the ‘joint resistance of Chinese, Australian peoples against Japanese aggression’. This tries to position China and partner countries on the same page against Japan.

In various X posts, the Chinese embassy in Manila referenced ^[16] countries ‘in Asia that endured brutal occupation and aggression from Japan, such as China, the Philippines, and Southeast Asian countries’; said ^[17] the ‘peoples of China and the Philippines, among other Asian nations, fought shoulder to shoulder against the Japanese aggressors during World War II’; and called ^[18] on Japan to ‘face up to and reflect on its history of aggression’ in order to ‘earn the trust of its Asian neighbors’.

State media reinforced these themes, linking Japan’s contemporary defence activities to alleged historical aggression. When then prime minister Shigeru Ishiba met NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte in April, a foreign ministry spokesperson argued Japan should ‘draw profound lessons from history’. These comments were then cited ^[19] in NetEase News.

An article ^[20] in China Military Online described Japan’s release of its space defence guidelines as evidence of a renewed military adventurism, encouraged by Washington. This was linked to the anniversary of WWII, saying the world must remember the lessons of history, remain vigilant against hegemonism and militarism, and safeguard global peace by resisting such forces. Responses such as these are common from Chinese outlets and paint Japanese security engagement as militarisation, creating a juxtaposed image of China as a peace-loving country.

China also targeted bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation. After Australia chose a Japanese design for a frigate program in August, Chinese state-owned outlet Ifeng argued ^[21] that Japan’s participation in the project reflected multiple strategic intentions. It said, ‘Japan aims to use this opportunity to build alliances, disrupt regional order and stability, and advance its own interests through a patchwork of military partnerships.’

Similarly, on 29 July the Chinese embassy in Manila posted ^[22] a statement from a Foreign Affairs Ministry press conference criticising Japan’s reported sale of elderly Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippines, accusing Manila of ‘colluding’ with extra-regional forces.

Such comments redefine the regional space to exclude extra-regional partners—usually the US but increasingly Japan—isolating countries such as the Philippines and reinforcing China’s position in the region.

In 2025, Japan conducted several joint military exercises, drawing Chinese criticism.

In response to Japan’s participation in exercise Talisman Sabre, conducted mainly in  and around Australia, China Military Online said ^[23] ‘it can be seen that Japan is enhancing its offensive military capabilities through regular participation in military exercises at home and abroad.’ The article argued that such activity undermined peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and endangered the post-war international order.

In an article responding to Bushido Guardian—a Japan-based exercise in which Japan, the US and Australia took part—China Military Online argued ^[24] that the three countries had built a joint training framework focused on stealth fighter operations, signalling deterrence and offensive intent. So, it asserted, the exercise destabilised the region.

In August 2024, the Chinese embassy in the Philippines shared ^[25] a Xinhua article ^[26] denouncing the US and Japan ‘engaging in military activities alongside the Philippines’ in the South China Sea. The article specifically called out a ‘recent joint military exercise between Japan and the Philippines’, accusing Japan of ‘stirring up troubles and muddying the waters’.

And in July, the Chinese embassy in Australia posted ^[27] a statement by a Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson criticising the US’s deployment of a Typhon medium-range missile system in Japan ‘under the pretext of joint military exercise’. The spokesperson claimed that ‘due to its history of militarist aggression, Japan’s military and security moves always draw close attention from its Asian neighbors’.

This approach reframes the Indo-Pacific security landscape to delegitimise contributions from countries such as Japan, while presenting China as the stabilising alternative.

In the Pacific, China used WWII comparisons to argue that Japan’s development assistance and defence engagement concealed militaristic ambition. Following Tokyo’s announcement of 60 billion yen in aid at the 2024 Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting, Chinese analysts claimed ^[28] Japan’s actions would ‘not bring true security’ and would only trigger countermeasures. Similar lines appeared in Xinhua commentary ^[29] on Japan-Pacific defence meetings, which accused Japan and the US of ‘militarising’ the region.

As China asserts its influence in the region, its efforts to delegitimise and isolate Indo-Pacific partners—including Japan—are likely to intensify and diversify. Covert networks will persist, but Beijing’s growing reliance on overt diplomatic and state-media channels means disinformation is increasingly delivered with official authority and tailored to local political sensitivities. This makes the threat more visible, but also more difficult to counter.

Western governments should anticipate renewed propaganda attacks on joint exercises, defence cooperation and development initiatives. This means that strategic communications highlighting the stabilising purpose of their engagement remain essential. Clear, proactive messaging—grounded in transparency, respect for regional agency and evidence of practical benefits—can help inoculate partners against China’s narratives and highlight the extent to which those narratives seek to erode, rather than enhance, regional stability.

This article is a product of a partnership between ASPI and Japan Nexus Intelligence addressing state-sponsored information operations and hybrid threats in the Indo-Pacific.